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The thesis evaluates the causality of inter-community conflict in the Niger Delta, notably in 
the core states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. In contrast to previous studies, this research uses 
its own detailed definition and delineation of Niger Delta Communities (NDCs), and the nature 
of inter-community conflict, to determine the social, economic and political factors that cause 
conflict between communities in the ND. A further key distinction between this study and 
previous research on the causality of conflict in the Niger Delta is the use of evidence and data 
gathered from leaders and residents involved first-hand in the conflict in the region. The study 
defines NDCs as inherently autonomous entities, since they were politically autonomous prior 
to colonisation. Non-native means of administration first introduced by European colonisers 
constrained these community’s autonomy, most recently under the system of Local 
Government Areas (LGAs). Corruption and mismanagement in local administration has 
alienated NDCs who mostly no longer trust the LGAs and have fallen back on traditional means 
of interacting with their neighbours which can involve the use of violent conflict to settle 
disputes. Hence, at the heart of inter-community conflict in the Niger Delta is the tension 
between the ‘traditional’ represented by the NDCs’ inherent autonomy and ancient practices 
and the ‘modern’ represented by the LGAs’ constitutional authority. The current constitutional 
administrative system in the Niger Delta blurs community autonomy and forces communities 
to interact in the geographical, political and legal space created by the LGA. The inability of 
LGA’s to provide adequate social, economic and political ‘goods’ for their citizens creates an 
environment where interaction between NDCs often involves competition for access to these 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
This thesis argues that Niger Delta Communities’ (NDCs) inherently autonomous nature, 
rekindled by the tension between traditional versus modern administrative systems, drives 
communities to enter inter-community conflict over diverse social, economic and political 
factors. These include social prestige, employment and political influence. The thesis also 
explores the definition of an NDC as an inherently autonomous political unit that constitutes 
political and geographical parts of a Local Government Area (LGA), and, in some cases, clans 
or kingdoms. At the core of this argument is the premise that once NDCs are defined for the 
thesis as traditional and inherently autonomous units on the basis that they were politically 
independent prior to colonisation, the introduction of modern LGAs, which supress this 
autonomy, becomes problematic. It fuses them into one political unit, making them interactive 
units within a single LGA required to share social, economic and political resources. This 
scenario gives rise to tension between the NDCs’ traditional, autonomous nature and 
independent way of dealing with one another, against the LGAs’ modern constitutional 
authority that blurs the communities’ autonomy and makes them socially, economically and 
politically part of the same overarching political and administrative construct without providing 
adequate benefits and amenities to ensure peaceful co-existence. The thesis argues that it is this 
conflict between the traditional and modern that is the driver of inter-community conflict in the 
Niger Delta (ND). 
The researcher’s interest in this topic arose from having grown up in the Niger Delta state (ND 
state) of Delta, and received a degree in Nigerian history from Delta State University (DSU). 
The researcher was understandably concerned about the persistent inter-community conflicts 
in his home region. These conflicts risked instability, disorder and under-development. Daily 
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activities and discussions on the topic made clear that conflict has meant under-investment in 
the region’s wider economy. Only when conflict is addressed can large-scale investment in the 
region occur. However, for conflict management to take place there needs to be a concrete 
understanding of the causes of the conflict. 
Inter-community conflict, also understood by this study as intergroup conflict, can be analysed 
within three broad areas: social, economic and political. Social theories explain inter-
community conflict in terms of identity competition by focussing on the central role of identity 
in the inception and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when economic and political factors 
are also at play (Seul, 1999). Individual and group identity competition is considered a by-
product of individuals’ efforts to satisfy their basic human needs, which may be described as 
psychological. Thus, collective determination often serves these psychological needs more 
comprehensively and potently than other repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the 
construction and maintenance of individual and group identities (Seul, 1999). Examples of 
violent intergroup conflicts instigated by this concept are those of the Balkans, Sudan, East 
Timor, and Sri Lanka. In other words, the concept of identity competition can be broken into 
three major sections: a sense of belonging, self-esteem and self-actualisation; these are the 
major phenomena that stir individuals to form groups and which affords them social protection 
against competitors. 
From the economic and political point of view, eco-political theories explain how economic 
benefits can be derived from achieving political power that subsequently fuels intergroup 
conflict. The government exercises prejudice about which economic benefits are conferred to 
different groups, and this is cited as the political rationale behind intergroup conflicts. Gudrun 
Ostby contends that groups form ethno-political organisations that are often used as symbols 
of shared identity and grievances, thus building a sense of common interest and enabling them 
to achieve their economic goals (2008). Lars-Erik Cederman et al. argue that countries with 
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high degrees of political exclusion are more likely to experience armed conflict between ethnic 
groups since the exclusion from political power of one group implies the economic degradation 
of its environment (Cederman et al., 2010). This idea is reinforced and exemplified by Arnim 
Langer, who states that in the Cote d’Ivoire in 1994 civil war erupted between the northern and 
southern regions because eco-political inequalities became prevalent. These inequalities were 
due to the denial of a northern presidential candidacy and a lack of allocation of funds to the 
north from the central government, which was ruled by southerners (Langer, 2004). 
Inter-community conflict in the ND can be broken down into three categories: social 
interactions amongst NDCs: the economic structure of the ND region; and inadequate political 
attributes to alleviate tension emanating from the previous two factors. However, the existing 
literature has not been able to convincingly link NDCs’ attitudes to social and eco-political 
theoretical explanations; therefore, it has not had any far-reaching effects on understanding the 
causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. Social theoretical explanations advanced by 
the existing literature as causes of inter-community conflict argue that social imbalance 
between ethnic groups is responsible for this conflict (Ukiwo, 2007). For example, inter-ethnic 
conflict between the Ijaws and Itsekiris is used to explain the conflict between the two NDCs 
emerging from each ethnic group. Social theories can also explain inter-community conflict 
through social injustice and inequity in the allocation of scarce resources by government 
officials and Multi National Corporations (MNCs) alike (Aghalino, 2009a). 
Economically, the existing literature argues that individual economic interests are a major 
factor in disputes between NDCs (Ikelegbe, 2005). For example, individuals pursuing their 
own selfish interests use community goals as a pretext, to try and achieve their own aims. In 
other words, whilst NDCs are deemed to be violently engaging one another over economic 
gains, Augustine Ikelegbe argues that just a few individuals are responsible for instigating these 
fights for selfish gains (2006). Ukoha Ukiwo subscribe to the view that oil proceeds lead to 
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ethnic marginalisation, which deteriorates into inter-community conflict (2007). Thus, socially 
and economically, Ukiwo explains the causes of inter-community conflict from the perspective 
of inter-ethnic strife. Similar to Ikelegbe’s economic argument, the existing literature argues 
that inter-community conflict occurs because individuals attempt to enrich themselves by 
gaining political power with the support of their community, which in turn gives them control 
over oil rents (Akpan, 2010). This exemplifies that what is viewed as political conflict between 
NDCs is in fact political conflict between individuals from different communities who are 
using inter-community conflict as a pretext. 
The research is concerned with the causes of inter-community conflict in the ND over the 
period 2003-2014. However, there are limitations in the scope of the research. Firstly, although 
there are nine ND states in the ND region, the study was restricted to the three ND states of 
Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. The findings in the study are drawn from the views of respondents 
in these three ND states. Data from other sources were reviewed to triangulate the evidence 
and data given by the respondents. 
Secondly, whilst some of the findings of the research might be applicable to other wider 
instances of inter-community and intergroup conflict, the research is focussed on the three 
states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The existing scholarly literature on the causes of inter-community conflict in the ND, whether 
in terms of social, economic or political relations, stresses the role of influential individuals 
and ethnicity. This research focusses, however, on NDCs as collective groups, arguing that the 
terms inter-ethnic or inter-personal conflict when used in analysis of the conflicts are really 
both referring to causes of inter-community conflict, and that this results from insufficient 
research into what constitutes a Niger Delta Community. Although inter-personal conflict is 
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perceived as a pretext through which certain individuals use community ambition to achieve 
their goals, that is, individuals pretending that they are representing the community’s interests 
when they are igniting inter-community conflict for personal benefits, it has not been clearly 
differentiated from inter-community conflict that emanates from conflicted interests amongst 
NDCs understood as different independent groups. For example, two groups of individuals 
belonging to different NDCs engaging in violent conflict is often confused with two 
independent communities in dispute. Similarly, ethnicities are understood as groups, and the 
term inter-ethnic is understood as intergroup, which invariably means that it is confused with 
communities, which are another form of group. 
The main aim of the thesis is to determine the causes of inter-community conflict in the Niger 
Delta between 2003 and 2014. To accomplish this over-arching aim, three objectives have been 
formulated:  
1) To define and delineate Niger Delta Communities. 
2) To determine the nature and scope of inter-community conflict. 
3) To evaluate the social, economic, and political forces shaping inter-community conflict. 
In turn, these subsidiary objectives have been further divided. 
1) To define and delineate Niger Delta Communities.  
 The characteristics of an NDC. 
 The difference between modern NDCs and ancient communities in the ND. 
 The difference between discrete NDCs. 
2) To determine the nature and scope of inter-community conflict.  
 The characteristics of the Niger Delta environment. 
6 
 
 The respective roles of the Local Government Areas and the NDCs in instigating 
conflict.  
The culture of governance in the ND. 
3) To evaluate the social, economic, and political forces shaping inter-community 
conflict. 
 Social, economic, and political forces shaping inter-community conflict.  
 Social, economic and political factors underpinning inter-community relations.  
 The role of social, economic, and political factors that influences and leads to inter-
community conflict in the ND. 
1.3 Plan of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. This brief introduction sets out the main overarching 
aim, the subsidiary objectives and the core research questions. The second chapter presents a 
review of the scholarly literature including the broader issue of community conflict and the 
sub-set of inter-community conflict. It assesses the concept of community, as well as the types 
of conflict under research. It provides a historical context to the current traditional and 
organisational structure of NDCs and violent forms of dispute resolution, showing how the 
political economy of oil and dissatisfaction with the role of the elders brought the youths into 
the structure of community governance that subsequently fuels violence between communities. 
It goes on to explore why the causes of inter-community conflict in the ND remain under-
researched, and constructed a definition of an NDC to achieve the aim of the study.  The chapter 
then explores the current academic thinking regarding the nature and scope of inter-community 
conflict in the ND and the forces shaping the violence between two communities.  
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Chapter 3, builds on the under-examined areas identified in the preceding literature review, 
advances a fundamental analytical framework that acts as a hypothesis which will be tested in 
the subsequent analytical chapters. The second part of the same chapter focuses on a 
methodology suitable for understanding the causal factors behind inter-community conflict in 
the ND.  
Chapter 4 describes an NDCs’ relationship with the LGA and with other NDCs with an 
overview of the institutions surrounding LGAs and ND states, and how NDCs belonging to the 
same jurisdiction are dependent on LGAs for the regulation of their social, economic and 
political activities. It sets out the constitutional role of the LGAs, including the limitations of 
its jurisdiction over resolution of conflicts. It explores the relationship between inter-
community conflict and intergroup conflict from the perspective of a community as a form of 
‘group’. Additionally, social, economic and political factors, analysed in relation to intergroup 
conflict, are applied to isolate the causes of inter-community conflict. It also highlights conflict 
activities within the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers that are the geographical locus 
of the research and follows a timeline of key conflicts in the ND between 2003 and 2014. The 
chapter sets out that conflict starts either by inter-personal dispute i.e. conflict between 
opposing community members, disagreement between NDCs’ ethnic groups, or a rational 
decision made by a community as an autonomous entity.   
Chapter 5 explores the under-researched area of definition, analysing and evaluating the 
empirical evidence to move beyond the different definitional layers of an NDC to formulate a 
structural definition that will be functional for the study. The chapter will define NDCs from 
geographical, political, historical and cultural perspectives, through investigating arguments 
that go beyond scholars’ understanding of NDCs as kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages 
(Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 2003), kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), sub-ethnic 
groups (Ikelegbe, 2006) and people with common interests (Frynas, 2000). It evaluates these 
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overlapping terms using data from the respondents interviewed as part of the study to 
disaggregate scholars’ understanding of NDCs. The chapter also explores Alagoa’s argument 
that ancient clans and kingdoms that existed prior to European advent remain communities in 
the ND (Alagoa, 1971). The chapter explores the argument that current NDCs are not the same 
as clans and kingdoms that existed prior to European advent in the ND, as claimed by Alagoa, 
but that both sustain similar characteristics of autonomy. It then evaluates the definition of an 
NDC by investigating whether modern communities are the same as, or constitute geographical 
and traditional structures of, ancient clans or kingdoms. 
Chapter six analyses empirical data on the nature and scope of inter-community conflict in the 
ND by evaluating the characteristics of the Nigerian government as it relates to the nature and 
inter-relations of NDCs. It analysed and explored primary and secondary data on the 
relationship between LGAs and NDCs in the nine ND states, and determined that the 
constitutional practices and bye-laws in the states show that Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers have 
stronger ties with their NDCs than the other six ND states. In other words, inter-community 
conflict in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers are more likely to be influenced by LGAs than the other 
ND states, since their LGAs are more active in inter-community relations. The chapter 
evaluates arguments that lay the blame for inter-community conflict in the ND on corruption, 
poor governance and poverty (Watts, 2007). It argues that there are other features that lead to 
violent inter-community conflict in the ND, including the inefficacy of LGAs’  role in 
maintaining peaceful inter-community relations due to their untrustworthiness as a result of  
being  artificial ‘modern’ constructs that becomes a relative factor that facilitates the social, 
economic and political factors leading to NDCs’ resorting to traditional violent ways of settling 
disputes, and corruption within LGAs’ which allows the marginalisation of one community by 
another due to the modern administrative system whereby NDCs now are forced by the 
Constitution to interact within the same LGA. The research argues that the combination of both 
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these realities help breeds the social, economic and political factors that causes inter-
community conflict, and as such produces a dilemma of modernity against the traditional. The 
chapter analyses the direct impact of LGAs and ND states on NDCs and how NDCs have lost 
trust in these modern means of governance. The loss of trust on the LGAs is largely the result 
of the prevalence of corruption as an accepted culture that allows some NDCs to marginalise 
others over shared resources. The issue of the forced interaction of NDCs within the same 
LGAs necessitates an assessment of whether communities inevitably interact because of 
geographical proximity and the constitutional role of LGAs.  
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 analyse empirical evidence on forces shaping inter-community violence. 
Each of these chapters analyses the social, economic and political factors respectively, and how 
these force NDCs to interact considering their status as geographical and political subdivisions 
of LGAs. These chapters analyse social, economic, and political factors respectively, and 
explore how they interact. They evaluate arguments from scholars in this field from the social, 
economic and political perspectives respectively. Their arguments are based on the notion that 
inter-community conflict arises from differences in ethnicity or individual motives. For 
example, from a social perspective Ukiwo (2007) contends that inter-ethnic inequalities cause 
inter-community conflict; Ikelegbe (2005) argues that certain individuals ignite inter-
community conflict for their selfish economic benefits; Akpan (2010) maintains that 
individuals attempting to gaining political power through the backing of their community, 
accounts for inter-community conflict. Chapter 7, 8, and 9 disagree with these scholars and 
analyses how NDCs’ inherent autonomous nature rekindled by the traditional versus modern 
values can drive to inter-community conflict in the ND. Chapter 7, evaluates social factors such 
as community higher status and identity, and explores the traditional advantages why NDCs 
resort to violent means of settling disputes rather than believing in the rule of law; Chapter 8 
scrutinises economic factors such as wealth, land and water resources; and Chapter 9 
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investigates political factors such as the contest for councillorship and chairmanship positions. 
These chapters analyse these factors from the same viewpoint that NDCs’ inherently 
autonomous nature, ignited by tradition versus modernity, propels such actions.   
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Chapter 2: Understanding Inter-Community Conflict in the Niger 
Delta 
Introduction 
Concerns over marginalisation and conflict in the Niger Delta (Omonfonmwan & Odia, 2009) 
emerged soon after the discovery of crude oil in 1956 at Oloibiri. In the wake of this discovery 
and the subsequent exploitation of the oil reserves, regionalism introduced in the Nigerian 1954 
constitution to tackle community and regional conflict were being challenged and new ideas 
and concepts introduced including the creation of new ND states, developmental programmes 
and a conflict resolution scheme (Omotola, 2007) which sought to focus on the alleviation of 
causality of inter-community conflict. The focus of this chapter is to scrutinise the literature on 
inter-community conflict and the theories connected to this conflict, identifying the gaps in this 
literature.  
The chapter explores a variety of scholarly definitions of NDCs, delineates the environment in 
which conflicts occur, and explores existing rationales for inter-community conflict in the ND 
whilst critiquing the methods which scholars have adopted to study this phenomenon. It argues 
that the current literature undervalues NDCs as traditional and inherent autonomous units, and 
the role of modern Nigerian LGAs in blurring communities’ autonomy and does not employ 
specific detailed methods to investigate the political processes intrinsic to inter-community 
conflict. These three elements are at the heart of the scholarly debate over conflict between 
NDCs, and they are used to explore the gaps in the existing literature. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Following a short introduction, the chapter categorises 
and defines where NDCs sit in the typology of Nigerian territorial entities, and the specific 
definition and nature of NDCs, including how the understanding of what constitutes a 
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‘community’ has evolved over time. It explores the historical context on how NDC’s 
governance evolved from elderly patriarchy system to a democratic process that includes 
youth’s participation, and how such evolution and crude oil activities influenced the situation 
of violent inter-community conflict in the ND. The following section explores the types of 
conflict prevalent in the ND, ultimately focusing on the nature of conflicts between 
communities. A further section explicitly assesses scholarly debates concerning the causality 
of inter-community conflict in the ND, highlighting gaps in the literature, which form the basis 
for the core research questions underpinning the aim, objectives and methodology of the thesis. 
2.2 Conceptualising and Explaining Terminologies 
To understand what constitutes a NDC it is necessary to acknowledge their existence within 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). The FRN is a sovereign state in West 
Africa that became independent from Britain in 1960 (Adamolekun, 2005), and consists of 36 
states, including Abuja, the federal capital territory. Each of these states contains administrative 
districts, known as LGAs, with one LGA designated as a state capital. In this manner, each 
LGA has territories known as communities, with a community hosting the LGA’s headquarters 
(Anyanwu, 1999). However, the FRN only recognises three constitutional tiers of government. 
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) administers national affairs from the federal capital 
territory, while the states and LGAs administer their territories from their respective capitals 
and headquarters, rendering the community tier a more ambiguous and indefinite layer of 
‘governance’. 
The FGN constitutes the central political unit with the president of the country as the head 
overseeing federal affairs. Next in the political hierarchy are the 36 states, with each having a 
governor as head, administering designated administrative sectors within the state’s territory. 
These 36 states are spread over the middle-belt, northern, western, eastern and southern parts 
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of the FRN. Nine states – Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and 
Rivers – constitute the ND states and the ND region, referred to as the South-South geopolitical 
zone of the country. The third political unit of the FRN is represented by the LGAs located 
within each state, each having a chairman as its head (Adamolekun, 2005; Anyanwu, 1999). 
The nine ND states and their respective LGAs constitute the geographical boundary for this 
thesis. 
The physical geography of the ND comprises coastal lowlands and water-marshland, 
tributaries, creeks and lagoons of the southernmost ends of Nigeria that drain the Niger River 
into the Atlantic at the Bight of Bonny (Ibeanu, 2000). At its core are the six riverine ND states 
of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Ondo and Rivers (Ukiwo, 2007). In 2000, the 
Obasanjo administration added three states – Abia, Edo and Imo – increasing the number of 
states in the South-South geopolitical zone to nine (Aghalino, 2009b). These nine ND states 
cover 112,000 sq. kms, and include 27 million people from over 40 ethnic groups, administered 
within 185 LGAs, including 13,329 NDCs. Around 94% of the NDCs have fewer than 5,000 











Figure 2.1 Political Map of the Niger Delta  
 
Source: ND Link (2017) 
The ND is best known for the reserves of crude oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) within 
its borders, first discovered at Oloibiri in 1956 (Omonfonmwan & Odia, 2009). This oil and 
LNG has been the mainstay of the independent Nigeria’s economy. This made the country, as 
at 2014, the largest oil producer in Africa, and the world’s fourth leading exporter of LNG in 
2012. Most of this oil and LNG goes to the United States and other Western oil-importing 
countries (EIA, 2014; Obi, 2009). 
The relationship between oil and conflict has become a recurrent theme within the scholarly 
literature. Cyril Obi states that the ‘resource curse explains causes of violent conflicts by 
demonstrating how huge natural resource endowments, rather than brighten the prospects for 
development, paradoxically motivate people to struggle over resources, or act as an incentive 
for armed groups to engage in conflict to exploit the opportunity to loot’ (2009, p.6). He relates 
this to the intermittent violent turmoil in the ND when attempting to understand drivers of 
conflict in the region. In the same way, Augustine Ikelegbe, analysing causes of conflict in the 
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ND, states that ‘an economy of conflict has emerged characterised with an intense, violent and 
bloody struggle for the appropriation of oil resources and benefits from the oil economy and a 
thriving market of illegal trading and smuggling of arms, crude and refined oil’ (2005, p.209). 
These scholars’ linkages of oil resources and conflict in the ND not only indicate the huge 
importance of crude oil resources in the area, but also highlight the connections between oil 
production and violence within the main oil-producing states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. 
These are considered the most conflict-prone zones, recording the highest levels of community 
conflict amongst the nine ND states (UNDP Report, 2006). Accordingly, the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) ‘Noteworthy Inter-Communal Conflicts in the Most 
Conflict-Prone States of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers’ (UNDP Report, 2006, p.116) illustrates 
that Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers are the most conflict-prone ND states, with 56 conflicts between 
1997 to 2006, which is double the number of conflicts in their sister states in the ND put 
together (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). Among these conflicts, inter-community conflict is a major 
concern regarding oil-related issues. Accordingly, Ikelegbe states that ‘apart from issues of 
ownership of land and water, there have been conflicts between and within communities over 
the distribution and control of pay-outs and compensations by the Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) for appropriated and polluted land and water and related benefits’ (2005, p.220). This 
indicates that NDCs constitute parties engaging in violent conflict in the area. However, before 
reviewing what motivates NDCs to engage in violent conflict, it is necessary to understand the 
scholars’ definition of an NDC. 
Defining and determining the nature of NDCs has been controversial and problematic, 
especially when there seems to be a difference between current and ancient communities, that 
is NDCs that existed during and after the Nigerian colonial era and those that predate 
colonialism. Currently, NDCs are not recognised as constitutional municipalities with 
administrative powers by the Nigerian constitution, although Joab Peterside has described them 
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as units that have their own social, economic and political structures (2007). Accordingly, 
Peterside states that a NDC consists of ‘general characteristics of a customary system including 
inalienability of land, the head of the community, chieftaincy house or family holds land in 
trust for his people and his consent is essential to any disposition of land…these rules are not 
framed in abstract, rather reflecting the social and economic, sometimes political structure and 
perspective of communities’ (2007, p.10). He also argues that a NDC’s membership is 
understood to be in the form of kinship, which he describes as ‘a cultural system whereby social 
identity derives from membership of a group who trace their origin or descent to a common 
ancestor, and this membership or arrangement with members of a group provides access to land 
and resources’ (Peterside, 2007, p.8). Thus, the identification of NDCs having social, economic 
and political structures suggests that they have some system of administrative units within 
them, and the idea of membership in the form of kinship depicts an organised territorial group. 
Communities in the ND are also classified as sub-ethnic groups which occupy a given territory 
within the wider ethnic group to which they belong (Ikelegbe, 2006). Further scholarly attempts 
to define NDCs include describing them as clans or kingdoms composed of families, or 
extended families with kinship lineage, sharing the same dialect, territory, administrative 
structures, policies, and clan heads or kings. In other words, NDCs have been described as 
kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages (Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans or kingdoms 
(Ibaba, 2009), sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006), and people with common interests (Frynas, 
2000). Although scholars describe NDCs in different forms, their definitional status remains 
blurred, with the terms used by scholars having little or no similarities. 
Ebiegberi Alagoa describes the above terms as follows. A village is mostly found in rural areas, 
and consists of a small group of 15 to 20 houses, normally traditionally built using raffia or 
mud, with bamboo sticks serving as the roof top. A town is understood to be a densely 
populated area, larger than a village and smaller than a city; a town is more inclined towards 
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modern socio-economic activities using modern technology, rather than the traditional non-
mechanised methods used in the countryside. Major metropolitan areas known as cities, with 
modern and diversified commercial activities, are busier than towns. In the ND, ‘cities’ include 
Port Harcourt, Warri, and Yenegoa (Alagoa, 2005). Similarly, Ikelegbe describes a clan or 
kingdom as a group of people with a common identity headed by a clan head or king, depending 
on the case. For example, the Biseni clan has a clan head, while the Itsekiri kingdom has a king, 
with both self-identifying a unique language, culture and tradition. Aside from clans or 
kingdoms, there are ethnic or tribal groups located within LGAs, known as sub-ethnic or sub-
tribal groups possessing characteristics such as the same language, culture and customs, and 
conflict between such groups is popularly described as inter-community (Ikelegbe, 2005), 
thereby indicating that NDCs are sub-ethnic groups. Referring to NDCs as comprising people 
with common interests, George Frynas implies that these ‘interests’ reflect the physical and 
human environment of the communities that the people inhabit: rural village communities or 
oil-producing communities (2000). In a different way, Peterside understand the context and 
definition of a NDC: through its intrinsic administrative structure, it is administered by a 
presiding elder male chief with the assistance of other co-equal elder chiefs (2007). Thus, 
current NDCs are understood to consist of administrative sections of elder chiefs and youths, 
with scholars, as previously mentioned, describing a community as kinship units (Peterside, 
2007), villages (Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 2003), kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), 
sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006) and people with common interests (Frynas, 2000). 
Although this description of current NDCs is hard to grasp in terms of what defines it, ancient 
communities appear to have had different characteristics. 
Ancient NDCs are understood to be those communities that existed prior to the Nigerian 
colonisation and its current political dispensation. Alagoa (1971), Gwylim Jones (1963) and 
Robin Horton (2013) argue that NDCs are ancient ND clans or kingdoms settled in village 
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structures prior to the arrival of Europeans in the region. These NDCs evolved over time to 
become present-day communities with their own territories, administrative structures and 
policies. Accordingly, ancient NDCs in the central western part of the ND, prior to European 
contact in the fourteenth century, were communities or clans/kingdoms based on the village 
structure, exercising political autonomy in a politically anarchic world, and relating with one 
another diplomatically to avoid or mitigate inter-community conflict (Alagoa, 1971). Similarly, 
Jones analysing the history of the south-eastern ND people, regarded the Ijaw and Ibibio sub-
ethnic groups (understood by Ikelegbe in the present-day ND as communities) as primitive 
sovereign states lacking central authority, wherein their settlement structure is understood to 
be a system that constantly witnesses contested territorial boundary control (1963). Horton 
complements this view in his assessment of the eastern ND political development during the 
early period of trading with the Europeans, by stressing that the region comprised a quasi-
confederation consisting of diverse groups with equivalent political sects upholding a 
monocratic system of its own, which an influential political leader tries to dominate and turn 
into a confederation. Consistent failures to establish confederations by influential political 
leaders resulted in these groups coalescing into communities whose autonomy is tied in with 
their identity (Horton, 2013). These historical analyses suggest that communities in the ND 
often predate the advent of colonialism and the current Nigerian political dispensation, and that 
they were autonomous at that time. This then presents a disparity between current and ancient 
NDCs. Thus, whilst current NDCs are not autonomous, but under the jurisdiction of LGAs, 
ancient communities were autonomous with no overarching political government at that time. 
Accordingly, ancient communities are described as having a complete autonomous 
administrative system. 
Alagoa, analysing the Ijaw communities in the central ND, argues that ancient NDCs were self-
contained and autonomous political units operating a patriarchy system. Politically, he 
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describes the autonomous community structure to be the Amagula (village assembly), 
comprised of adult males forming the highest political unit, presided by the Amaokosowei 
(oldest male) and supported by a handpicked Ogulasowei (executive leader). Spiritually, the 
village was led by the Orukarowei (priest), and economically, farmlands resided in (wari) 
family lineages. Village or community political autonomy was complete, with inter-village 
disputes being settled by the Pere (high priest) of the Ibe (gods), but the high priest had no 
overall political leadership and significance to the villages involved (Alagoa, 1971). Thus, 
Alagoa’s interpretation of the pre-colonial community indicates that, although autonomous, a 
high priest would mediate in times of inter-village dispute. Though he states that the high priest 
had no overall political influence over the villages involved in dispute, the idea of settling 
disputes suggests that the high priests wielded some sort of influence over the villages, thereby 
undermining ancient communities’ complete autonomy. However, it is necessary to understand 
that Alagoa’s work concerns the Ijaw ethnic group in the central ND, which is a section of the 
ND, and the high priest’s significance is viewed as being more religious than political. 
Jones, analysing political development of the south-eastern ND in the eighteenth century, 
argues that: 
Whether it be the Ibo, Ibibio, or other peoples of the hinterland, or the Ijaw and 
Andoni of the delta, one finds them dispersed over the territory in a vast number of 
relatively small and virtually independent local communities, which today average 
5,000 Ibo people, about 500 Ibibio and 250 or less among the Ijaw…each of these 
units, which one can call either village groups or villages according to their size, had 
its own territory and government (Jones, 1962, p.16). 
Emphasising Alagoa’s argument of community autonomy in the ND that predates colonialism, 
Jones reiterates the same quality of autonomy in the south-eastern region, stating that 
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eighteenth-century communities were independent, with their own territory and government. 
Although, it should be noted that the high priest in Alagoa’s description of inter-village or 
community dispute does not apply to Jones’ explanation of independent communities, hence 
ancient NDCs are perceived to have different types of autonomous political structure from one 
part of the ND to another. 
In the eastern ND, Horton argues that ancient communities before transatlantic trade’ ‘defined 
their village by its territorial isolation from other communities, by its political autonomy under 
a distinctive body of village laws, and above all by its possession of a distinctive culture or way 
of life’ (2013, pp.41-42). Thus, the western, central, south-eastern and eastern ancient ND 
communities were politically autonomous, with their own unique laws and distinctive culture, 
embodying their peculiar administration. These autonomous ancient villages, communities or 
political groups are claimed to be what are now the present-day NDCs of Nembe Ogbolomabri, 
Nembe Bassambri, Opuama, Ofonobiri, Okpoama, Ewoama and Okere, located in the ND 
states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers (Bisina, 2003; Ibaba, 2009). These predate European 
encounters, and have engaged in violent conflict with one another. However, the nature of the 
NDC as autonomous is muddied by the existence of current non-autonomous communities 
founded in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
Although the term ‘community’ is used to describe territorial units before and after the advent 
of European colonisation of the ND, there is a clear distinction between the nature of ancient 
and current communities regarding their autonomy. Thus, whilst ancient communities are 
regarded as autonomous, current NDCs are viewed as not having autonomy, since they are 
subjugated to LGAs under the Nigerian constitution. Such subjugation is perceived by Walter 
Rodney as being the ultimate result of changes to the traditional governance practices 
introduced by Europeans arriving along the Nigerian coastal areas that are not part of the ND 
region (2012).  The European activities in the Nigerian coastal areas influenced the nature of 
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its inhabitants as they evolved over time (Curtin, 1973; Diffie, 1977). Thus, clarity on the 
evolution from ancient to current NDCs necessitates understanding the term ‘community’ and 
how it applies to different phenomena, as well as the changes applied to it over time. 
To understand the evolution of the term ‘community’, Ferdinand Toennies and Jose Harris’s 
theory of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, or community and society, is adopted. Thus, whilst 
Gemeinschaft represents the local, traditional, small-scale kinship and neighbourhood-based 
communities, Gesellschaft represents broad-scale competitive societies (2001). In other words, 
the evolution of the word ‘community’ is the evolution of society, thereby interchanging the 
terms. For Toennies and Harris, evolution of a society or community means a shift from 
equanimity to competitiveness (2001). Other scholars of social change such as Max Weber, 
Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels refer to the constant evolution of ‘society’, 
with tradition and religious practice naturally replaced by modernity and rationality (Agrawal 
& Gibson, 1999). Others sought to impose a chronology on societal change: ‘underdeveloped’, 
‘developing’ and ‘developed’ (Bender, 1978; Parsons, 1966). However, Gemeinschaft, for 
Toennies and Harris, implies qualities such as small numbers of people, familiarity and 
emotional bonds, all of which are found in a small village community where people live like 
extended family. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, implies many people, unfamiliarity and 
competition, found typically in modern society (Toennies & Harris, 2001). In this light, the 
word ‘community’ in the wider aspect is perceived to be ever-evolving, and therefore involves 
complex characteristics as time passes. Accordingly, these views indicate that whilst ancient 
communities reflect simple activities, current communities involve complex societal life, with 
changes contingent on activities that transpired during its evolution. 
Thus, relating simple activities and complex societal life to understanding ancient and current 
NDCs suggests that resounding changes have occurred over time, subsequently affecting their 
evolution. These changes can be viewed from the notion that there is a distinction between the 
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‘political’ and ‘cultural’ life of NDCs before and after contact with their European counterparts. 
The Europeans, notably the British, brought cultural artefacts such as written documents and 
libraries, in other words European education, that was in stark contrast to existing political and 
cultural processes of the Nigerian people (Alegbeleye, 1998). Prior to contact with European 
education, ND indigenes were mostly illiterate, and history was communicated to generations 
through memory and story-telling, with individual story-tellers playing a vital role in storing 
and transforming information (Meyer, 2005). Thus, the introduction of European education to 
the ND’s story-telling practice is considered an evolutionary process, introducing complexity 
to ancient NDCs. Apart from the introduction of European education, there was also the 
emergence of a new political system involving colonialism and constitutional rule, to which 
the inhabitants were not accustomed. 
Colonialism brought about the amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria, and stripped 
ancient NDCs of their autonomy, subjecting them to British colonial rule. The constitutions of 
Lord Lugard (1914), Macpherson (1922, 1946, 1951) and Littleton (1954) recognised the role 
of constitutional chiefs as community and traditional leaders, but did not provide them with 
any political power. The 1954 constitution also established the then Crown Colony of Nigeria’s 
regional political structures, which the FRN continued to employ after gaining independence 
in 1960 (Otite, 1975; Rodney, 2012). This is indicated by the newly introduced educational and 
political activities which brought complexity to ancient NDCs, as well as the evolution of their 
traditional autonomous pre-European patriarchy system of government, practised by old ND 
villages, replaced by the democratic and dependent administration practised by current NDCs.  
The historical context to the current organisational structure of NDCs and traditional forms of 
dispute resolution date to pre-colonial times. This structure has evolved over time in ways that 
demonstrate how the dissatisfaction with the older generation’s inefficient leadership, 
encouraged younger people into community governance. More so, the involvement of the 
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youth in community organisation came after colonialism had ended, and when the exploration 
of oil was exacerbating conflict in the ND (Obi, 2009), thereby heightening the willingness of 
NDCs to engage in inter-community conflict. Though NDCs’ current traditional organisational 
structure is dependent on the constitutional administration of LGAs, the introduction of 
democratic governance is mainly associated with the youth. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, current NDCs are administered by a presiding elder male chief with the assistance of 
other co-equal elder chiefs (Peterside, 2007). These elder male chiefs are recognised as the 
heads (older males aged 50 and above) of the larger extended families who trace their origin to 
a common ancestor, thereby making it difficult for the youth and non-descendants of a 
dominant lineage to become chiefs (Peterside, 2007). 
The administrative duties of these male chieftaincies lacked authority in the colonial 
constitutions of 1914, 1922, 1946, 1951 and 1954, as well as the post-colonial FRN 
constitutions of 1979, 1993 and 1999, leaving NDCs as units within LGAs. Community 
leaderships are integrated to the FRN as an administrative extension to address detailed NDC 
issues (Peterside, 2007). However, as an institution, the chieftaincy had played an active 
administrative role during the colonial period when, as part of the indirect system developed 
by the British, chiefs had acted as warrant chiefs, tax collectors and customary law jurists 
(Afigbo, 1972; Ikime, 1968). Following independence, these chiefs, who were mostly elders 
of a kinship lineage, continued to claim compensation in the form of cash, employment, 
security and development contracts from the FGN, as well as the MNCs, from 1960 until the 
early 1990s. For example, in 1998, Elf’s project in the Obite community and Agip’s operational 
compound in the Egbema community were known to pay money, often categorised as 
‘corporate social responsibility’ to the local chiefs of their respective host NDCs (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998). These payments have been the focus of accusations of mismanagement 
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and corruption directed towards the respective elder male chiefs, who sometimes used it to 
enrich themselves.  
Thus, according to community members, contractors, and oil industry employees spoken to by 
Human Rights Watch, ‘much development spending gets diverted into the pockets of oil 
company employees or local contractors or chiefs, or is spent to pay off those who might 
otherwise be troublemakers’ (Human Rights Watch, 1988). In 1990, this personal enrichment, 
at the expense of the inhabitants of the NDCs that the elder male chiefs were meant to represent, 
led to demands, backed by menaces from marginalised youths within the NDCs, for the 
dismantling of the hierarchical chieftaincies. This led to the establishment of democratic youth 
administrative sections comprising a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Provost and 
Treasurer elected by members of the community in all NDCs. Ostensibly, this was to ensure a 
fair share of community benefits for all NDC residents, and notably to ensure that wealth 
percolated down from the layer of preferred elders to the deeper community (Peterside, 2007). 
These youth administrative sections are outside the constitutional governance arrangements, 
but are nevertheless recognised as part of the political life of the community, and have become 
a key delineator of the heightened violent dispute between NDCs.  
The injection of youths into the power structure has added the enthusiasm and vigour of youth 
to the way NDCs deal with one another. Such youthful vigour, however, can easily transmute 
into militancy and, is not immune from corruption (Zalik, 2004). This stems from the notion 
that it is the youth that make up the clear majority of the membership of the militant groups in 
the ND whose main motivation is to access oil money. Historically, youths made up the 
soldiery of precolonial communities, the ones would raid neighbouring NDCs for slaves to be 
traded in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade (Aghalino, 2009). The involvement of youths in both 
precolonial and current times of inter-community dispute has an association with illegal and/or 
illicit commercial activities. Conflicts driven by greed are hard to handle.  
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In the historical context NDC governance, the approach to traditional forms of dispute 
resolution between communities has often been more violent than diplomatic. In precolonial 
times, the communities in the central ND with peaceful relations are usually those communities 
with strong trade ties (Dike, 2008). Disputes about boundaries, cultural differences and trading 
rights with precolonial European traders were often settled with violence with the victor 
winning the right to trade, whilst the vanquished community is excluded (Aghalino, 2009). The 
diplomatic approach was mainly adopted when the NDCs involved in the conflict perceived 
themselves to be militarily equal, with the diplomacy conducted in the context of military 
deterrence. For example, the dispute between the Ijaw communities and Itsekiri communities 
over trading rights with the precolonial European Trans-Atlantic traders in the seventeenth 
century were settled by separating the sea ports (Aghalino, 2009).  
Precolonial dispute resolution between NDCs reflect of the current situation where NDCs’ self-
interest drives them to marginalise one another to fulfil their social, economic and political 
ambition. The peaceful resolution of disputes often occurs when those involved have the 
capacity to militarily engage each other.        
However, what status do NDCs created under, or even since, colonialism hold? For example, 
NDCs such as Okere-Urhobo, founded in 2003 after Nigerian independence, and Kilama, 
founded in 1927 during colonialism, cannot be said to have had an autonomous status prior to 
colonialism, as they did not officially exist at that time. Clarification is required in the form of 
a holistic definition of NDCs suitable for achieving the aim of the thesis, which will aid 
understanding of what constitutes ancient and current communities, in terms of how they differ, 
remain the same or are juxtaposed. This constitutes a major task of the thesis to be undertaken 
and addressed in chapter 5, whilst subsequent chapters evaluate how the NDC’s definition 
relates to the causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. However, it is necessary to 
comprehend the kind of conflict the thesis seeks to understand. 
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According to Roy Lewicki et al., ‘conflict implies incompatible goals between interdependent 
people and interference from each person(s) in realising those goals’ (1992). This kind of 
conflict involves a scenario where one person seeks personal interests at the expense of another, 
and therefore differs from Stuart Schmidt and Thomas Kochan’s (1972) view, defining conflict 
as opposing interests involving limited resources, thus, in the process of achieving these 
interests, frustration becomes an inevitable result. From a different perspective, Karen Jehn and 
Corinne Bendersky (2003) view conflict as incompatibilities between involved parties, just as 
Morton Deutsch et al. (2011) explain conflict as incompatible activities where one person’s 
actions obstruct the other. From these scholars’ viewpoints, conflict is a negative phenomenon 
which is understood and demonstrated by violence, break-ups, sanctions and destructive factors 
during the process of individual parties pursuing their personal interests. 
To the contrary, drawing on Deutsch and Robert Krauss, Dean Tjosvold argues that conflict 
can be constructive in structuring relationships when it is managed cooperatively (Tjosvold, 
2006). Cooperative factors provide opportunities to enable consensus, whilst the competitive 
factors produce the disagreements that withhold these opportunities (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962). 
Tjosvold (2006) suggests that cooperative conflict helped Hong Kong managers to resolve 
major budget issues by discussing their divergent issues cooperatively, which led them to deal 
with their prejudice effectively and consequently resulted in effectively utilising available 
limited financial resources. Similarly, Joseph Nye and David Welch’s (2013) idea of 
cooperation in relation to conflict is concerned with conflict management, thereby positioning 
Tjosvold’s concept of cooperative conflict as a better means to manage conflict and not to 
define it. Nye and Welch, in analysing the term, identify it as any time two or more entities (a 
person, people, groups, communities, states, nations and organisations) have different 
preferences as to what constitutes conflict; some of these conflicts escalate into violence, while 
some manifest more peacefully (Nye & Welch, 2013). Whilst Tjosvold’s concept of conflict 
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mainly concerns how it can lead to cooperation and subsequent positive outcomes, Nye and 
Welch’s view is that conflict can bring about cooperation as well as disagreement, which can 
result in a positive or negative outcome. 
Conflict in the ND can be understood through Nye and Welch’s notion of ‘different 
preferences’, which bring violent conflict between parties with negative outcomes. Different 
preferences are understood to be differences in interests, wants/needs, orientations and ideas 
embedded in all levels of economic and social interactions in daily life. Relating to daily 
interactions, conflict is perceived as a necessary creative mechanism, constructing change by 
constraining and creating incentives in human relations from which new outcomes are achieved 
(Okoh, 2007). These outcomes can be defined in negative or positive terms, the former when 
the outcome is undesirable and violent, which tends to be destructive, and the latter when it is 
peaceful and wisely handled, which often leads to economic and social progress (Okoh, 2007). 
Undesirability often results from improper handling of difference in preferences, thereby 
constituting a menace, whose result is the violent conflict that ushers in destructive tendencies, 
bringing about social and economic retrogression. Conflict understood in this way underlies 
the force driving the scholarly debate.  
Thus, inter-community conflicts have hindered development in the ND, rendering the area 
unsafe for foreign investors, damaging existing investment, instilling a sense of insecurity, 
destroying infrastructure, displacing inhabitants and reducing the possibility of a better life for 
the people therein (Bisina, 2003). Conflicts between communities in the ND depict the epitome 
of underdevelopment, given its destructive tendency in the area. Inter-community conflicts 
often hinder the construction of roads and housing infrastructure in areas of contested 
boundaries between two communities; the underlying factor is that the communities involved 
constantly demand development levies, termed ‘development fees’, from the contractor, 
whether foreign or local, which has gained the contract for that particular construction 
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(Ikelegbe, 2005). Thus, this becomes a major problem concerning who is entitled to collect 
these levies in areas of contested boundaries, which led to the inter-community conflict 
between the Enerhen and Effurun communities (Ijaw Monitoring Group, 2008; Osagie et al., 
2010), resulting in the abandonment of developmental projects in the area, leading to further 
underdevelopment in the region. In a bid to resolve the numerous problems precipitated by 
inter-community conflicts in the ND, scholars have opened a debate over which factors lead to 
inter-community conflict in the ND. Before joining this debate on the causality of inter-
community conflict, it is necessary to review the broader context regarding the causes of 
community conflict in the ND.  
2.3 The Broad and Narrow Context of Community Conflict in the ND 
Community conflict in the ND spans the NDC–FGN conflict through the NDC–MNC conflict 
to inter-community conflict in the ND. Prior to Nigerian independence in 1960, the discovery 
of crude oil in the present ND state of Bayelsa in 1956 led the British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to appoint the Willink Commission to investigate the concerns of ND minorities 
(Willink, 1958). Shola Omotola, analysing institutions set up to tackle social, economic and 
political issues with the aim of developing the region and reducing violent conflict, refers to 
the Oil & Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) established in 
1992 and introduced by the then military administration, and the present Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) established in 2000 by the Obasanjo government (2007). 
Both institutions are accused of falling short of expectations, described as being plagued by 
‘institutionalised corruption’, implying that corruption has been officially incorporated into 
public activities (Aghalino, 2004). The consequent results of these failed institutions have been 
violent conflict between the population of the ND and the federal government.  
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Kenneth Omeje, analysing the violent conflict between NDCs and the FGN, coined the term 
‘oilification of extra-oil conflict’, meaning that the FGN has sought to connect all disputes in 
the ND to oil to securitise the region with military action, using the elites in the area to secure 
oil zones for their own selfish interests (2004). From a different perspective, John Ejobowah 
evaluates counter ownership claims to petrol and gas resources, by both the FGN and NDCs in 
the ND, as the reason for the parties being in dispute (2000). The conflicting interests of both 
parties led to the Odi massacre, a notorious example of ethnic cleansing in which FGN soldiers 
were ordered to shoot on sight any young male indigene from Odi in retaliation for the murder 
of seven police officers protecting local oil facilities (Albert, 2003). The FGN and NDCs also 
became embroiled in conflict when oil flow stations were shut down by indigenous community 
members operating as part of the Movement of Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND) in 
Rivers and Bayelsa (Obi, 2010). Scholars continue to dissect possible causes and solutions to 
the violent conflict between the FGN and NDCs. 
Alongside the FGN–NDC conflict, exists a NDC–MNC conflict. Bright Oshwofasa and David 
Anuta argue that bad governance and corruption have resulted in the absence of effective 
environmental law operating in the ND (2012). In this vacuum MNCs have secured their own 
economic interests at the expense of the citizens of the ND, and the spoliation of the local 
environment. The failure of the MNCs to alleviate the consequences of crude oil activities by 
actively fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities in the region through providing roads, 
health facilities, income-yielding ventures and electricity, has been held as the reason for 
violence by members of NDCs towards MNCs in the area.  Engobo Emeseh analyses such 
violence from a legal perspective, arguing that the failure of NDC residents to receive 
compensation for MNCs’ social irresponsibility, notably the environmental degradation to the 
region because of their oil drilling activities, has led to NDCs adopting extra-legal and self-
help strategies (2011). Manifestations of violence in the region have included acts such as 
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kidnapping MNCs’ employees, shutting down flow stations, vandalising pipelines, as well as 
causing deaths and thefts in the area (Omofonmwan & Odia, 2009). Often, MNCs respond by 
paying a large amount to the FGN’s military personnel to guard their employees at their 
residences and work places against possible attacks. When MNCs will not or cannot pay for 
military protection they often withdraw. This can be seen in cases such as the Bomu Bonny 
section of Owokiri, located in Rivers, in July 2013, where Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC) had to shut down the pipeline in the area due to vandalism, and the Nembe-
Basambri community in Bayelsa where an SPDC flow station was shut down due to the 
unavailability of security (Guardian, 2013). Scholars have had conflicting views on the debate 
regarding the NDC–MNC conflict, with Uwafiakun Idemudia and Uwem Ite dismissing 
environmental factors as the proximate causes of violence in the region, ascribing the root 
causes to the willingness of the NDCs to use theft as a means of enriching themselves, in this 
case through pipeline vandalism and looting of crude oil (2006).  
Violent conflict between NDCs, or inter-community conflict, has hindered development in the 
area, making it unsafe for foreign investors, damaging existing investments, destroying 
infrastructure, displacing inhabitants and reducing the possibility of a better life for the people 
of the ND (Bisina, 2003). Fierce conflicts between NDCs reported through the media appear 
to be the epitome of underdevelopment. Protracted inter-community conflicts continue 
between the Itsekiri and Urhobo communities in Delta since 2003; the Ogoni and Okrika 
communities in Rivers since 2003; and between the Itsekiri and Ijaw in Delta since 2013 
(Bisina, 2003; Vanguard, 2013). Other conflicts recede and then re-emerge such as the inter-
community wars between the Ogbe-ijoh and Ogidigben communities in Warri Southwest LGA 
in Delta, which started in 1997 and have resurfaced in successive decades (Daniel, 2010).  
This propensity to violence has resulted in the spread of small arms, which exacerbates 
insecurity in the region (Bisina, 2003; Osagie et al., 2010). Inter-community conflict has 
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resulted in widespread hooliganism and the creation of the phenomenon of the ’area boy’, a 
term for violent protagonists between the ages of 16 to 40 (Momoh, 2003). Area boys become 
so steeped in violence that they continue to engage in violence and crime even when their 
communities are not involved in inter-community conflict. The result is endemic insecurity in 
the region (Momoh, 2003).  
2.4 Causes of Inter-Community Conflict in the Niger Delta: The Scholarly 
Debate  
There are five core strands seeking to explain inter-community violence in the ND running 
through the scholarly literature: corruption and oil resource conflict; social causes; economic 
causes; political causes; and the empirical perspective.  
Michael Watts argues that the ND is largely ungovernable due to the inability of government 
to manage the needs of the local indigenes. He blames this failure on corruption which 
subsequently makes governmental institutions unable to contain inter-community conflict in 
the area (2007). He argues that the ND is highly insecure due to hostage taking and active 
violent conflicts, both of which are rooted in the pervasiveness of corruption within the ND 
states (Watts, 2007). Watts argues that the ND governmental institutions are crippled by 
corruption, hence the area has become ungovernable. Ungovernability of the ND represents all 
types of chaos and violent conflict in the area, essentially precluding peaceful relationships 
between NDCs. In a recent study based essentially on a meta-analysis of secondary materials, 
Anthony Agbegbedia ascribes the causes of the inter-community conflicts between Okere-
Itsekiri and Okere-Urhobo in 2003 and between Ogbe-ijoh and Ogidigben in 1997 to the issue 
of legitimate claims to ownership of Warri (2014). This is contingent on the notion that each 
of these groups or communities’ lays claim to the ownership of Warri – the capital of crude oil 
activities. Agbegbedia and Watts analyses are rooted in oil resource conflict, since 85% of the 
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ND’s income comes from the exploitation of the region’s crude oil resources (Wall Street 
Journal, 2015). 
In a recent study, Obi also argues that oil is instrumental to the high levels of violence between 
communities in the area. He connects this to causes of inter-community violence by 
emphasising historical construction of social inequalities and injustices, the nature of state–
society relations, and the linkages between the local–national–global actors in the globalised 
extraction of oil from the ND (Obi, 2014). This illustrates global actors’ domination of oil 
activities in the ND through sophisticated oil-drilling technology. He argues that local 
communities have only limited input into this process and are reduced to fighting amongst 
themselves over the marginal assets that remain in the oil-producing region (Obi, 2014).  
Social forces precipitating inter-community conflict are also perceived to be a by-product of 
oil resource conflict. From a social perspective, Ukiwo argues that some ethnic groups living 
in the same geographical territory tend to be disadvantaged by resource allocation decisions 
and policies, and this has often led to frustration and aggression that instigates inter-community 
conflict (2007). This is contingent on the view that certain ethnic groups hold a monopoly on 
key institutions that control the ND’s resources which invariably connotes social imbalance 
between communities belonging to different ethnic groups. It should be noted that Ukiwo’s 
view cuts across social, economic and political perspectives, as these factors tend to motivate 
NDCs to strive for balance. Samuel Aghalino argues that social factors, such as social injustice 
and inequity in the allocation of scarce resources by the Nigerian government and MNCs, are 
the main cause of inter-community conflict between Oleh and Olomoro communities. He 
suggests that the conflict erupted because of frustration on the part of Oleh over the sharing 
formula for waste pipes imposed by SPDC taken as being in favour of the Olomoro community 
(Aghalino, 2009a). In 2003, Oleh’s frustration with this perceived injustice converted to 
violence and its members attacked Olomoro triggering inter-community conflict. Social 
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conflict of this type is the result of frustrated individuals within an NDC, mindful of the status 
of their status vis-à-vis other NDCs, allowing their frustration to translate into aggression.  
Similarly, Judith Asuni argues that in the early 2000s, NDCs belonging to the same ethnic 
groups as the Ijaws, Urhobos and Itsekiri in Delta went into conflict against one another 
through a desire to retain social prestige by exercising their rights and control over petroleum 
facilities located along blurred borders of conflicting NDCs (2009). She further stresses that in 
Rivers, NDCs split between the Okrika and Ogoni ethnic groups have a history of being torn 
apart by socially driven power struggles. Thus, the people in each of these communities are 
united by a sense of grievance about the exploitation of their region, which they perceive as an 
infringement on their social status. Hence, they go into conflict with neighbouring NDCs, who 
they consider perpetrators taking what rightfully belongs to them (Asuni, 2009). Exemplifying 
this, Ukiwo analyses the 1976 inter-community conflict between the NDCs of Gbaramatu and 
Ugborodo over ownership of oil bearing locations, suggesting that intergroup inequalities and 
ethnic marginalisation accounted for the former fighting for its social identity in an unfriendly, 
marginalised environment (Ukiwo, 2007). His analysis of causality of the conflict is based on 
the view that the FGN had accorded a higher social status to Ugborodo over Gbaramatu, by 
placing strategic locations and MNCs’ headquarters in Ugborodo zones, whereas the drilling 
and hazardous activities took place in Gbaramatu areas. Hence, members of Gbaramatu sought 
to exercise self-determination in an unfriendly environment of community status differences 
by engaging in violent conflict with members of Ugborodo. This social struggle emanating 
from grievances over MNC headquarters is related to economic motivation, which can also be 
a factor that drives self-determination. 
From an economic perspective, Aghalino, assessing inter-community relations in the ND prior 
to colonialism, describes relations as peaceful with people trading local commodities amongst 
themselves, exchanging fish from the coastal parts of the ND for land harvests such as palm 
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nuts from the hinterlands. For Aghalino, this peaceful co-existence was fatally destabilised by 
the introduction of the slave trade to the region by the Europeans, together with the concomitant 
influx of weapons, leading to communities fighting each other for access to a portion of the 
profits (Aghalino, 2009a). He cites the raids that took place between the Itsekiri and Ijaw 
communities in the Warri area at the time of early European contact in the fifteenth century as 
paving the way for the colonisation of the region. The co-option of local communities into 
these imperial projects led to competition between communities to become the preferred 
partners of the European arrivals.  
Ikelegbe, arguing from a different perspective, contends that the ‘economies of war’ have been 
a major driver of conflict between NDCs in the region (2005). ‘Economies of war’ describes 
the deliberate involvement of the high-level economic interests of stakeholders, willing to 
condone violence to secure economic advantage from the delta’s oil and minerals. He 
emphasises the establishment of an, essentially, anarchic environment in the region as 
favourable to a cynical strategy that is accepting of violent activities such as pipeline vandalism 
and oil bunkering that results in oil scarcity leading to price inflation that ultimately leads to 
higher profits for oil companies and stakeholders. Ikelegbe cites the inter-community conflict 
between Nembe-Basambri and Nembe-Ogbologbomabri in 2003 as being caused by the illegal 
oil business inciting false rumours and propaganda, during which period the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced that 114 pipelines were vandalised and a high 
quantity of crude oil diverted to black markets for sale at higher prices (Ikelegbe, 2005).  
Johnson Osagie et al in a quantitative study, associated inter-community conflict with the 
deprivation of ND citizens from the dividends of oil proceeds in the region (Osagie, 2010). He 
discovered from feedback from the project’s respondents that youths from across all social 
backgrounds blame the unfair allocation of the dividends of oil exploitation as the prime reason 
for violence between NDCs. Eghosa Osaghae et al. from a different viewpoint, argues that 
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inequity driven by elite manipulation of the political system, linked to environmental 
degradation and persistent unemployment as the main cause for inter-community conflict 
(2007).  
Nseabasi Akpan’s study, drawing on government statistics, argues that that inter-community 
conflict is largely a result of rent-seeking by unprincipled politicians who use their 
communities as the facilitators of personal political power (2010). He contends that NDCs have 
a vested interest in the success of their own politicians and that inter-community violence is 
directly linked with inter-community competition over access to oil rents. Thomas Imobighe 
traces the drivers of inter-community conflict in the ND to the politicisation of financial 
resource control in 1993, whereby the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) became responsible for disbursing funds to develop oil communities in the ND 
(2004). The emphasis on oil communities meant that only those NDCs where oil was produced 
would receive developmental assistance. Accordingly, Von Kemedi argues that, the immediate 
outcome was violent conflicts between NDCs contesting ownership of lands where oil was 
present so as to benefit from OMPADEC funding (2003). For Von Kemedi, the connection 
between the designation of an ‘oil community’ has become a fundamental factor engineering 
envy and disagreement among different NDCs.  
The frustration–aggression hypothesis originally proposed by John Dollard et al. argues that 
where an entity’s expectation is blocked by another entity, there is bound to be an aggressive 
confrontation between the entity responsible for the blockage and the frustrated entity (1939). 
Darren Kew and David Phillips link the frustration–aggression hypothesis to the poverty of 
most NDCs, describing them as communities living in failed conditions, hence their residents 
lash out against the surrounding environment including neighbouring NDCs and the 
government alike (2013). Denied basic human needs, the frustration of these NDCs increases 
leading to conflict with neighbouring NDCs perceived to be responsible for blocking access to 
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these needs. Olubayo Oluduro and Olubisi Oluduro (2003) combine the frustration–aggression 
hypothesis with Rasheed Draman’s (2003) relative deprivation analysis that proposes that not 
only does conflict lead to poverty but that poverty leads to conflict. Oluduro and Oluduro argue 
that, 
the frustration-aggression theory and the relative deprivation theory, both of 
which suggest that individuals become aggressive when there are obstacles- 
perceived and real- to their success in life, becomes important to the Niger Delta 
conflicts in Nigeria…democracy means nothing if people do not have access to 
nourishing food, good health care, good education, access to resources for a good 
life (2003, pp.56-57).   
From a different perspective, Samuel Ibaba describes the frustration–aggression trap, where 
NDCs trapped by environmental degradation and ethnicity-based political domination have no 
option but to enter violent conflict with the NDC perceived as responsible for the trap (2011). 
He cites the example of inter-community wars between Ijaw NDCs in the 1990s. These NDCs 
are built on crude oil reserves, yet fail to provide basic needs.  
Chukwuma Okoli argues that the conflicts between NDCs are the result of a struggle for self-
determination and self-preservation in a hostile environment that is indifferent to their well-
being. He ties this in with the theory of existentialism, a belief that humans possess an innate 
need for freedom, self-determination and responsibility (Okoli, 2013). The individual is taken 
to be isolated in a hostile and indifferent world, yet free to select the direction of his destiny 
and responsible for his actions. Okoli applies existentialist thinking to ND community relations 
and violent conflict, notably the conflict between Ijaw communities in Delta and Bayelsa in 
the 1990s, concluding that is this innate need for freedom and self-determination that underpins 




2.5 A Critique of the Existing Literature  
Inter-community conflict in the ND has attracted a degree of targeted research. However, a 
fundamental limit to the existing research is the limited attention paid to accurately defining 
what constitutes a Niger Delta community, and how that term is understood in the ND itself. 
This section focuses on the definition of NDCs, the characteristics of inter-community conflict, 
and the facilitating social, economic and political factors that are the underlying causes of 
conflict between NDCs. 
As previously indicated, NDCs are defined as kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages (Ite, 
2004) and towns (Omeje, 2004). Other scholars describe them as clans or kingdoms that 
possess the structure of a well-organised municipality (Bisina, 2003; Ibaba, 2009), and sub-
ethnic groups with their own unique culture (Ikelegbe, 2006) or as communities based on 
common interests (Frynas, 2000). Other scholars delineate NDCs as ancient autonomous 
villages and city states that predate the encounters with Europeans in the region (Alagoa, 1971; 
Jones, 1963; Horton, 2013). This variation in definitions implies that scholars have not yet 
arrived at a consensus on a definitive definition of an NDC. The existing literature fails to link 
ancient to current NDCs in order to determine the exact nature of the ‘autonomy’ that current 
communities claim in the light of the autonomy of ancient communities and the existence of 
communities established during the colonial and independence eras. The salience of the 
distinction between ancient and current NDCs is not stressed by scholars researching inter-
community conflict in the ND. To determine the vestigial influence of ancient NDCs’ pre-
colonial autonomy on contemporary conflict in the region, a more detailed and focussed 
understanding of the distinctions between NDCs than currently exists is required for the 
purpose of this study.  
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The causes of inter-community conflict in the ND are multi-faceted. However, the existing 
literature is narrow in focus. Studies often analyse only the external nature of the conflict such 
as the immediate causes triggering inter-community conflict like ethnic marginalisation or the 
role of politically ambitious individuals. Theoretical explanations such as Ibaba’s frustration–
aggression trap (2011) and Ikoli’s employment of existentialist thinking (2013) bring to bear 
philosophical and sociological tools to understand the causation of inter-community conflict, 
in this case in the ND. This study, however, concentrates on the specificity of the relationship 
that the contemporary communities in the ND have with the idea of a vestigial autonomy 
related, in multiple ways, with pre-colonial communities. Thus, Ibaba and Okoli’s theories, 
whilst potentially helpful, explain group or individual behaviour in a community with a defined 
status, rather than a community whose definition is not fixed.  
Ikelegbe argues that the greed of individuals underpins conflict in the ND (Ikelegbe, 2005), 
whilst Aghalino emphasises competition between ethnic groups going back to rivalry for 
control of the slave trade (Aghalino, 2009a). However, whilst both these approaches cast light 
on some dimensions of some inter-community conflicts within the ND, they only offer narrow 
and discrete understandings of causality in particular cases. This research moves beyond these 
particulars to examine NDCs as collectives, in so doing seeking to move beyond discrete 
explanations of causality to a more general understanding of inter-community conflict in the 
ND.  
A detailed examination of existing literature on inter-community conflict in the ND suggests 
that most studies rely on meta-analysis of secondary sources and quantitative data. These 
studies rely on data from three main sources: journal articles and books, data on inter-
community conflict gathered by the UNDP, and data from reports in newspaper articles. 
Although this allows for generalisation, there are criticisms regarding the employment of 
quantitative data to analyse inter-community conflict since this data is rarely consistent or 
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reliable, and hence provides a distorted perspective of events on the ground. There is also a 
tendency for studies that use quantitative data to select the data that fits their own position 
(Grix, 2002). Likewise, while this data can be useful in analysing the conflict between NDCs, 
the data rarely focusses on the different dimensions to inter-community conflict. For example, 
the statistical data does not specifically provide insight into the complex political processes 
involved in these conflicts. A detailed qualitative study is better suited to provide practical 
insight (Cousin, 2009).  
The originality that this study brings to the literature on inter-community conflict in the ND is 
the richness of the primary evidence and data collected from stakeholders who have not 
previously contributed to the scholarly debate, and critical analysis and evaluation of this 
primary evidence and data. Oliver Treib concludes that ‘…unless the problems associated with 
quality and form of available data used in quantitative research designs have been solved, 
scholars are advised to rely on qualitative case studies’ (2008, p.18). The premise of the study 
that NDCs are traditional and inherently autonomous groups in a vulnerable ND administrative 
system that provokes conflict over social, economic and political dynamics. NDC nature and 
behaviour have not been researched explicitly or in detail. It is against such a backdrop that the 
thesis seeks to address gaps, using a detailed understanding of the traditional nature of NDCs 
in relation to modern LGA governance, as an empirical tool to detect factors causing inter-
community conflict, and therefore representing the originality of the research project. 
Thus, by using a concrete understanding of the nature of NDCs, as well as comprehending the 
characteristics of inter-community conflict in the ND, the thesis will employ a qualitative 
empirical approach to determine the causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. The thesis 
seeks to add to the understanding of how weak governance can allow for conflict amongst the 
governed. It strives to explain how the tension between tradition and modernity has exacerbated 
the inherent autonomous nature of NDCs, giving them the status of traditional inherent 
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autonomous communities tantamount to independent states. This is juxtaposed with the modern 
Nigerian LGA administrative system which blurs a community’s autonomy since it is 
constitutionally forced to share social, economic and political resources. In many ways this 
then replicates a realist interpretation of an anarchic world system in a national, or indeed, 
regional, microcosm. The thesis’ scholarly contribution is complementary to existing work on 
intee-community conflict, as well as providing a concrete base for building solutions to the 
















This chapter reviews the scholarly literature on inter-community conflict in the ND. It argues 
that definition, conceptualisation and nature of NDCs, and hence the causes of inter-community 
conflict, rather than other types of conflict such as conflict with the FGN and MNCs, in the 
ND, have not been adequately explored in the scholarly literature to date. The concentration in 
the literature on the role of individual personalities and/or ethnicity undervalues the underlying 
tension between NDCs’ traditional nature and the modern administrative environment within 
which inter-community conflict takes place. A review of the literature indicates that there has 
been only limited effort made to reach out to the leaders and residents of NDCs in conflict-
prone states in the ND and to incorporate their analyses, evidence and data into the wider 
understanding of inter-community conflict in the region.  
The next chapter outlines the methods used in gathering evidence and data from these 




Chapter 3: The Analytical Framework & Methodology 
Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on the causes of inter-community conflict. This 
chapter, using the absence of a functional understanding of the term Niger Delta Community 
required to achieve the aim of the study as a starting point, develops an analytical framework 
based on analysis and evaluation of the evidence and data collected for the study to act as a 
working hypothesis of the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta. The framework contributes to 
the existing scholarly debate by investigating, exploring and analysing the bases of NDCs and 
how their inherently autonomous nature, in conjunction with the ND’s modern governance, 
influences, affects or catalyses inter-community conflict in the region. The study argues that 
NDCs’ inherently autonomous nature, rekindled by a contemporary struggle between 
traditional versus modern values, drives communities to engage in inter-community conflict 
over social, economic and political factors. These factors include prestige, employment 
opportunities and political authority which affords economic privileges. This is a form of 
collective action by community members rather than by a whole ethnic group or influential 
individuals within a community, as argued by other scholars. Moreover, this collective action 
is motivated by the lack of welfare support for citizens from the LGAs and ND states, which 
reinvigorates the inherent autonomous nature of each NDC instigating competition that can 
lead to violence. In this way, the research makes a direct contribution to the scholarly literature 
on the causality of inter-community conflict in the ND, as well as to the wider literature on 
intergroup conflict beyond the ND. 
In the continuing debate, no obvious link has been made between the causes of inter-
community conflict and the definition, nature and environment of NDCs. Similarly, the existing 
literature argues that conflict between communities is either caused by the marginalisation of 
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one ethnic group by the other (Ukiwo, 2007), or by certain individuals who seek profit from 
business activity and desire social, economic, and political power (Ikelegbe 2005; Osaghae 
2009; Aghalino, 2009a). Even though these are valid arguments, they are not supported by 
substantive empirical evidence that investigates in detail these conclusions; the factors that 
necessitate such actions; or the actual effect and relevance the arguments have on communities, 
understood as a group of people engaging in inter-community conflict in the ND. Furthermore, 
the focus of much of existing research is limited in scope, with the definition and context of 
NDCs’ traditional nature functional for this study lacking, the implications of the inherent 
differences between and amongst communities unexplored, and the effect of modern ND 
governance being detached from the circumstances of the people involved unexplored. It is 
perhaps assumed that since NDCs are combined under one LGA this automatically makes them 
autonomous with individuals seeking their self-interest inside the LGA. This chapter aims to 
explain how the thesis will seek to fill gaps in the literature by scrutinising the connection 
between the inherent and autonomous traditional nature of NDCs, and the ND’s colonial and 
post-colonial governance. This will then be used as the foundation for investigating the 
causality of inter-community conflict in the ND in the later analytical chapters.  
This chapter is split into three sections. A first section delineates an analytical framework, or 
hypothesis, in which the causes of inter-community conflict are not necessarily individually 
motivated, but instigated by the self-awareness and self-interest of the communities involved. 
A second section outlines the main research question. The final section sets out the 
methodology used for this research.   
3.2 The Analytical Framework 
By drawing on ideas derived from the research process, it is possible to develop an analytical 
framework that will act as a working hypothesis to explain the relationships between and 
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amongst communities in the region, as well as setting out the factors that are crucial in 
explaining the process of how and why inter-community conflict occurs. To investigate the 
causes of inter-community conflict in the ND, a multi-theory approach is adopted. This 
approach combines theories of community conflict in the ND and theories relevant to general 
intergroup conflict. The analytical framework below is a schematic of the process of 
governance in the ND, setting out the factors that trigger inter-community conflict in the region 
based on a critical analysis and evaluation of the evidence and data collected during the field 
work in the ND. As such it forms a graphical representation of the research’s hypothesis which 
will be tested in the subsequent chapters. 
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At the top of the framework is a symbol representing six standalone communities 
demonstrating the autonomy and independence they possessed before colonisation. The 
introduction of the LGA as the means of providing for local administration in the ND eroded 
the autonomy and independence of NDCs, establishing NDCs’ dependency, which is 
understood to be the constitutional subjugation of ND communities to LGA authority, 
interacting in that they must share resources within the LGA of which they are constituent 
communities.  The large majority of LGAs have proved to be ineffectively administered, 
corrupt and incapable of supplying the governmental needs of NDC residents. This has led to 
NDCs fighting amongst themselves over scarce social, economic and political resources. This 
is the result of the constitutional requirement for NDCs to sit within a LGA. NDCs’ residents 
are forced to depend on the community for welfare. The failure of the LGA system to supply 
basic needs has reinforced the ancient traditional identities of NDCs, strengthening their 
perceived pre-colonial, hence inherent, autonomy. Pre-colonial NDCs have been described by 
scholars as autonomous villages that engaged in inter-village wars to settle disputes (Alagoa, 
1971; Horton, 2013). This traditional autonomy is expressed through rivalry with other 
inherently autonomous NDCs, a rivalry that can lead to violent conflict. 
The thesis argues that the inherently autonomous nature of NDCs is instrumental in instigating 
conflict between communities. This is facilitated by the inability of the LGA system to provide 
a more effective alternative than this inherent autonomy of individual NDCs. An example of 
this is the disbursement of funds from the Warri South LGA headquarters in Effurun to its 
sixteen constituent NDCs. As such, this kind of scenario makes constituent NDCs belonging 
to the same LGA interact to some extent, since the chairman and top officials of the LGA must 
emerge from certain communities in the jurisdiction (Deltastate.com, 2014). For instance, the 
LGA’s strategic officials consist of a chairman, vice chairman, treasurer and speaker (Ukiwo, 
2006). These personnel decide the direction of funds allocation and other important welfare 
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packages such as employment and scholarships among the nine NDCs in the LGA. The 
indication of this is that some NDCs, who do not produce any of these important personnel, 
must depend on favourable decisions emanating from the officials who are from other 
communities, hence the interaction. This scenario becomes conspicuously vulnerable when the 
LGAs’ officials are designated as institutionally corrupt (Aghalino, 2009b), thereby 
relinquishing every form of legitimate reliability and trustworthiness from NDCs’ members. 
Thus, the issue of interaction results in inter-community conflict when certain communities 
feel marginalised over scarce resources, as seen in the bottom box of the framework. 
The analytical framework has been constructed based on evidence and data collected from key 
stakeholders in the local government and NDC environments and indicates the fundamental 
relationships between NDCs and LGAs. The drivers and rationales for these relationships are 
explored in detail in the substantive analytical chapters of the thesis. This involves assessing 
the nature of NDCs and the ineffective LGA system that allows this self-perceived inherent 
autonomy to endure and how social, economic and political factors are managed and 
mismanaged by NDCs and LGAs in such a way that often leads to inter-community conflict. 
3.3 Main Research Questions 
The aim and objectives are supported by core research questions linked with the analytical 
framework above which serves as a working hypothesis. The research questions are not the 
same as the aim and objectives and are not reformulations of the aim and objectives, but rather 
are questions that allowed the researcher to test the analytical framework when conducting the 
field work. These questions also seek to fill the gaps in the research isolated in the literature 
review. The questions investigate how the tension between traditional versus modern values 
facilitate diverse factors that cause inter-community conflict. The relationship between NDCs’ 
inherently autonomous nature, ND governance and diverse factors is shaped not only by 
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contextual elements but also by exogenous criteria. To comprehend the endogenous as well as 
exogenous factors that catalyse causes of inter-community conflict, the study adopts a multi-
theoretical approach to answer the following main and sub-questions. 
The main research question is: Does the causality of inter-community conflict conform to the 
drivers of traditional versus modern values? 
The research question will be answered by developing a detailed understanding of what 
constitutes a NDC, and how communities interact.  
The main research question is supported by a series of sub-questions: 
 What constitutes a NDC? 
 What are the characteristics of inter-community conflict in the ND? 
 Do communities fight over social, economic and political factors? 
3.4 Methodology 
The hypothesis represented by the analytical framework above is based on a critical analysis 
of evidence and data gathered through a series of semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders. During these interviews, a range of individual analyses and opinions were 
expressed by the divergent respondents who were willing to be interviewed for the study. The 
hypothesis is the result of an analysis and evaluation of this evidence. As such it provides what 
Rachel Ormston et al. describes as a ‘peripheral reality’, intended to be free from the opinions 
and understanding that people hold (2014). This peripheral reality can only be comprehended 
and adopted into the lives and views of individuals through socially constructed meanings 
(Ormston et al., 2014). The approach in the study to the causality of inter-community conflict 
in the ND is informed by the epistemological norm of human social life, understood as the 
experiences of different individuals and the meanings they attach to them, which sum up their 
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belief (Neumann, 2008). A complete understanding of the factors that instigate conflict 
between NDCs requires the adoption of the diverse perceptions of what characterises reality. 
The core evidence on which the conclusions of this study are based is derived from detailed 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and actors in NDCs. Thus, the methodology 
adopted for this study prioritises the analyses, perceptions and interpretations of highly 
informed and engaged stakeholders and participants.  
The approach adopted for this study is immersive in that, contrary to a positivist position, the 
researcher recognises the value of consistent interaction with the phenomenon under 
investigation, in this case inter-community conflict in the ND. This interaction includes the 
process of data collection, which has an effect on both the researcher and the respondents 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007). There has been some criticism of qualitative studies as being reliant 
on subjective analysis of social phenomena to draw conclusions. This study seeks to address 
this by adopting a mixed-data collection method in the form of semi-structured interviews and 
observations to triangulate the data (Yin, 2013). 
The Design of the Case Study 
In social research, the study design involves the entire process of organising a research project, 
which is concerned with a logical sequence that connects the empirical data to the research 
questions as well as the conclusions (Yin, 2013). Thus, empirical data, which originates from 
single or multiple case studies, are essential for effective research projects in social research 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007). The study examines a multiple case study of NDCs engaging in 
inter-community conflict in the ND, meaning it is enriched by comparative analysis, unlike a 
single case study that lacks objectivity. This indicates that a comparative approach, using 
similar cases of inter-community conflict from the three ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers 
provides more examples and helps to demonstrate that the factors impelling conflict are 
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applicable to the whole ND regions, as well as to other places with similar conditions.  
However, since it is beyond the scope of this research to investigate in detail places above the 
ND, the study restricts itself to the analysis of primary evidence and data gathered through a 
series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the ND states of Bayelsa, Delta 
and Rivers. Due to limited time and resources, the research restricted itself to the analysis of 
secondary data on the other six ND states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and 
Ondo which it used in a comparative analysis to the three core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers. From the comparative analysis, the study analyses the effect of LGAs as a relative 
factor that instigates other factors, i.e. social, economic and political phenomenon that 
instigates inter-community conflict in the ND. The study’s limitation to gather primary data on 
the other six ND states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo, makes these 
ND states an area for further research.  
Regarding the research design, the study applies a qualitative method, which requires analysis 
from evidence and data extracted from semi-structured interviews and observation, informed 
by primary and secondary source material. This design is adopted in preference to, for example, 
an experimental design which would require the researcher to remain detached from the 
context. This is not appropriate when seeking an empirical explanation (Yin, 2013). The 
adoption of a survey design would limit the number of variables and predetermine the 
respondents of the research, thereby resulting in an ineffective evaluation of contextual issues. 
Thus, since the behaviour of stakeholders in the respective NDCs cannot be influenced by the 
researcher, it is not good practice to apply an experimental or survey research method to explore 
the causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. 
The research uses qualitative data gathered through fifty semi-structured interviews with local 
leaders and politicians in NDCs. The interviewees have been chosen as their communities have 
been involved in inter-community conflict in the three ND states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers.  
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The study uses the semi-structured interview technique as most suitable for data making, 
meaning making and data gathering. It also follows Jody Miller and Barry Glassner’s 
interactionist position which refutes the ‘objectivist-constructionist’ continuum (1997). Miller 
and Glassner argument is that interviews make meanings in the original sense, yet defend the 
researcher’s authority to shape the interview and the analysis of the data to understand an 
element of the social world (1997).  
The scrutiny of the causality of inter-community conflict is essentially a close inspection of 
political processes. However, such processes are encompassed within complex experiences that 
are not always framed by documentation, making their study difficult. Grappling with complex 
experiences, as Glynis Cousin reasons, requires detailed interviews to obtain layers of meaning 
(2009). Likewise, Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin explain, ‘you could measure poverty by 
counting the dollar income people earn, before taxes, but you would learn little about how 
people survive on their income, whether they share apartments with boarders, whether they fix 
the plumber’s car in exchange for plumbing services…’ (2005, p.2). Such complex experiences 
lack documentation, as Rosamond Tansey points out, either because people feel that their 
actions are not important enough to merit recording them, or because they feel that they are too 
sensitive to document in written form (2007). The use of semi-structured interviews shines a 
light on meanings in complex experiences, by conceptualising them as a ‘third space’ where 
the interviewer and respondent work together to develop understandings and bypass the 
problem of insufficient documentation, by acquiring knowledge that is not available in written 
form. This contributes to our understanding of the incentives and reasoning behind political 
processes. For inter-community relations in the ND, the use of semi-structured interviews 
becomes a necessity given that NDCs’ members rarely put down in document form positions 
that are already accepted within a community. Similarly, semi-structured interviews can assist 
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in exploring incentives behind NDC leaders’ and followers’ actions, as well as the impact that 
social context has on their perceptions on conflict between NDCs. 
Semi-structured interviews are structured in an open-ended question format: the wordings of 
the questions are flexible; the level of the language is adjustable; and the interviewer may 
answer questions for clarification purposes (Berg, 2009). The interview is structured around a 
set of themes that serve as a guide to facilitate interview talk (Cousin, 2009). The open-ended 
questions allow the respondents to organise their answers within their own framework, which 
in turn increases the validity of the responses (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Thus, unlike the 
structured interview, the interviewer is expected to adapt, modify and add to the laid down 
questions if the flow of the interview talk suggests it. Rubin & Rubin offer a structure of 
interview questions that breaks them down into main questions, probes and follow-up questions 
(2011). This allows for facilitation, with the main question setting the stage for the interview 
in the form of a structured question that allows the participants to respond, and with the probes 
helping to manage the conversation by regulating the length of responses and amount of detail, 
clarifying vague statements, and keeping the conversation in line with the subject. All of this 
is successfully concluded with the ability to follow hunches, hints and openings through 
judicious follow-up questions (Cousin, 2009). Thus, semi-structured interviews, whose task is 
mainly to grapple with complex experiences associated with the data needed to undertake 
research and draw conclusions, constitute the appropriate methodology for researching the 
causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. As one NDC view could differ from another, 
a semi-structured interview that allows NDCs’ members to respond in an information 
facilitation manner is essential for the success of the project. 
Apart from favouring the qualitative method of semi-structured interview over experimental 
and survey techniques, the choice of the most appropriate case study design was also 
challenging. In a bid to overcome such a challenge the researcher carried out an investigation 
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on different case studies and their suitability in social research projects. Thus, the researcher 
adopted Robert Yin’s analysis of single and multiple case studies which he disaggregated into 
unitary and multiple units. He states that a single case design and a multiple case design can be 
holistic or embedded (Yin, 2013). In a holistic case study, the case has one unit of analysis for 
each case, while an embedded case study has multiple units of analysis. The unit of analysis of 
each case is that part that is relevant to answering the main research question (Yin, 2013). 
Amongst these disaggregation, the study of inter-community conflict rests within the frame of 
a multiple case study with embedded units. In this regard, the study will investigate multiple 
cases of inter-community conflict in the ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers respectively. 
The embedded case design will tackle the main research question and the logical sub-questions 
that are relevant for answering the main question (Yin, 2013; Creswell & Clark 2007). Thus, 
the thesis’ main research question is; does the causality of inter-community conflict in the 
Niger Delta conform to drivers of conflict emanating from traditional versus modern values? 
The sub-questions are: i) what constitutes a NDC? ii) what are the characteristics of inter-
community conflict in the ND? and iii) do communities fight over social, economic and 
political factors? 
Notwithstanding the application of multiple and embedded case designs, the choice of 
respondents was crucial. This choice is contingent on the notion that samples make inferences 
about a larger population from smaller ones (Berg, 2009). Such extrapolations stem from 
inferential generalisation, that is, empirical generalisation communicates the outcomes of a 
research to the wider populace from which the original sample was selected. This is referred to 
as figurative generalisation. Thus, the sampling method adopted is ‘purposive sampling’. This 
is choosing the number of respondents based on shared characteristics, which is relevant to the 
inquiry on causality on inter-community conflict in the ND. 
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The respondents include community leaders including elder chiefs and youth executives, NDC 
local political activists, and LGA Chairmen and Ward Councillors in the three ND states of 
Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. They number fifty in total and they all have direct responsibilities 
for the welfare of the NDCs. The elder chiefs and youth executives constitute a NDC 
administrative segment that deals with neighbouring NDCs; NDC local political activists are 
indigenes from these NDCs that campaign for the socio-political rights of NDCs from local to 
national level; and LGA Chairmen and Ward Councillors constitute the third-tier constitutional 
political administrative segment of the FRN, after the FGN and state government. The LGAs 
are the administrative areas in which a NDC is situated, making a Local Government Chairman 
(LGC) the FRN’s constitutionally elected official presiding over and responsible for the affairs 
of the communities located in his/her municipality. The Ward Councillors are subordinate to 
the LGC, acting as representatives of different sections of the LGA (Adamolekun & Rowland, 
1979). These represent the NDC elite who influence political, and often social and commercial, 
affairs in the community and are instrumental in decisions over whether to enter conflict with 
other NDCs. Cousin (2009) sees ‘purposive sampling’ as a useful tool for qualitative 
researchers as it identifies a set of people that can inform the inquiry. However, the group of 
people selected for interview for this research work is not intended to exhaust any possible 
variation, but is chosen as the key source of variation to add to the depth and plausibility of the 
analysis. 
A full list of respondents, their roles and geographical locations is given in Appendix1. 
The Region and ND States Selected 
The researcher selected the ND as the principal case for the study of inter-community conflict. 
The choice of the ND was based on empirical and practical reasons. The ND is the epicentre 
of oil-related and community-related conflict. Prior to the onset of the Boko Haram terror 
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campaign in northern Nigeria, the ND was the most conflict-prone Nigerian region, its 
environment drastically polluted and neglected and much of its people impoverished. The 
researcher is from the ND state of Delta and is familiar with the area’s social and political 
system. Practically, this also offsets accommodation and transport costs during the research 
process. Familiarity also helped with gaining access would-be respondents and give credibility 
to the snowballing technique used to expand the reservoir of respondents.  
Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers are the most historically the most politically and economically 
active ND states. The decision to base the research in these states was made for several reasons. 
Firstly, the respondents in the three ND states were easier to access to than in the other six 
(Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross Rivers, Edo, Imo, and Ondo) since the researcher already had 
established relationships in these areas. Secondly, the literature on inter-community conflict in 
the ND argues that these three ND states represent the most conflict-prone zone in the region, 
with 56 inter-community conflicts between 1997 and 2006 (Conflict Bulletin, 2014; Obi, 
2009). Lastly, these three ND states were also the states in which there has been the most 
activity by militant groups including MEND and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), 
instrumental in stirring inter-community conflict in the ND. 
Methods and Data Collection 
The methods applied for gathering data were semi-structured interviews, observation, and 
analysis of primary sources including newspaper articles, official reports and national laws on 
community affairs. Field work was preceded by an extensive meta-analysis of the relevant 
scholarly literature. This literature review was conducted to familiarise the researcher with the 
existing level of knowledge and understanding of community conflict in the ND. Academic 
monologues and journal articles were accessed in the Lanchester Library at Coventry 
University, the British Library in London, and community-related publications retrieved from 
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the Nigerian National Library. The literature review re-assured the researcher that there was a 
relevant and sufficient scholarly literature regarding inter-community conflict in the ND, and 
a continuing debate between academics and practitioners over the causes of this conflict. The 
researcher also identified areas that required further research and it is these gaps that the study 
seeks to fill.  
The field visits were carried out using the semi-structured interview technique based on a 
research guide developed by the researcher to focus the study on areas for research relevant to 
the gaps in the literature. The researcher adopted a flexible approach and was willing to revise 
this research guide in response to the evidence and data he was receiving from the respondents.  
The respondents were guaranteed in writing that the information obtained from the interviews 
would be used solely for the research study. In addition, the respondents were asked for their 
consent prior to participation. They were interviewed between March and April 2014 and 
November 2016, with the researcher inviting prominent NDC leaders, activists and academics 
to suitable locations for interviews. During the period of March to April 2014, the researcher 
collected the Niger Delta Development Commission’s (NDDC) minutes of meetings on NDC 
affairs, as well as its mandate on developing communities in the ND. The minutes and mandates 
are unique documents in that they contain highly focussed and relevant, albeit sensitive, 
evidence and data on inter-community conflict in the ND.  
Semi-structured Interviews 
The researcher used the interviews to consolidate the information gathered from the meeting 
and mandates. Owing to the qualitative method of collecting data, the researcher had to choose 
between structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. The researcher adopted the 
semi-structured interview method as it allows different techniques for gathering data such as 
recorded audio/video interviews, field notes or both. Secondly, semi-structured interviews can 
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take the form of face-to-face interactions, telephone conversations or video conferencing. The 
decision over which technique would be used in any instance was made based on convenience 
for the respondent, as well as costs and timing (Creswell, 2013). 
The method of data collection was also guided by the epistemological approach adopted by the 
study. Interviews, field notes, and face-to-face interactions suit the approach of the interpretive 
philosophy adopted to effectively understand social interactions (Yin, 2013). Thus, inter-
community conflict in the ND comprises social interactions and complex experiences that 
require an interpretivist approach (Cousin, 2009). Structured and unstructured interviews are 
designed as, respectively, formal and informal methods of gathering data. For instance, 
structured interviews are usually formal and mainly used for in surveys that demand the 
researcher use a representative sample. This also requires that that the researcher is 
scientifically unbiased. Alternatively, unstructured interviews are informal, and do not adopt a 
survey format; they rely on informal interactions and conversations between the interviewer 
and respondents to collect data suitable for addressing the research questions (De Vaus, 2013). 
Following the nature of the research subject of inter-community conflict, which consists of 
social interactions and complex experiences (Cousin, 2009), semi-structured interviews were 
adopted for as they helpfully sit between structured and unstructured interviews. Thus, semi-
structured interviews are a technique for collecting data that require the researcher to make a 
research guide. This constitutes a list of topics that guide the discussion, conversation, and 
interactions between the interviewer and respondents. The guide illuminates the aspects that 
need to be discussed during the interview. In this way, semi-structured interviews allow the 
interview to follow an informal but logical style that generates information in an orderly and 
formal manner (Bryman, 2015). 
The semi-structured format adopted in the study entails broad, open-ended questions about 
inter-community conflict in the ND. Each question has sub-questions that guide the direction 
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of interview. This allows the questions to be broken down into different segments that inform 
the causality of inter-community conflict. These were included in the guide, which helped the 
researcher to introduce follow-up questions to the initial open-ended questions.  
The use of semi-structured interviews, though appropriate for this study, presents some 
challenges. Firstly, NDC leaders most usually communicate in Pidgin English and their own 
ethnic languages. The researcher is not fluent in pidgin and there were concerns about 
translation. However, following discussions with the respondents, and given that all 
respondents have a reasonable level of education in the English language, it was agreed that all 
interviews would be conducted in English. Secondly, the semi-structured interviews were 
guided by open-ended questions, which allowed participants from NDC administrative sectors 
to talk about the nature of the relationship they had with conflicting communities. In this regard, 
participants sometimes wanted to also discuss relationships with third parties such as MNCs, 
as well as focusing on inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict, moving beyond the scope of 
the study. To maximise the efficiency of the interview process, the researcher developed inter-
personal skills to persuade, without being impolite, the respondents to focus on inter-
community conflict. Thirdly, some respondents preferred to communicate with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
response or a very brief explanation, undermining semi-structured interview technique. The 
researcher dealt with respondents who were unwilling to elaborate their responses to the 
question, by breaking down the questions into further segments to gather a fuller picture of 
these respondents’ analysis and opinion.  
Document Review 
The documents reviewed included secondary data on community conflict in the ND. These 
constitute an important source of data for the study of causes of inter-community conflict as 
they can help to unveil concepts and contexts in the subject area. This helped in the validation 
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process and with the triangulation of the data. These documents were collected from NDDC, 
Nigerian and British libraries, and journals on the internet. The documents reviewed consisted 
of NDDC mandates on community development in the ND, interviews, legal documents, 
newspaper articles, media reports, academic books, and journal articles deliberating on relevant 
subject matter. The collection of these documents continued after the field work. 
Observation 
Observation of inter-community conflict was adopted as a supplementary method. Observation 
in a case study is contributory as it takes place with key actors (Yin, 2013). The objective of 
observation is to triangulate the data collected by applying other methods. Observation in the 
study was carried out in an informal way with no laid down protocol (Creswell, 2013). It was 
descriptive and focused on the behaviour and reactions put forward by NDC respondents whose 
communities are, or were, in conflict. Often the manner and tenor in which the respondent 
answered the interview questions betrayed and/or underlined their emotional response to the 
topics under discussion. However, this kind of observation can distract from the subject matter 
and lead to prejudice in data analysis (Yin, 2013). Thus, during the observation process, the 
researcher made efforts to curb the prejudice that observation can generate. For instance, the 
researcher made notes on peculiar demonstrations and body language produced by the 
respondents when asked certain questions about their rival NDCs, in order not to deviate from 
the questions that were being asked. 
Data Analysis 
Once primary data has been collected, the next step is to analyse it. This process involves 
interrogating the data for themes, developing categories, and interpreting the data. These 
activities are broken down into data management, data generation, data interpretation, and data 
presentation (Yin, 2013; Creswell, 2013). 
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Data management involves the process of managing raw data by storing it in a safe and secure 
environment, as well as making sense of it. Such activities entail scrutiny of the raw data for 
completeness and coherence to begin the interpretation of the data. The management of data 
started whilst the researcher was in the field during the period of March to April 2014. The 
exercise continued after the research exercise was complete with the transcription of the 
interviews.  
The transcription of the interviews was carried out by the researcher. During this process, the 
researcher included all observations made during the interview such as exclamations, pauses, 
laughter, etc. The transcribed data produced over 300 pages of single spaced A4 sheets. The 
raw data and A4 sheet transcripts were kept secure. The analysis process involved the 
identification of recurring issues and themes including the isolation of recurring key words and 
phrases from the transcripts bearing on the relationship between communities, the 
environments in which they are governed and factors that instigate conflict in the ND. These 
key words and phrases were used to generate categories and themes that underpin the analysis 
and evaluation and ultimately underpins the argument advanced by the thesis.  
Key words and phrases obtained from the data to generate categories and themes were coded. 
The coding process included making inferences and adopting an open coding system. This 
process allowed the researcher to tag the data applicable to the three research questions, 
scrutinising the different categories and themes that contribute to inter-community conflict, 
and disaggregating similarities and differences. The disaggregation allowed the preliminary 
findings to be evaluated in more detail, thereby generating further relevant categories and 
themes.  
The coding process produced a directory file containing the categories and themes with links 
to the interview transcripts. This directory file consists of a 70-page document. This facilitated 
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the retrieval of data and helped with the accurate referencing of the respondents’ interviews 
during the analysis and evaluation phase. More fundamentally, the directory file, by breaking 
down the data into categories and themes, helped the researcher to perceive the contours of the 
debate over the causes of inter-community conflict from the perspectives of those involved in 
the conflict.  
The interpretation stage is the key step in an effective data analysis process. The data embedded 
in the directory file was grouped according to the coding exercise which led to the 
establishment of categories and themes. In all, five major categories and themes with sub-
categories and sub-themes were developed from the directory file that underpinned the 
analysis. The major categories and themes that emerged from the coding process are: the 
definition and nature of NDCs; the characteristics of inter-community conflict; the 
governmental environment of the ND; social, economic and political relations within and 
between NDCs and relations between communities in the region.  
Data presentation relates to the procedure through which the data is shown in a way that enables 
the researcher to draw conclusions from the data (De Vaus, 2013). At the time of the collection, 
transcription and interpretation of the data, the researcher adopted a tabular pattern to allow the 
data to be exhibited in a modest and vivid way. The table simplified the data by alleviating the 
final output into five categories and themes that appeared differently, but were connected by 
the general research aim and preliminary findings that were gathered from the interpretive 
section. 
Research Assessment 
Once the data is presented, there needs to be assessment of the reliability and validity of the 
presentation. The idea of reliability and validity is prominent in qualitative research to 
determine the viability of the research findings (Creswell, 2013). In other words, these 
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measures reflect how well the phenomenon being assessed suits the construction that the 
researcher adopted for the study (Creswell, 2013; Bryman, 2015). Whilst reliability relates to 
if the findings could, or would, be repeated if another study were to be carried out with the 
same method, validity is associated with the possibility of generalising the qualitative data. The 
aspect of generalisation seeks to acknowledge whether the findings of the study are relevant 
beyond the context of the research. This is tested in two ways via empirical and theoretical 
generalisations. Whilst empirical generalisation concerns itself with applying the findings of a 
research study to the bigger population within which the original sample was drawn in a 
representational and inferential manner, theoretical generalisations are inferences and theories 
developed from the findings of a research for more universal applications such as causal 
relations (Miller & Brewer, 2003). 
Thus, critics have levelled allegations against qualitative research and the case study design for 
not being capable of meeting standards of empirical and theoretical generalisations (Creswell, 
2013). This assumes that qualitative research lacks the statistical samples that would pass for 
generalisations of research findings. In response, qualitative research is not intended to be 
statistically representative, but rather it is intended to generalise findings to theory by applying 
interactive or theoretical sampling (Yin, 2013). This indicates that research should be directed 
towards allowing the appraisal of findings from one context to another. Thus, the reliability 
and validity of the qualitative research data is further analysed. 
Reliability of Data 
The perception of reliability in qualitative research is embedded in a comprehensive 
explanation of the methods adopted by the researcher for the field work, data collection, data 
analysis, data interpretation, and presentation of the research findings. This differs from 
reliability in quantitative research, which adopts tools that produce consistent results. Thus, the 
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study adopts qualitative research methods on causes of inter-community conflict in the ND, by 
presenting the process in an honest and transparent way. This includes delineating the 
preparation for the field work session, the procedures and processes of data collection, data 
analysis, data interpretation and data presentation for any audience and reader to imaginatively 
replicate the research (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). To be specific, the researcher carried out 
various steps to ensure the reliability of the study: the concept of triangulation was adopted by 
applying multiple methods:  semi-structured interviews, observation and document review; the 
model of iterative approach was applied, when the researcher employed the initial data analysis 
as a foundation for making decisions on further data collection and analysis. These steps ensure 
that the research study adopted a qualitative method of honesty and transparency to ensure 
reliability of data. 
Validity of Data 
The validity of the study centres on allowing the comparisons of findings from one context to 
another that lies above the research focus through the application of a broad description. Thus, 
an elaborate description of the research findings allows academics reviewing a study to 
examine whether the results depict any shared characteristics that can allow for the findings to 
be generalised above the study (Miller & Brewer, 2003). The study adopts this approach by 
expressing how inter-community conflict is synonymous to intergroup conflict by highlighting 
how the nature of NDCs reflects that of sovereign states, autonomous regions and groups i.e. 
city states and religious groups. It further compares the features of the ND environment where 
NDCs are located to that of the international system that comprises sovereign states. This also 
extends to the association of similarities between the factors that facilitate conflict between 
NDCs and those that trigger violence between sovereign states, as well as autonomous regions 
and groups. These were captured in the concept of traditional versus modern values, with the 
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traditional reflecting the nature and characteristics of NDCs and the modern that of sovereign 
states and autonomous groups in an ineffective governmental environment. 
Ethical Review 
A credible social research demands that it conforms to four ethical principles regarding 
voluntary participation, informed consent, avoiding hazard to participants, and confidentiality 
and anonymity (De Vaus, 2013). Social research ethics demand that the researcher guarantee 
that the profits of the study would dwarf any potential hazard, and that the study is supervised 
by an institutional research committee (Creswell, 2013; De Vaus, 2013). The study on causes 
of inter-community conflict in the ND was sensitive to the principles of moral research ethical 
practice in respect to the expectations, norms and character of the participants in relation to the 
data collection activity. 
The researcher ensured that the study met ethical standards by carrying out the following steps. 
Firstly, the researcher applied for and was granted ethical clearance by Coventry University’s 
ethics procedures and processes before embarking on the field work. Secondly, a consent letter 
and participation leaflet, outlining the purpose of the research, requests for consent to 
participate, rights of withdrawal from participating at any time, and the basis for selecting 
participants, were given or sent to all participants. Thirdly, interviews conducted with 
participants and community leaders were arranged in suitable and safe locations, as well as 
commencing with a salutation in the respondent’s language to establish a friendly atmosphere. 
Fourthly, the researcher paid careful attention to sensitive issues such as ethnic division, 






This chapter has outlined the analytical framework, as well as the methodology adopted for the 
research. Each of these were specifically formulated and designed because of the limited 
response of existing research to the causes of inter-community conflict in the ND. Firstly, the 
analytical framework consists of connections amongst characteristics such as NDCs’ inherent 
autonomy, the vulnerable environment and the circumstances of community governance in the 
region, as well as the relationship amongst communities in order to investigate causes of inter-
community conflict in the ND. In other words, the framework stipulates that the inherent 
autonomy of NDCs, propelled by the contrast between traditional and modern values, accounts 
for why communities collectively engage one another in violent conflict over social, economic 
and political resource factors. This framework becomes the backdrop used to assess, evaluate, 
and interpret the case study adopted to investigate the causality of inter-community conflict in 
the ND. This allowed the research to formulate as well as outline the information needed to 
address the overall research question: does the causality of inter-community conflict in the ND 
conform to the drivers of conflict emanating from traditional versus modern values? Secondly, 
to address this question, lapses found in the existing literature suggest that the qualitative 
research design is best suited to exploring political processes synonymous to inter-community 
conflict in the ND. This informed the methodology for managing, collecting, analysing, 
interpreting and presenting data in the research. The techniques adopted for gathering data on 
the case study necessary for addressing the research question were semi-structured interviews, 




Chapter 4: The Context of Inter-Community Conflict in the ND 
Introduction  
The analytical framework in the previous chapter argues that NDCs are ‘inherently 
autonomous’. It further argues that NDCs’ traditional way of handling relations with other 
NDCs differs from, and is parallel to, the LGA’s current ‘modern’ approach to the 
administration of communities within their authority. Arguably, this instigates inter-
community conflict, whereby communities are willing to fight to maximise access to the 
benefits of social, economic and political goods under the control of the LGA’s administrators. 
This chapter explores the nature and causes of inter-community conflict in the ND, notably in 
the most conflict-prone states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. 
The chapter seeks to accomplish this with an overview of the institutions surrounding LGAs 
and ND states, and how NDCs belonging to the same jurisdiction are dependent on LGAs for 
the regulation of their social, economic and political activities. It sets out the constitutional role 
of the LGAs, and how the ND states reserves the constitutional authority to limit or expand 
LGAs’ jurisdiction over the resolution of inter-community conflict and NDCs’ social, 
economic and political affairs. Additionally, social, economic and political factors are analysed 
in relation to intergroup conflict, demonstrating its relevance from the perspective that a 
community is a peculiar form of group. The chapter concentrates on the scope of the three ND 
states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, as well as analysing the number of key inter-community 
conflicts that occurred in these states from 2003 to 2014. It then sets out that conflict starts 
either by dispute between opposing community members (inter-personal conflict), hostility 
between NDCs’ ethnic groups, or a rational decision made by a community as an autonomous 




4.2 An Overview of the Niger Delta’s Institutions 
As analysed in the literature review, the ND comprises nine states: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. These constitute the ND states. These ND 
states consist of 185 LGAs that contain 13,329 NDCs (NDDC Masterplan, 2006), with a 
varying number of LGAs in each ND state. For example, Bayelsa has 8 LGAs, Delta has 25 
LGAs and Rivers has 23 LGAs (Deltastate.com, 2014). Constitutionally, LGAs are administers 
with the support of wards that acts as congress. Each LGA is administered by a local 
government council consisting of an LGC, who is the chief executive, alongside elected 
members known as councillors, who are representatives of their respective wards (Ukiwo, 
2006). However, wards are vaguely designated to the extent that ordinary people often struggle 
to distinguish one from another, especially given that wards are popularly denoted by coded 
numbers. The more familiar traditional administrative entities such as clans, kingdoms, ethnic 
or tribal groups, and communities within an LGA are popularly known by their names. 
Amongst these familiar traditional entities, a community is always located within an LGA 
(Deltastate.com), whilst a clan, kingdom, ethnic or tribal group can extend to two or three 
LGAs depending on their sizes.  
Within and between LGAs, are ethnic or tribal groups delineated by language, culture and 
customs. Walter Opello and Stephen Rosow recognise traits including language, culture and 
customs as the fundamental definitional characteristics of an ethnic group, which, whilst not 
necessarily inhabiting a single bounded territory, also define an autonomous group or nation: 
A third historical rival to the nation-state is the ethnic group. An ethnic group is 
a non-territorial social group composed of numerous extended families grouped 
into clans, which are believed to be related to one another by being the 
descendants of a common mythical ancestor. Social solidarity is based on ties of 
67 
 
blood and kinship, not territorialized national identity. Governance of the ethnic 
group is in the hands of a hereditary chief from one of the families or clans, 
usually assisted by a council of elders or warriors. The clear majority of human 
beings who have ever lived on the planet have lived in ethnicities. Ethnicities 
exist today, especially in Africa, but have been surpassed and overlain by the 
nation-state. Occasionally an ethnic group is given a state of its own (e.g., 
Botswana, Swaziland); more typically, however, a state contains many ethnicities 
(e.g., the Yorubas, Ibos, and Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria), or a straddle the borders 
between one or more states (e.g., the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran). 
(2004, p.10) 
Opello and Rosow recognise that there are instances where ethnic groups are coterminous with 
a bounded territory such as in Botswana and Swaziland. This is mirrored as a microcosm in 
NDCs. 
In practice, within the ND, the terms ethnicity, clans, kingdoms, villages, towns, cities and 
communities are interchangeable. A ND indigene might interchange these terms, hence 
confusing their meaning, since definitions continue to be amorphous and ambiguous. However, 
despite this confusion, ethnicity, clans, kingdoms, villages, towns, cities and communities as 
constructs are familiar to indigenes, whilst LGA wards are not. Moreover, the number of wards 
and NDCs in an LGA are often not the same; for example, in Port Harcourt LGA there are 20 
wards and 23 NDCs (NDDC Masterplan, 2006). Thus, some LGA wards can contain more than 
one NDC.  
The constitutional role of LGAs is delineated by their political and geographical jurisdictions. 
Each LGA has authority in a wide spectrum of activities that reflect the day-to-day life of a 
community. The limitations of LGAs’ jurisdiction over the resolution of inter-community 
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conflict is set out in the latter part of this section. Section 7 of the General Provisions Act 
defines the constitutional roles of an LGA as follows,   
Economic recommendations to the state; collection of taxes and fees; establishment 
and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds, and homes for the destitute or 
infirm; licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), 
canoes, wheel barrows and carts; establishment, maintenance and regulation of 
markets, motor parks and public conveniences; construction and maintenance of 
roads, streets, drains and other public highways, parks, and open spaces; naming 
of roads and streets, and numbering of houses; provision and maintenance of public 
transportation and refuse disposal; registration of births, deaths and marriages; 
assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for levying such rates as may 
be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a State; control and regulation of out-
door advertising, movement and keeping of pets of all descriptions, shops and 
kiosks, restaurants and other places for the sale of food to the public, and laundries 
and; licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor (General Provisions Act, 
SN (1999) C1, S 7). 
Formally, an LGA’s authority extends to the administration of the social, economic and 
political activities of its constituent NDCs. Also, according to section 7 of the General 
Provisions Act, the constitutional role of an LGA council includes participation in state 
government of in the following areas, 
The provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education; the 
development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of 
materials; the provision and maintenance of health services; and; such other 
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functions as may be conferred on a local government council by the House of 
Assembly of the State (General Provisions Act, SN (1999) C1, S 7).   
Therefore, as can be seen from the extensive roles and tasks assigned to LGAs by the General 
Provisions Act, each LGA has a wide-ranging input into many aspects of the local 
communities’ daily life. This includes conflict resolution. However, there are important 
limitations to the role that LGAs can, and do, play in addressing inter-community conflict. 
LGAs’ constitutional function that may be conferred by the State’s House of Assembly include 
the resolution of conflict between NDCs. In the states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, resolution 
of conflict between communities are the responsibilities of LGAs and the states. Whilst the 
state governments give directives to their respective commissioners of police to enforce the 
law, local governments being the governmental tier closest to the communities, set up conflict 
resolution forums including leaders of involved parties (Akinsanmi, 2013). Examples of this 
include the 2006 inter-community conflict between Akassa and Egwema communities when 
the Brass LGA set up a conflict resolution forum involving leaders from both NDCs (Peterside, 
2007). The constitutional role of conflict resolution between NDCs by the core ND states’ 
governments is also intrinsically limited by the necessity for LGA leaders to collaborate with 
state governors who exercise authority over the forces of order that operate across all NDCs 
with a state’s boundaries.  
Another limitation of LGAs’ jurisdiction is the ultimate overriding power of the FGN over ND 
states and LGAs.  According to section 1 of the General Provisions Act, the federal government 
reserves the power to overrule the constitutional authority of state and local governments where 
there are conflictual interests or in a situation where that requires intervention to protect the 
national interest (General Provisions Act, SN (1999) C1, S 1). In addition, the constitutional 
role of the ND states on conflict resolution between communities by giving directives to the 
commissioner of police to enforce peace is restricted by the FGN (Akinsanmi, 2013). For 
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example, section 2 of the General Provisions Act states that the commissioner of police, before 
enforcing the directives of a state governor, reserves the right to seek the approval of the 
president of the FGN on matters concerning federal properties before carrying out such 
directives (General Provisions Act, SN (1999) C1, S 2). Such restrictions, limits both the ND 
states and LGAs power over conflict resolution in their constituent’s NDCs. 
The limitation of ND state governors’ power to direct the police force necessarily limits the 
LGAs’ authority over conflict resolution between communities. This is based on the notion that 
ND states and LGAs for logistic and personnel reasons must work closely together to resolve 
community conflicts. Conversely, LGAs and FGN do not work together directly, but rather 
communicate through state governments (Akinsanmi, 2013). Such limited communications 
between LGAs and the FGN makes conflict resolution a more complex and protracted process. 
This is particularly the case in inter-community conflicts that require the intervention of the 
military which are under the direct command of the FGN. An example of this is the 
militarisation of Warri city in 2003 following conflict between Okere-Urhobo and Okere-
Itsekiri (Agbegbedia, 2013). Often ND state governments request military intervention early in 
the course of a conflict, effectively limiting the capacity of the LGA to influence mediation. 
However, although limited by constitutional and jurisdiction boundaries, LGAs still exercise a 
key and highly sensitive role in conflict resolution. They are the entities responsible for the 
setting up of forums that bring the warring parties together. More trenchantly, LGAs represent 
the layer of administration closest socially, economically and politically to the NDCs.           
As set out above, the administration of the social, economic and political activities in NDCs 
constitutionally requires LGAs to provide and sustain the welfare of those who live in their 
constituent NDCs. The inability to provide and sustain members’ welfare can instigate conflict 
in cases where marginalisation is perceived to be inflicted on one NDC by another. Such 
scenarios often stem from the prejudicial administration of an LGA by the executive and chief 
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administrator of that LGA who prefer their own NDCs to the detriment of the social, political 
and economic welfare of other NDCs. It is this inefficient, unfair and/or prejudiced 
management of these key sectors that can easily lead to conflict. 
As stated previously, the concept of inter-community conflict is violent conflict between two 
NDCs, and is based on group or community-identity conflict. Group or community identity 
conflict argues that intergroup conflict is synonymous with inter-community conflict. This is 
based on the definition of NDCs as identified groups operating in the form of communities. 
For example, the Ugbokodo and Gbaramatu are two different groups that identify their 
settlements with their respective community names (Ukiwo, 2007). The Okere-Urhobo and the 
Okere-Itsekiri are two different groups (Agbegbedia, 2013) which split the defunct Okere 
community when both were created in 2003 as separate communities. Group identity in the ND 
has often been associated with the discovery of crude oil in a part of the ND, and has become 
key to gaining access to the economic benefits from exploiting these finds. The intergroup 
conflicts between Bayelsa’s Ofonobiri and Opuama in 2002 (Ibaba, 2009), Delta’s Itsekiri and 
Urhobo in 1997 (Obi, 2010), and Rivers’ Ogoni and Okrika in 1994 (Okolo, 2008) can be 
understood as groups of individuals coming together to share an identity for the common 
interest of securing such benefits. Whilst Ofonobiri and Opuama are perceived as NDCs (Ibaba, 
2009), Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ogoni and Okrika are viewed as ethnicities (Obi, 2010; Okolo, 2008). 
Though the word ‘group’ goes beyond NDCs and ethnicities, and could also mean nation-
states, continental regions and religions (Cederman et al., 2010), what is deduced here is that 
they all constitute intergroup conflict, with each group having a peculiar definition. As peculiar 
as different groups’ definitions may be, intergroup conflicts appear to have similar social, 
economic and political implications. From a social perspective, Jeffrey Seul argues that it is 
the overarching concept of identity competition that depicts intergroup conflicts as resulting 
from social factors. His concept of identity competition maintains that social identity theory 
72 
 
plays a central role in the inception and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when economic 
and political factors are also at play (1999). Individual and group identity competition is 
considered a by-product of an individual’s efforts to satisfy basic human needs, seen as 
psychological. Thus, religions often serve these psychological needs more comprehensively 
and potently than other repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of individual and group identities (Seul, 1999). 
This implies that religions supply cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, 
traditions and other identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for 
psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem 
and even self-actualisation. Seul argues that the ‘peculiar ability of religion to serve the human 
identity impulse thus may partially explain why intergroup conflict so frequently occurs along 
religious fault lines’ (1999, p.553). He gives examples of this overlap of ethnicity and religion 
in the conflicts in the Balkans, Sudan, East Timor and Sri Lanka. The concept of identity 
competition can be broken into three major attributes: a sense of belonging, self-esteem and 
self-actualisation; identity is the main rationale behind the forming of groups providing a sense 
of social protection against rivals. However, does group identity underpin the conflicts between 
communities in the ND in the same way as in the Balkans, Sudan, East Timor and Sri Lanka? 
This is to be investigated in a later chapter of the thesis. Thus, just as identity competition 
underpins the social aspect of intergroup conflict, economic and political factors also abound. 
Ostby (2008), Cederman et al. (2010) and Langer (2004), defines a group to mean ethnic, 
religious and continental regions that went into intergroup conflict due to economic and 
political reasons. Ostby analyses 39 developing countries, measuring economic polarisation to 
imply average household assets owned by members belonging to different groups, and 
concluding that the higher the level of economic polarisation between two groups, the higher 
the risk of intergroup conflict (2008). Similarly, Cederman demonstrates that groups with 
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wealth levels either poorer or richer than the country’s average are more likely to experience 
intergroup conflict (2010). Langer likewise explains intergroup conflict in Ivory Coast in 1994 
as a result of the economic grievances of the northern population, who felt economically 
discriminated against by the southern-dominated government (2004). 
These three scholars also explain the connection between economic discrimination between 
groups and political rationales for conflict. For Ostby, groups form political organisations as 
symbols of shared identity, and shared grievances, to build a sense of common interest in order 
to achieve economic goals. He cites the higher levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita than the national average in some Indonesian regions as the main reason for continued 
intergroup conflict (Ostby, 2008). Likewise, Cederman et al. claim that countries with high 
degrees of political exclusion are more likely to experience armed conflict between ethnic 
groups, since the exclusion from political power of one group implies its economic downturn 
(Cederman et al., 2010). In addition, Langer argues that the political schisms in Ivory Coast in 
1994 were predicated on economic disparity between the north and south (2004). 
Ostby, Cederman and Langer’s conception is that the attempt to regulate the economic scale 
and political relevance between groups belonging to same region is the primary reason for 
intergroup conflict. In other words, regulating economic scale means poorer regions attempt to 
balance the situation or overcome the richer regions, or the richer regions attempt to protect or 
increase their monetary status, or when both are at the same level, one seeks a higher status. 
All of this infuriates the other party and subsequently triggers intergroup conflict. Political 
irrelevance becomes a major centrepiece with which these regions or groups feel negligence, 
marginalisation and inequalities in terms of their relationship with the dominant groups. These 
eco-politico connotations give motivation to the dominated group to fight back through armed 
conflict (Ostby, 2008). Whilst a country has an average national GDP, those groups that fall 
below this, while also excluded from power at the same time, are likely to instigate civil wars 
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(Cederman et al., 2010). This is noted for instigating inter-ethnic conflict between the north 
and south of Ivory Coast in 1994 (Langer, 2004). Conversely, in countries where one group is 
economically privileged and the other has political power, such as Malaysia, conflict seems to 
be less likely (Barrow, 1976). In other words, Ostby (2008), Cederman et al. (2010), and Langer 
(2004) suggest that in regions where both economic benefits and political authority belong to 
one set of groups, there is bound to be intergroup conflict, due to the agitation of the 
marginalised or the determination of the dominant to continue to protect their status. 
Thus, intergroup conflict understood as fight between two groups is analysed to illuminate how 
communities, which are a type of group, can become motivated by social, economic and 
political factors in starting inter-community conflict. However, it is not certain whether the 
analysis of ethnic groups, religious groups, regional groups, social groups, economic groups 
and political groups conforms to community groups. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will investigate how 
social, economic and political factors affect the causality of inter-community conflict. This 
section is not intended to compare how these scholars’ intergroup analysis conforms or 
contrasts with social, economic and political factors affecting inter-community conflict. 
However, it demonstrates how they can be relevant in understanding the causality of conflict 
between NDCs, considering that communities are a peculiar type of group found in every part 
of the ND region. Thus, though there are nine ND states forming the region, the thesis 
concentrates on the most conflict-prone states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. 
4.3 Conflict Scenarios in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States 
The present composition of the ND region is a pragmatic one, bringing together all oil-
producing ND states in the Nigerian Federation. Historically and cartographically, Bayelsa, 
Delta and Rivers made up the Palm Oil Rivers, which was the British Oil Rivers Protectorate 
from 1885 until 1893, when it was expanded and became the Niger Coast Protectorate 
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(Coombes, 1994), later becoming known as the ND (Willink, 1958). In 2001, the president of 
the World Environmental Movement for Africa (WEMFA), Stephen Siniktiem Azaiki, stated 
in a report to the President of the FRN: 
We have studied the position papers of the Bayelsa Leaders of Thought, the 
Movement of Concerned People of the Niger Delta, Major Isaac Adaka Boro’s 
papers and they hold almost the same views as the report of the WEMFA study on 
the Developmental Needs of 1995. It is our understanding that the Niger Delta, of 
truth, historically and cartographically is the present Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta 
States (Azaiki, 2003). 
These three core ND states, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, are the states most prone to conflict 
between their constituent communities (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Noteworthy inter-communal conflicts in the most conflict-prone ND states up to 
2006 
 ND state of Bayelsa ND state of Delta  ND state of Rivers 
Okpoama vs. Ewoama 
Twon-Brass vs. Okpoama 
Liama vs. Beletiama 
Emadike vs. Epebu 
Egweama vs. Beletiama 
Oleh vs. Olomoro 
Isama vs. Gbarigolo 
Ogidigbe vs. Okerenkoko 
Odimodi vs. Ogualagha 
Olota vs. Oboro  
Emohua vs. Ogbakiri 
Okrika vs. Elesa-Eleme 
Bille vs. Ke 
Ekunuga vs. Okolomade 
Soku vs. Kula  




More recently, other sources such as the Niger Delta Watch have indicated that violent conflict 
continues to increase in these three ND states. Figure 4.1 shows the number of violent incidents 
that occurred between January 2007 and December 2012 across the ND region. 
Figure 4.1 Violent incidents in the ND between 2007 and 2012 
 
Source: Niger Delta Watch (2014) 
The map shows that the ND state of Bayelsa, consisting of Yenagoa, Buguma and Edumanom, 
had a total of 16 violent incidents. The ND state of Delta, consisting of Sapele, Ughelli, Warri 
and Uwheru, had a total of 14 violent incidents. The ND state of Rivers, consisting of Port 
Harcourt and Ataba had a total of 44 violent incidents. The number of incidents in these three 
states significantly outnumbers the total number of violent incidents in the other ND states. 
Bayelsa shares boundaries with Delta to the west, with Rivers to the east, with these two ND 
states bordering the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. With 1.7 million people, Bayelsa 
is one of the smallest Nigerian states by population, yet produces 30–40% of Nigeria’s crude 
oil and natural gas. In addition to the petroleum sector, the state has a commercial fishing 
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industry and produces palm oil, raffia palm, rubber and coconut (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). 
Figure 4.2 indicates the conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA in Bayelsa from 
2010 to 2014. 
Figure 4.2 Bayelsa conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA 
 
Source: Conflict Bulletin (2014) 
Though the fatality rate appears to be declining, the number of violent incidents continues to 
rise, leading to the destruction of infrastructure and thwarting opportunities for development. 
Conflict risk factor incidents in Bayelsa soared in 2013, with a steadily increasing pace in 2014. 
This implies that conflict is on the rise in different LGAs. In the state of Bayelsa, inter-
community conflict is identified by the Conflict Bulletin to be the most destructive type of 
conflict (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). Ibaba (2009) comparing the most destructive types of 
conflict in Bayelsa argues that inter-community conflict is the most destructive. He determines 
that 62.4% of all conflicts in Bayelsa are inter-community conflicts, 27.4% are conflicts 
between NDCs and the FGN, and 12.9% are conflicts between NDCs and MNCs. Similarly, 
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NDCs in the Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs of Bayelsa have a high probability of engaging in inter-
community conflict, due to their strategic location in the oil fields and the large oil-derived 
financial allocations from the FGN (SDN, 2014). The state of Delta has a similar profile.  
Delta shares boundaries with the ND state of Edo to the west, with Bayelsa to the east, the state 
of Anambra to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. With 4.1 million people, Delta is 
the second most populous ND state after Rivers. It produces 35% of Nigeria’s crude oil and a 
considerable amount of its natural gas. It is also rich in tuber crops such as potatoes, yams, 
cassava and cocoa yams. The area has a legacy of community, ethnic and political tensions that 
have been exacerbating since 1997 (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). The area is documented for its 
conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA. 
Figure 4.3 Delta conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA 
 
Source: Conflict Bulletin, 2014 
Unlike Bayelsa, Delta’s fatality rate and conflict incidents have been steadily increasing from 
mid-2012. This shows that conflict activities in the area need urgent attention to halt their 
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steadily increasing pace. Moreover, conflict activities appear to be evenly spread across the 
indicated LGAs, with Aniocha North and Aniocha South recording the highest figures from 
beginning to mid-2014. The indication of high conflict risk factors in Delta implies that inter-
community conflict will be a major factor. Among the conflict risk factors in Delta, ethnic 
conflict is highlighted to be the most widespread in the area (Conflict Bulletin, 2014; Ikelegbe, 
2006). Ethnic conflict in Delta has often been argued to degenerate into inter-community 
conflict, since the larger ethnic group is not committed to fighting a course that concerns an 
NDC within that ethnic group. In the light of this, Agbegbedia (2014) argued that the deadly 
Warri crisis in 2003, between the ethnic groups of Itsekiri and Urhobo, was indeed an inter-
community conflict between the NDCs of Okere-Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri, of Warri South 
LGA, Delta. His words were  
nevertheless, there seems to be diversity about the crisis in Warri. This is since 
some Urhobos believe the crisis is concerned with only a family lineage that is 
fighting the Itsekiris. These families are fighting for their own selfish end and not 
for the interest of the whole Urhobo ethnic nation (Agbegbedia, 2014, p.346). 
This was also the view presented by Okolo (2008) when he explained that the quest to establish 
boundaries between the ethnic groups of Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri in Delta have instigated 
more than 12 inter-community conflicts between 1992 and 2005 in the area. An inter-
community conflict associated with this view is Esanma vs. Gbarigolo in 1997. Esanma is of 
the Ijaw ethnic group in Burutu LGA, Delta, and Gbarigolo is an NDC of the Urhobo ethnic 
group in Ughelli South LGA, Delta. Likewise, Kpakiama vs. Olodiama in 1992, where the 
Kpakiama community is of the Ijaw ethnic group in Bomadi LGA, Delta, and Olodiama 
belonged to the Urhobo ethnic group in Ughelli South LGA, Delta (Okolo, 2008). It should be 
noted that while these NDCs in conflict are in different LGAs in the ND state of Delta, it would 
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be irrational to call it inter-LGA conflict. It is in this same sense that Okolo saw ethnic conflict 
in Delta as inter-community conflict. Thus, inter-community conflict becomes paramount in 
the Delta, as NDCs from different ethnic groups involved in violent disputes with each other 
end up fighting their own course, just as NDCs within the same ethnic group are involved in 
fierce conflict against each other in order to defend their interests. Such enormous violent 
disputes between NDCs in Delta are also evident in the ND state of Rivers. 
Rivers shares boundaries with Bayelsa to the west, Delta to the north-west, the ND state of 
Akwa-Ibom to the east, the ND state of Abia to the north-east, the state of Imo to the north, 
and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. With over 5.1 million people, Rivers is the most populous 
ND state. It produces 48% of Nigeria’s crude oil and a considerable amount of its natural gas. 
It is rich in farm lands and fisheries, and has the second largest commercial and agricultural 
centre, as well as the second largest seaport in the country after the state of Lagos 
(Lawnigeria.com, 2017). The area had been at the heart of the ND militancy until 2009, when 
it became ravelled with a different array of issues, as some former combatants turned to 
criminality, since uneven economic development continued to present a problem to 
sustainability and human security (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). The area is documented for its 
conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA. 
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Figure 4.4 Rivers conflict risk factors and insecurity per capita by LGA
 
Source: Conflict Bulletin 2014 
Like Delta, Rivers’ fatality rates soared at an alarming level, and its conflict incidents increased 
at a steady pace from mid-2013 to mid-2014. This shows that its conflict risk factors are 
worrisome, with the indicated LGAs having more insecurity than those of Delta. The 
worrisome insecurity level results from conflict activities, of which inter-community conflict 
is included. Thus, the alarming rates of conflict risk factors and insecurity in Rivers are said to 
be aggravated by political tensions, cult violence, militancy and inter-communal disputes. 
Inter-community conflict is among such factors and rampant in the LGAs of Port Harcourt, 
Khana and Gokana, where communities are engaged in disagreement over land ownership and 
oil locations (SDN, 2014; Vanguard, 2013). The percentage at which inter-community conflicts 
occur in the area is summed to be even (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). These inter-community 
tensions have different timescales, with their intensity fluctuating around the timeline of key 




4.4 Timeline of Inter-Community Conflict in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers 
The timeline of key events spreads across the three ND states, with violent incidents relating 
to inter-community tensions springing up at different intervals in diverse locations. The period 
of 2003 to 2014 unveiled six key cases (1 in Bayelsa, 3 in Delta and 2 in Rivers) of inter-
community conflicts in the ND according to the timeframe in the three ND states, which this 
section analyses on a quarterly basis. 
In the ND state of Delta, the NDCs of Okere-Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri in Warri South LGA 
engaged in violent conflict in 2003 (Agbegbedia, 2014). The violence began on the weekend 
of January 31/February 1, 2003, during the lead up to the Nigerian state and FGN elections 
held in April and May of the same year. The fight was alleged to have been aggravated by the 
primary election being held for the Delta South senatorial district by the People's Democratic 
Party (PDP), the incumbent party both in Delta and at the federal level (Human Rights Watch, 
2003a). The dispute centred on the number of wards forming the district, and the boundaries 
between the wards, which the Okere-Urhobo community alleged disadvantaged them. 
According to local accounts and press reports, Okere-Urhobo youths attacked the Okere-
Itsekiri area on the afternoon of January 31, and began to loot and burn properties (Human 
Rights Watch, 2003a). The Okere youths then converged at the Warri township football 
stadium, where the primary voting was taking place, and retaliated in response to reports of the 
raid. Over the next couple of days, most of the large housing estate belonging to Chief 
Benjamin Okumagba (the traditional ruler of the Okere-Urhobo community) was destroyed 
(UNDP, 2006). Estimates of the number of dead people during the conflict ranged from 200–
1,200, with over 6,000 inhabitants displaced (Human Rights Watch Interviews, 2003). These 
damages caused by violent conflict brought about the shutdown of crude oil activity in the 
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Warri area, as the then ND state Governor Chief James Ibori declared a state of emergency 
(Natufe, 2006), which halted other commercial activities. Warri South LGA, being the centre 
for crude oil and commercial activities, commonly experiences inter-community conflict over 
lands enriched with crude oil minerals. This view motivates Kemedi to argue that the location 
of oil productions has become a factor engineering envy and disagreement among different 
NDCs regarding land that makes an oil community (Kemedi, 2003). Thus, the root of the 
conflict can be traced to ownership of the oil-rich Warri land. 
In mid-2003, the benefits accrued from oil lands were to cause the major incident that kicked 
off the conflict between the NDCs of Nembe-Ogbolomabiri and Nembe-Bassambiri in Nembe 
LGA, Bayelsa. The conflict was the result of stiff competition over control of the oil industry, 
which can be traced back to the late 1980s, when the Nembe Council of Chiefs acquired the 
power from their king to negotiate benefits with the MNCs in the area (Kemedi, 2005). Nembe, 
being a kingdom and an LGA at the same time, had Nembe-Ogbolomabiri and Nembe-
Bassambiri, among others, as their constituent communities, which led to the negotiation of oil 
benefits to be perceived by Nembe-Bassambiri as a process of marginalisation, since Nembe-
Ogbolomabri had more chiefs in the council (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). This is due to the 
notion that the word ‘Nembe’ in its actual sense means Ogbolomabiri. This automatically 
presents the NDC of Nembe-Ogbolomabiri as the rightful owner of the kingdom and LGA, 
which provides them with more chiefs in the council, while Nembe-Bassambiri contends that 
Nembe is a common heritage to which any one community cannot lay claim (Kemedi, 2005). 
This long-standing bitterness between these NDCs in Nembe was to intensify between mid-
2002 and mid-2003, when a group from Ogbolomabiri arrived in Bassambiri to collect the 
election materials for the Nembe LGA Chairmanship seat. The Nembe-Ogbolomabiri residents 
reported that they heard gunshots, and the group that had gone to collect the materials made 
quick calls back to Nembe-Ogbolomabiri to report that they had come under attack by means 
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of broken bottles and sticks. They were told to return to Nembe-Ogbolomabiri as quickly as 
possible. One young man, a speedboat driver who was in the group sent from Nembe-
Ogbolomabiri to Nembe-Bassambiri, reported that some youths from Nembe-Bassambiri 
started beating them, and that most of the group, which was unarmed and not prepared for 
attack, ran off. A friend from Nembe-Bassambiri helped him escape across the water in a 
speedboat back to the jetty on the Nembe-Ogbolomabiri side (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). 
Thus, the contention over controlling the oil-rich land of Nembe has seen properties and lives 
destroyed in the area. 
As contentious as oil lands may seem, in November 2003 the violent conflict between the 
NDCs of Owhor and Effurun-Otor, both in Ughelli South LGA, Delta, appeared to take a 
different perspective, being triggered by an emotional affair between two parties from opposite 
communities. It was reported that the two neighbouring communities locked horns in fierce 
battle after a minor disagreement concerning a love relationship matter at a burial ceremony 
(Vanguard, 2003). A news report revealed that trouble broke out when two male youths had a 
disagreement over a female friend, whom they both desired to accompany. The clash of 
interests led to a violent conflict, which subsequently resulted in the solidarity of people from 
both sides (the two communities represented). At the height of the conflict, three people were 
reportedly killed and several others wounded (Vanguard, 2003). Other inter-community 
conflict in the ND, the root causes of which can be traced back to late 2007, snowballed and 
triggered into the following decade. 
From late 2007 to the end of the decade, the Bangha kingdom of the Ogoni ethnic group, in 
Khana and Gokana LGAs, Rivers, encountered a series of farmland disputes between its 
constituent communities of Kere-bangha and Nyowi-bangha. These disputes were alleged to 
have been instigated by SPDC, resulting from oil spillages that degraded the farmland of 
indigenes (Opukri & Ibaba, 2008). Though SPDC is not seen as the immediate cause of the 
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conflict, its crude oil spill caused environmental degradation in the area, reducing available 
fertile soil, thereby leading to Kere-bangha and Nyowi-bangha fighting over the limited 
available fertile soil. Unlike purely crude oil-driven conflict, in 2008, the inter-community 
strife between Ogunu and Ugbuwangue, in Warri South LGA, Delta, re-ignited after its initial 
kick-off in 1976. This resulted when the families of E. A. Okorodudu from Ogunu and A. V. 
Deduwa from Ugbuwangue contested the ownership of a piece of land on the Ogunu and 
Ugbuwangue borderline in the Supreme Court (Vanguard, 2008). Though the conflict was not 
infamous, as no fatality was recorded, it has been noted in terms of the intermittent violence 
carried out by both NDCs’ youths. 
In June 2011, physical confrontation ensued between the communities of Luusue-Sogho and 
Kaani 1, both of Khana LGA in Rivers, leading to the loss of two lives (Social Action Group, 
2013). This was reported to have emanated from the land grab of the boundary land bordering 
both NDCs by the Rivers government for the purpose of a banana plantation project in 
collaboration with a Mexican company (Ogoninews, 2013). It was alleged that, while many 
communities refused to give up their land for such a project, a few others were cajoled into 
succumbing. Among these is the Luusue-Sogho, who received meagre compensation for their 
crops. This differing response between the communities in Khana LGA was said to be exploited 
by the Rivers government to create conditions that resulted in inter-community clashes, with 
the view that members of Luusue-Sogho led government agencies to survey lands belonging 
to other communities in the area (Social Action Group, 2013). The intent of the ND state 
government to grab the 200,000 hectares in the Khana LGA (Ogoninews, 2013) pioneered the 
encroachment of one community on another’s land. The trend of inter-community conflict in 




There are a number of common instigators of conflict between communities in the ND. The 
question of whether these instigating factors can be considered as ‘rational’ depends on the 
specifics of each factor. The key causes of inter-community conflict in the ND - boundary 
disputes, oil revenue disagreements, social imbalance, economic and political manoeuvring – 
impact both individuals and communities (and wider constructs such as ethnic groups) as a 
whole. According to Ukiwo, ethnic marginalisation is the fundamental driver of conflict and 
conflict is propelled by the wider ethnic group (Ukiwo, 2007). On the other hand, Ikelegbe and 
Akpan argue that it is individuals that initiate inter-community conflicts for economic 
(Ikelegbe, 2006) and political (Akpan, 2010) reasons. Ethnic groups constitute an identity 
wider than the community and multiple NDCs exist within the territorial extent of an ethnic 
group (Alagoa, 2005), therefore two ethnic groups engaging in conflict will be rightly described 
as inter-ethnic conflict. However, such inter-ethnic conflict according to Ukiwo can degenerate 
into inter-community conflict, thereby establishing one way in which inter-community 
conflicts start. For example, the inter-community conflict between Okere-Urhobo and Okere-
Itsikiri in 2003 is described as an inter-ethnic conflict between the Urhobo and Itsekiri ethnic 
groups that degenerated into violent conflict between their two constituent’s communities 
(Ukiwo, 2007; Agbegbedia, 2013).  
Another way in which conflicts start, whilst similar to the first, is conflict between individual 
members, which can be termed inter-personal conflict. According to Ikelegbe and Akpan, this 
inter-personal conflict can escalate into inter-community conflict when a whole community are 
involved.  For example, from an economic perspective, Ikelegbe argues that MNCs’ 
stakeholders and politicians instigate conflict between NDCs through raising false rumours, 
i.e. offensive and alarming information that infuriates communities, in order to maximise their 
profits through scarcity of petroleum products and inflation of prices which becomes possible 
under conflict circumstances (Ikelegbe, 2006). According to him, such individuals’ (MNC’s 
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stakeholders and politicians) interests clashes when they belong to different communities 
thereby leading to inter-personal dispute. Thus, whilst a few individuals instigate conflict, it is 
the NDCs that finds themselves involved in violence. Similarly, from a political viewpoint 
Akpan contends that politician sets up conflict between NDCs for them to prove a point of 
insecurity which they use as a campaigning advantage against their incumbent opponent by 
promising to instil peace if they are voted into power (Akpan, 2010). This exemplifies an inter-
personal dispute between politicians that manifests in the form of inter-community conflict.     
The ways in which inter-personal disputes do, or in some cases do not, transmute into inter-
community conflicts depends on the particularities of the communities, personalities and 
causes of conflict. For example, the Okere-Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri inter-community conflict 
in 2003 centred on a dispute between both communities over the numbers of wards accounting 
for votes needed to acquire the Delta South Senatorial district seat; the Nembe-Ogbolomabiri 
and Nembe-Bassambiri inter-community dispute in mid-2002 and 2003 over ownership of the 
oil rich land of Nembe; the violent contention between Kere-bangha and Nyowi-bangha in 
2007 over farmland; and the fierce conflict between Luusue-Sogho and Kaani 1 in 2011 over 
land grab blamed on Luusue-Sogho administrative members. In these cases, communities made 
conscious and rational group decisions to enter into conflict in order to protect their status. 
Access to oil-rich land and farmland. 
On the other hand, examples such as the Owhor and Effurun-Otor inter-community conflict in 
2003 which started as a result of a minor disagreement concerning a love relationship between 
two male youths that had a disagreement over a female friend, whom they both desired to 
accompany; and the inter-community dispute between Ogunu and Ogbuwangue in 2008 over 
the disagreement between the families of E. A. Okorodudu from Ogunu and A. V. Deduwa 
from Ugbuwangue on the ownership of a piece of land on the Ogunu and Ugbuwangue 
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borderline are cases where communities become drawn into conflict that were started by a few 
of the communities’ members.  
However, even conflicts that have their origin in inter-personal disputes can become long-
standing and virulent inter-community disputes, the Ogunu and Ogbuwangue conflict began in 
1976 (Vanguard, 2008). There is an element of rationality and self-interest on the part of the 
community in supporting what began as an inter-personal dispute in that the whole community 
benefits from the oil operations’ levy paid by the relevant MNC to the community. Also, since 
2001 violent confontations have occurred between Owhor and Effurun-Otor communities over 
disputed boundaries (Vanguard, 2003), which triggers inter-community conflict over minor 
issues like love relationship conflict between members from opposite NDCs. The rationality 
for Owhor and Effurun-Otor to support this is that both NDCs have a history of conflict and a 
community pride that they constantly protect. Thus, whether it is a rational decision made by 
a ‘community’ as an autonomous entity, instigated by the ethnic group or communities drawn 
into conflicts that have already been started by a few of its members, the underlying factor is 
that NDCs engage themselves in conflict for the benefits of the entire community irrespective 











This chapter demonstrates how the ND’s local government system of LGAs, forces NDCs to 
socially, economically and politically interact within the same geographical and political space. 
It sets out the constitutional obligations and limitations LGAs usurp over the resolution of inter-
community conflict and NDCs’ social, economic and political affairs. Furthermore, it explores 
the connectivity between the concepts of intergroup and inter-community, and explains how 
social, economic and political factors can motivate intergroup and/or inter-community conflict. 
The chapter investigates why the ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers are the most conflict-
prone areas in the ND and as such represent a highly suitable case for the study of inter-
community conflict. It examines the timeline of key events from 2003 to 2014, and explores 
how inter-community conflict has a destructive impact in the ND. Finally, it analyses whether 
it is a rational decision made by an NDC as an autonomous collective entity set up by the ethnic 
group or a few of its members that draws a community into conflict. The chapter determines 
that inter-community conflict erupts either through the rational decision made by an NDC, 
ethnic disagreements or that a community is drawn into conflict by a few of its members 
engaging in inter-personal disputes with members of a rival community.  
The following chapter marks the beginning of the chapters analysing the empirical data on the 
causality of inter-community conflict in the ND. It defines and delineates communities in the 
ND, showing how they resemble, and at same time differ, from other forms of groups. Chapter 
5 investigates how the study’s contextualising of NDCs’ nature contrasts to existing scholars’ 






Chapter 5: Defining Niger Delta Communities 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the setting within which NDCs exist in the ND. It sets out the 
institutional context, LGAs’ constitutional role and limitations of jurisdiction over inter-
community affairs, the relationship between intergroup and inter-community conflict, explores 
the specifics of the most conflict-prone ND states, outlines a timeline of inter-community 
conflict in the ND and sets out how inter-community conflict starts. However, to make sense 
of this context, a concrete understanding of what defines and delineates an NDC is required for 
the study. This chapter seeks to define NDCs by exploring gaps in the scholarly literature on 
community conflict in the ND. The existing literature’s definitions – that NDCs are villages, 
towns, clans and kingdoms, family kinship units, sub-ethnic groups, or based on common 
interests, as well as the understanding of NDCs as pre-colonial autonomous villages – are 
diverse and did not connect ancient and modern communities needed to achieve the aim and 
objective of the study. The literature does not take into consideration either the NDCs’ 
traditional and political delineations, or the difference between their status prior to and after 
contact with Europeans. These two elements are at the heart of this study’s critique of the 
existing scholarly conceptualisation of NDCs. 
The chapter is structured to investigate arguments that go beyond the understanding of NDCs 
as kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages (Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 
2003), kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006) and people with common 
interests (Frynas, 2000). It evaluates the divergent interpretations of these scholars, and 
incorporates the evidence and data gathered from respondents interviewed as part of the 
research for this study to disaggregate the plethora of overlapping terms for NDCs. To 
accomplish this, it explores synonymous features found in the disaggregation, and connects 
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them in terms of how they reflect the formation of LGAs’ geographical and political structures. 
It then deliberates on arguments that current NDCs are not the same as ancient autonomous 
communities in the ND, as claimed by Alagoa, but that both sustain similar characteristics of 
autonomy. This is explored by examining communities that existed prior to European advent, 
which introduced the current regime of LGAs presiding over present NDCs. It also explores 
Alagoa’s argument that NDCs are ancient clans or kingdoms (Alagoa, 1971) by investigating 
the relationship between the two – whether modern communities are the same as, or constitute 
geographical and traditional structures of, ancient clans or kingdoms. Furthermore, the chapter 
scrutinises the argument that NDCs are formed based on characteristics such as overpopulation, 
disagreements between groups, drive to maintain certain traditions, and administrations. This 
goes beyond Peterside’s argument that communities are only formed out of kinship lineage 
(Peterside, 2007), and Ikelegbe’s claim that they are essentially shaped by sub-ethnic groups 
(Ikelegbe, 2006). To consolidate the investigation, the research analyses NDC formation 
processes and the forces that necessitate their subsequent emergence. The chapter also proposes 
that the thesis’ definition and delineation of an NDC is aimed at achieving the aim and 
objectives of the thesis. It then concludes by bringing the analysis together, drawing 
conclusions and at the same time providing the necessary background information for the 
following Chapter 6, which seeks to analyse the characteristics of inter-community conflict in 
the ND.            
5.2 Assessing Divergent Definitions of Modern Niger Delta Communities 
The term ‘community’ is an existing phenomenon familiar both to those who live in the ND 
and scholars exploring the nature of conflict between these communities. Whilst limited 
literature exists on conflict between NDCs, there is a continuing problem of definition, with 
individual scholars defining NDCs as villages, towns, clans and kingdoms. Ite, arguing in 
favour of Shell as a major development facilitator in the area, uses the term ‘community’ to 
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mean ‘village’, referring to Ughotun village as a community that has benefited from Shell’s 
activities (2004). Omeje, while exploring conflict between the FGN and NDCs as the 
‘oilification of extra-oil conflict’, meaning that the FGN connects every uprising in the ND 
with oil in order justify the militarisation of the region, uses the term ‘community’ to mean a 
‘town’ when he refers to Odi town as a community (2004). Thus, NDCs are understood by Ite 
and Omeje to be either villages or towns. This does not correspond with the understanding of 
the ordinary ND indigene, since a village or town can be hardly distinguished from a kinship 
unit, clan, kingdom or city in the region. For example, as analysed in Chapter 2, clans and 
kingdoms are described as possessing the same characteristics, meaning they could easily be 
interchanged depending on whether the group in question has a king or clan head arrangement. 
Moreover, some clans or kingdoms signify particular ethnic groups, e.g. the Itsekiri kingdom 
is also known as the Itsekiri ethnic group, since all Itsekiri ethnic indigenes belong to the same 
kingdom. Thus, apart from NDCs being taken to mean villages and towns by scholars, they are 
also viewed as clans and kingdoms that have various meanings, thereby presenting the usage 
of the term ‘community’ as faulty and inaccurate. 
The use of the term ‘community’ in the scholarly literature seems arbitrary, and individual 
scholars do not seek to justify their use of the term. Whilst Ikelegbe (2005) considers Otorogu, 
Egbema, Agalabiri and Agbichiama to be communities, Joel Bisina (2003) understands these 
to be clans. Bisina uses the clan of Odimodi and the kingdom of Ogulagha to mean 
communities, as he writes that both communities entered into violent conflict in 2001 over the 
ownership of the oil terminal in Forcados, operated by SPDC (2003). This differs from Ibaba, 
who, when analysing community violence and sustainable development in Bayelsa, describes 
NDCs as kingdoms, mentioning Nembe-Ogbolomabri and Nembe-Gbasamabri as engaging in 
inter-community conflict in 2003 (Ibaba, 2009). In contrast, Ikelegbe equates communities to 
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sub-ethnic groups when he states that the protests of the Ogoni sub-ethnic communities in 
Rivers were suppressed between 1990 and 1996 (2006). 
Although 65% of ND community leaders classify villages in the region as NDCs, there appears 
to be no proper definition as to what differentiates villages from towns. According to Chris 
Nalaguo a Niger Delta community activist, a group of people can dictate whether their 
community should be a village or a town. 
The Nembe areas are towns, while the Apie areas of Agudama and Akenfa are 
villages. So, it depends on what the people want to identify themselves as. There 
are people who prefer calling themselves towns instead of villages. There is no 
proper definition of what distinguish a town from a village, so that is it. 
Importantly, they are discrete communities (Nalaguo, April 2014). 
Accordingly, Bright Okumagba the Secretary of Okere-Urhobo Community, Warri South 
LGA, ND state of Delta, stresses that a community can be referred to as a town, citing places 
such as Etegene, Okpokiti and Edjeba (Okumagba, March 2014). Contrarily, Henry Hope a 
Community Development Officer, Academic Associates Peaceworks, ND state of Delta, 
believes that once a village is subsumed by a town, it automatically becomes a community, but 
remains a village if isolated (Hope, April 2014). The significance of Hope’s interpretation is 
that towns can have a group of villages within them. 
Whilst respondents put forward conflicting views of what defines a town and a village, in the 
context of defining a community it seems that both can be considered a NDC, depending on 
their characteristics. This further confuses the use of the term ‘kingdom’ in the context of 
defining communities. Ibaba uses the term ‘town’ to describe Nembe-Ogbolomabri and 
Nembe-Gbasamabri when describing an inter-community conflict in 2003 (2009). Contrarily, 
these towns/NDCs of Nembe-Ogbolomabri and Nembe-Gbasamabri are also designated as 
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kingdoms (Nalaguo, April 2014), which makes determining what characteristics a place as a 
community complex. Apart from the view that these two Nembe towns/kingdoms do not have 
a village status, places that claim to have village status in the ND have also been described by 
Emmanuel Onobrakpeya the President General of Okere-Urhobo Kingdom, Warri South LGA, 
ND state of Delta, as no more than a cluster of extended families living in a part of the village 
(Onobrakpeya, April 2014). Thus, since the descriptions of these terms differ from one another, 
the characteristics that could portray a village, town or clan/kingdom as an NDC depend on the 
features they share, and that equally represents a community in the ND. However, such features 
will be difficult to prove, as villages, towns, clans and kingdoms can extend to two or more 
LGAs, which goes beyond an NDC normally located in one local government jurisdiction (see 
section 4.2). Considering this, it is possible that some villages, towns, clans or kingdoms could 
portray an NDC whilst others would not, i.e. in the case of any of these categories extending 
to two or more LGAs, it would be considered as going beyond the community status, which 
should normally be in one LGA. However, further analysis of NDCs’ ambiguity is needed to 
determine a valid definition. 
A further layer of ambiguity relates to the geography of the ND. The status of villages, towns, 
clans and kingdoms in the ND differs from one place to another. What is a kingdom to the Ijaw 
ethnic group could be a town to the Itsekiri ethnicity, and consequently, could occupy more 
than one LGA. 
The Itsekiris do not name their communities as clans or kingdoms, they only have 
theirs as towns. For instance, in Warri Southwest and Warri North LGAs, the 
Eweres from the Itsekiri ethnic group call themselves the Ewere town wherever 
they are located. But, the Ijaws have four kingdoms in Warri Southwest LGAs, 
namely Gbaramatu, Ogbe-ijoh, Sagba and Teburu. Each kingdom has its own town. 
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These Ijaw kingdoms also extend to places in Bayelsa state, and are called clans in 
those places (Hope, April 2014). 
This indicates that in areas where ethnic groups such as the Itsekiris dominate, there are mainly 
towns rather than kingdoms or clans (Hope, April 2014), unlike the territory that is dominated 
by the Ijaws, consisting of kingdoms and clans such as the Nembe kingdom and Biseni clan 
(Ikelegbe, March 2014; Nalaguo, April 2014). This then forms a complex scenario when 
generalising the definition of an NDC as a village, town, clan or kingdom. In the ND, clans and 
kingdoms are terms used interchangeably, with an area having a clan head understood to be a 
clan (Igiran, April 2014), and a place having a king described as a kingdom (Ikelegbe, April 
2014). However, not all clans appear to have just one ruler. A clan may be a federation or 
centralised system of governance, where the ruling class are members of the several 
communities that make up the clan (Ikelegbe, April 2014). Thus, the meaning of clan in the 
ND is different from the dictionary meaning that states it to be a group of people of common 
descent. As stated previously, in the context of this research, and in keeping with Alagoa, clans 
in the ND are understood to be a group of people with common identity such as language, 
culture and tradition, as well as being headed by a clan head (Alagoa, 2005). In this manner, a 
clan can also mean a sub-ethnic group, which further complicates the understanding of an NDC 
when referring to it as a clan or sub-ethnic group. Since clans share similar characteristics with 
sub-ethnic groups, it is important to recall the study’s understanding of an ethnic group as a 
large communal group possessing characteristics such as the same language, culture and 
customs (Ikelegbe, 2005). 
‘Ethnic’ in this sense connotes the dictionary meaning, ‘a people belonging to or deriving from 
the same racial, religious or linguistic traditions’ (Dictionary.com, 2017). Ethnic groups are 
bigger entities, which encompass clans and kingdoms, although ethnic groups that are clans or 
kingdoms themselves abound, i.e. as analysed earlier, the Itsekiri ethnic group is also a 
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kingdom. Examples of other ethnic groups include the Ijaws, Urhobos, Ogonis, Bini and 
Ikwerre (Ojuwu, March 2014; Otavie, April 2014). Some of these ethnic groups have one clan 
head or king with various communities under them. An example of this is the Olu, or king, of 
the Itsekiri ethnic group, where all the Itsekiri communities are under him (Iniku, April 2014). 
This is different from the Ijaw ethnic group, which has the Apie, Biseni, Okordia and other 
clans containing communities under them (Nalaguo, April 2014; Nengi, April 2014; Tamunor, 
April 2014), as well as the Urhobo ethnic group, which has various kingdoms such as Jesse, 
Agbarha, Olomu and others having communities under them (Okpeya, March 2014; 
Okumagba, March 2014; Oyoroko, March 2014). Figure 5.1 shows examples of ethnic groups 
in the ND state of Delta. 
Figure 5.1 Ethnic groups in the ND state of Delta 
 
Source: Global Security News (2007) 
Extrapolating the respondents’ comments, ethnic groups can be classified as clans or kingdoms, 
which invariably overlap with sub-ethnic groups, or parts of an entire ethnic group. Thus, 
except for ethnic groups such as the Itsekiri, which constitutes a kingdom, the Ijaw and Urhobo 
sustain sub-ethnic groups that are also classified as clans and kingdoms. For example, the 
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Urhobo ethnic group has Okpe kingdom, Uvwie kingdom and Udu kingdom. What can be 
deduced here is that, though these categories vary in status from one place to another, there are 
villages, towns, clans, kingdoms and sub-ethnic groups that can be classified as NDCs and 
those that cannot. However, scholars such as Peterside, Ukiwo and Frynas, who do not utilise 
such terms, view NDCs as smaller units such as kinship units, people settled in locations 
bearing identified names, and those that came together based on common interests. 
Peterside argues that NDCs are composed of kinship units having the same dialect, living in 
their own territory, and administered by a presiding elder male chief with the assistance of 
other co-equal elder chiefs (2007). This contends that NDCs represent a kinship lineage that 
can trace its descent to one origin; however, it is pertinent to note that NDCs exist in the ND, 
just as cities, states and countries exist around the world with known names. Ukiwo’s 
assessment of the causes of the violent strife between the Ugborodo and Gbaramatu NDCs in 
1976 is an example of a situation where the author acknowledges that the names of these places 
are the Ugborodo and Gbaramatu communities, since they have their names on signs at their 
entrances (2007), as is the convention of other towns around the world. Frynas, scrutinising 
community conflict erupting from anti-oil protests in the ND, mentioned community categories 
as village communities, rural communities and oil-producing communities (2000), thereby 
separating communities based on common interest. Such a basis of common interest indicates 
that communities can either be in a village, rural or oil-producing structure. Thus, though 
scholarly debates ensued regarding community conflicts in the ND, the definition of NDCs has 
often been confused by these scholars with kinship units and places with community signposts, 
as well as interest groups. The problem ascribed to such complex misunderstanding is that the 
word ‘community’ connotes a group, and both are considered abstract in themselves. Thus, 
communities and groups being abstract terms highlights the definitional ambiguity of NDCs. 
98 
 
Respondents associate definitional ambiguity with the NDCs’ lack of constitutional status. For 
many leaders from the NDCs, it is the absence of constitutional authority that marginalises 
their communities, with precedence resting with LGAs, the states and the FGN (Odje, March 
2014). Taking this further, it might be argued that the Nigerian constitution deliberately negates 
political powers previously exercised by NDCs prior to colonisation, reducing the communities 
to ‘traditional’ vestiges (Eyakade, March 2014). Moreover, NDCs are not given the legal 
authority to sue, unless they are being represented by or acting under a registered organisation, 
company or other governmental body (Duumaa, April 2014). These voices from the NDCs 
emphasise the perceived absence of salience imposed by the constitutional vacuum regarding 
NDCs. Accordingly, sections 1 and 2 of the Nigerian constitution and the Supreme Court in 
Abia state uphold that the country is made up of 36 states of the federation and the 778 local 
governments, with no subsequent politically constitutional municipalities (General Provisions 
Act, SN (1999) C1, Ss 1&2). The ramification of this judgement is that NDCs are of a different 
quality in law from LGAs, states and the FGN, whose status and powers are clear in Nigerian 
constitutional law. Thus, the constitution is of little help when it comes to accurately defining 
what constitutes an NDC. 
The use of the term ‘community’ by Peterside, Ukiwo and Frynas is contingent on the notion 
that it is an English word, rather than a translation of a word(s) from a local language(s). The 
dictionary definition of the word ‘community’ is ‘a group of people living in the same place or 
having a particular characteristic in common’ (Oxford Living Dictionary, 2017). Thus, the term 
‘community’ in the sense of Niger Delta Community has become a catch-all in the scholarly 
literature to incorporate villages, towns, kingdoms, clans, sub-ethnic groups, kinship units, 
places with identified names, and people with common interests. This broad understanding of 
the term ‘community’ extends to those leading and living in NDCs. One respondent 
understands an NDC to be a group of people dominating a fishing and/or farming settlement 
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with clearly defined boundaries from one another (Eyakade, March 2014). Others define NDCs 
as a group of people having common identity such as culture, dialect and descent (Iniku, April 
2014). Another describes NDCs as geographical entities within an LGA (Ighoriemuse, April 
2014). NDCs such as Agudama and Akenfa of Yenagoa LGA in Bayelsa are described by 
another as ‘district autonomous villages’, which belonged to the Apie sub-ethnic group before 
the creation of states in Nigeria (Nengi, April 2014). Nengi’s definition stresses the fusion of 
communities into ethnic groups or towns. Others are contentious about such a view, envisaging 
that there are communities within communities, giving the notion that community is all-
embracing, and that community and the interpretation of its conceptualisation is subjective 
(Nalaguo, April 2014). 
Should the term NDC be taken as articulating a multi-faceted, complex concept or should the 
term be a catch-all that does not have a strict definition? Section 28 of the Nigerian constitution 
states that ‘a Nigerian citizen belongs to a community that is indigenous to Nigeria’ (General 
Provisions Act, SN (1999) C1, S 28), thereby seemingly recognising communities as concrete 
entities in law. According to Mudiagha Odje, a Niger Delta human rights advocate, the 
constitution does not define a community, but the Supreme Court has held a community to be 
people of common interests, genealogy and pedigree over a relative time, or even from time 
immemorial, who have the same characteristics, tradition and culture and who still share and 
have a common interest (Odje, April 2014). The perception of Odje and other respondents in 
the last two paragraphs regarding what constitutes an NDC can be construed as villages, towns, 
kingdoms, clans, sub-ethnic groups, and people with common interests that combine to make 
up the territory of a LGA. In other words, places that do not make up the territory of an LGA, 
irrespective of their status, cannot be NDCs. For example, a large kingdom that cuts across 
LGAs or ND states, such as the Itsekiri kingdom, cannot be termed an NDC, whilst a small 
kingdom such as Effurun-oOor, which is a constituent part of territory of the Ughelli South 
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LGA, is considered a community. The same scenario applies to the other categories such as 
villages or towns. 
This analysis builds on the ambiguities found in the scholarly literature, which define NDCs to 
be villages (Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 2003), kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), 
ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006), family units (Peterside, 2007) and groups with common 
interests (Frynas, 2000). Respondents subscribe to the above categories as representing NDCs; 
their perception suggests that these categories differ from one place to another. A village in 
Delta can be a town in Bayelsa. However, the key mutual defining characteristic is that, 
regardless of the specific descriptor, NDCs should constitute a part of the territory of a single 
LGA. 
The third tier of Nigeria’s governmental authority, after the FGN and states, are LGAs; there 
are 185 LGAs in the ND containing an estimated 13,329 communities (NDDC Masterplan, 
2006; Deltastate.com, 2014). The complexity of the relationship between communities within 
an LGA is demonstrated by the location of the administrative hub. For example, Gokana LGA 
in Rivers consists of seventeen communities, with the Kpor NDC as its central hub 
(Uzoribarima, April 2014). Among other NDCs forming the Gokana LGA are the K-Dere and 
B-Dere communities (Tombare, April 2014). Similarly, the Yenagoa LGA of Bayelsa is 
structured into seventeen constituent communities, with the Yenagoa town serving as its central 
administrative hub (Nengi, April 2014). Respondents’ comments suggest that Yenagoa town 
is a name that emerged owing to its fast-emerging growth as a metropolis. However, it is 
composed of the Apie and Atissa communities, which together, alongside Agudama, Akenfa 
and other NDCs, constitute the Yenagoa LGA (Nengi, April 2014). Among these communities 
located in Yenagoa town, Apie is said to be the location of the central administrative hub 
(Nalaguo, April 2014). This type of scenario is reflected in Warri South LGA, which has the 
constituent NDCs Okere-Urhobo, Okere-Itsekiri, Ogunu, Ekuruode-Urhobo, Ekuruode-
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Itsekiri, Ugbuangbue, Agbassa and Igbudu, yet has Warri town as its administrative hub 
(Okumagba, March 2014). Warri town itself is composed of the Okere-Urhobo and Okere 
communities, with the latter being the location for administrative activities (Ojuwu, March 
2014). 
The location of the administrative hub can be a source of friction between NDCs. The Warri 
Southwest LGA comprises multiple NDCs, known locally as Isenaibes (Hope, April 2014), 
with the Ogbe-ijoh community serving as its administrative hub. Thus, the attempt to relocate 
the Warri Southwest LGA administrative hub from the Ogbe-ijoh community to the Ogidigben 
community in 1997 sparked a major crisis (Agbegbedia, 2014). Whilst the instances of Ogbe-
ijoh and Kpor are examples of NDCs serving as administrative hubs of their respective LGAs, 
towns such as Yenagoa and Warri go beyond the status of NDC and, at the same time, act as 
the administrative hubs of the Yenagoa and Warri South LGAs. However, whilst the towns of 
Yenagoa and Warri contain multiple communities, the actual location of administrative 
activities is within a certain community – the Apie community in Yenagoa town and the Okere-
Itsekiri community in Warri town. Thus, evaluation of the analysis determines that NDCs 
constitute the geographical and political parts of LGAs. Furthermore, the analysis of NDCs as 
the geographical and political parts of LGAs shows that the former does not have independence 
from the latter. 
Referring to NDCs’ dependence on LGAs, Odje notes that ‘Niger Delta Communities have 
different characteristics, laws and administration but they are not actually autonomous…they, 
to some extent, share their dependence because they do not have independence from the local 
government’ (Odje, April 2014). Other respondents state that community leaders are 
consistently agitated regarding NDCs’ political independence from the LGAs, going so far, on 
occasion, as to sequester oil found within their boundaries (Eyakade, March 2014; Otavie, 
April 2014). This is with the aim of creating a further layer of administration in Nigeria, 
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whereby NDCs maintain a relationship with their respective LGAs akin to the relationships 
between the LGAs and the states, and the states and the FGN (Anyanwu, 1999). Due to the 
NDCs’ agitation regarding community participation at the level of constitutional governance, 
the Nigerian government tasked what is called the Community Development Committee 
(CDC) – a body that deals with external matters such as business with MNCs, private 
companies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and government development projects 
– to meet such ambitions (Odje, April 2014). Further effort by state governments to address 
community agitation regarding constitutional authority brought about the ND state of Rivers’ 
creation of administrative units under its LGAs, in the form of a chieftaincy unit, headed by a 
government-recognised ruler called Amenabo, with the assistance of community chiefs, the 
CDC and the Youth Executive Council (YEC) (Variside, April 2014). Thus, the recognition of 
NDCs’ agitation regarding constitutional autonomy by the Nigerian government, suggests that 
the former has distinct spheres of authority and activities within itself, even though they do not 
have political independence from the LGAs. Thus, whilst the three tiers of Nigerian 
government, namely the FGN, states and LGAs, are the constitutional political structures, the 
recognition of NDCs’ agitation for municipal powers is borne out of the notion that 
communities were autonomous prior to the existence of the current governmental 
arrangements. This suggests that NDCs’ nature in the past and present shows substantial 
differences of autonomy and non-autonomy. 
5.3 NDCs’ Nature: Past and Present 
According to Alagoa (1971) and Horton (2013), prior to the first contact with Europeans in the 
fourteenth century, clans and kingdoms in the ND were communities with settled village 
structures (Alagoa, 1971), each exercising political autonomy, operating in isolation using 
diplomatic practices to avoid inter-community conflict, as no supreme political unit to bind 
them existed at that time (Horton 2013). Thus, Alagoa and Horton claim that communities were 
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politically autonomous prior to the arrival of European settlers. Alagoa concentrates on the 
western and central ND, whilst Horton focuses on the eastern ND, with both arguing that 
communities’ autonomy in the ND predates encounters with the Europeans, and the ensuing 
impact of missionaries, international trade, slavery, imperialism, colonialism, and the 
subsequent establishment of the FGN, the states and LGAs (Horton, 2013; Alagoa, 1971). 
Alagoa, analysing community development in the western and central ND prior to the 
European encounter, argues that unity within an ND community had lain primarily in the 
possession of a common dialect and culture (Alagoa, 1971). These communities constituted 
autonomous political units operating a patriarchy system with the village assembly, or 
Amagula, comprising adult males as the highest political authority (Alagoa, 1971). Jones, 
assessing the history of the south-eastern ND people, argues that pre-colonial Ijaw and Ibibio’s 
communities, currently located in Rivers, were primitive sovereign states in an anarchic 
environment, consistently involved in boundary disputes (Jones, 1963). Although inter-village 
disputes were often mediated by the Pere (High Priest) of the Ibe (gods), his role was more 
religious than political (Alagoa, 1971). Nonetheless, it gives credence to the comparison 
between these communities and proto-sovereign states capable of engaging in diplomatic 
practices. This seemingly supports Horton’s assessment of the pre-colonial eastern ND region 
as a quasi-confederation comprising political sects upholding a monocratic system of its own, 
which an influential political leader tries unsuccessfully to pull together (Horton, 2013). Thus, 
these groups understood to be current NDCs are described as autonomous clans and kingdoms 
classed as ancient communities in the ND. These postulations by Alagoa, Jones and Horton are 
confusing and incorrect, as current NDCs do not precisely reflect autonomous clans and 
kingdoms. If there is any relationship between current NDCs and ancient autonomous clans 
and kingdoms, it is that the NDCs are considered geographical and traditional parts of the 
ancient autonomous clans and kingdoms. 
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According to Iniku a compound Chief in Luusue-Sogho community, Khana LGA, ND state of 
Rivers, clans and kingdoms can be ethnic or sub-ethnic groups that inhabit their own territorial 
communities (Iniku, April 2014). Others perceive NDCs as sub-ethnic groups that occupy a 
given territory within the overarching territory of the ethnic group to which they belong 
(Nalaguo, April 2014; Okpeya, March 2014). Accordingly, some respondents argue that some 
ethnic groups such as the Urhobos, Ijaws and the Itsekiris more closely resemble sovereign 
states than NDCs (Omoseye, November 2016). Instead, NDCs are viewed as subordinate and 
owing allegiance to the larger ethnic group to which they belong (Omavonwa, November 
2016). Thus, as clans and kingdoms are categorised as ethnic or sub-ethnic groups depending 
on their size, NDCs are classed as smaller versions of sub-ethnic groups. However, clans and 
kingdoms are perceived to be in different categories, as some have NDCs as their geographical 
territories, while others are NDCs themselves. Comments from NDC leaders indicate that clans 
and kingdoms have communities as their geographical territory. Thus, Bekesu states that 
‘Kilama is among the 10 communities under the Biseni clan that came into existence long 
before I was born, that is how they normally call it, Biseni Oyakri meaning Biseni is in 10 
places’ (in Bayelsa) (Bekesu, April 2014). Similarly, Okumagba comments that ‘Igbudu, 
Agbassa, Otegene, Okpokiti, Edjeba, Ogunu, are communities within the Warri axis that are 
under the Agbarha kingdom’ (in Delta) (Okumagba, March 2014). Variside a youth secretary 
of the Luusue-Sogho Community Council of Chiefs, Gokana LGA, ND state of Rivers, states 
that the ‘Luusue-sogho community is one of the six communities that make up the Sogho clan, 
we are predominantly farmers, a part of the Gokana LGA council’ (in Rivers) (Variside, April 
2014). Together, these accounts support the idea that NDCs are geographical and traditional 
sections of clans and kingdoms. 
Other respondents argue that not all kingdoms have communities as their geographical and 
traditional sections. A kingdom such as Effurun-Otor possesses no constituent community 
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within its territory. Thus, Bernard Eyakade the Vice President General of Effurun-Otor 
Community, Ughelli South LGA, ND state of Delta, believes that ‘Effurun-Otor is 
simultaneously a kingdom and a community, unlike neighbouring kingdoms such as Olomu 
that have 14 communities and Oghieanvwen that controls 30 communities’ (Eyakade, March 
2014). Such a type of kingdom, which is perceived as having a community status, is typical of 
an emerging community that attains the status of a kingdom, such as the Okere-Urhobo NDC, 
which became independent of the Okere community in 2003. In Okumagba’s words, ‘the 
Otorere, the Okis, the Iyaras are families and compounds that constitute the Okere-Urhobo 
community which is also a kingdom’ (Okumagba, March 2014). Thus, Effurun-otor and Okere-
Urhobo are considered kingdoms because both have kings at their administrative apexes, and 
are perceived as NDCs based on the notion that they do not possess communities that serve as 
their geographical and traditional sections. The lack of communities acting as geographical and 
traditional sections within both kingdoms makes them NDCs themselves, because such 
conditions meant that they become geographical and political segments of a single LGA. For 
example, the absence of communities acting as their geographical and traditional sections 
ensures that, whilst Effurun-Otor is a geographical and political subdivision of the Ughelli 
South LGA, Okere-Urhobo represents the same status in the Warri South LGA, hence both 
kingdoms are NDCs themselves. 
This differs from other types of clans and kingdoms that have NDCs, which do not only serve 
as their geographical and traditional sections, but also serve as the geographical and political 
subdivision of different LGAs or ND states, as the case may be. An example of this is the 
Itsekiri kingdom, which has NDCs serving as its geographical and traditional sections, spread 
over the Warri South, Warri Southwest and Warri North LGAs, as well as between the ND 
states of Delta, Edo and Ondo, respectively (Bisina, 2003; Deltastate.com, 2014). Similarly, 
the Apie clan have communities serving as its geographical and traditional sections in the likes 
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of the Apie, Agudama and Akenfa in Yenagoa LGA in Bayelsa, as well as the Obiama NDC 
in Rivers (Nalaguo, April 2014). This indicates that NDCs – whether bearing a clan or kingdom 
status – are categorically subdivisions of LGAs. Thus, clans and kingdoms that are not 
classified as communities, such as the Apie clan and Itsekiri kingdom, have NDCs as their 
geographical and traditional sections, which are also geographical and political subdivisions of 
LGAs. It is these clans and kingdoms that Alagoa, Horton and Jones claim to be ancient NDCs 
that predate the advent of Europeans in the ND, which at the time were completely autonomous 
in their political and administrative activities. Thus, Alagoa, Jones and Horton’s definitions of 
ancient communities in the ND do not represent what defines current NDCs, because clans and 
kingdoms now includes NDCs as its geographical and traditional sections. There are 
exceptions, as in the cases of the Effurun-Otor and Okere-Urhobo kingdoms, which are NDCs 
themselves based on the notion that they lack geographical and traditional communities, 
making them geographical and political subdivisions of LGAs. However, the difference 
between ancient and current NDCs is that whilst ancient NDCs do not constitute the 
subdivisions of LGAs, current communities do. 
Notwithstanding, current NDCs appear to sustain the same autonomous feature of ancient 
communities, with the view that they both possess the same characteristics, except ancient 
communities in the ND existed prior to the advent of Europeans, which introduced the present 
supreme political authority of the FGN, states and LGAs. Thus, clans and kingdoms that existed 
prior to European advent in the ND had the same structure as current NDCs, with most 
becoming the way they are, having constituent communities due to growth and expansion over 
the years (Alagoa, March 2014). Whilst such expansion accounts for clans and kingdoms 
having constituent communities, kingdoms such as Effurun-Otor, which predated European 
advent in the ND, remained at NDC status because it failed to expand in terms of having 
constituencies, as others did. This means that whilst some ancient clans and kingdoms 
107 
 
expanded from ancient NDC status into having traditional independent constituent 
communities, those that failed to expand continue to maintain a community status. This 
highlights the idea that new NDCs are formed out of old NDCs, and therefore establishes the 
parent and child community, which are completely independent of one another. This will be 
elaborated upon in a later section of the chapter. 
Moreover, respondents’ comments conveyed that current clans and kingdoms have no 
constitutional powers over their constituent communities, and that NDCs are administratively 
independent from clans and kingdoms. Thus, Oyoroko the President General of Owhor 
Community, Ughelli South LGA, ND state of Delta’s statement was that: 
The Owhor-Olomu community is autonomous. The laws that govern the 
community are made by the community itself. The constitution it abides by is quite 
different from other communities situated within the Olomu kingdom. If there is a 
conflict between two communities in the Olomu kingdom, it can be resolved by the 
council of chiefs at the kingdom level. Otherwise every community is autonomous 
and is not liable to the kingdom, under the Nigerian constitution. (Oyoroko, March 
2014). 
The nominal nature of clans and kingdoms over NDCs is also indicative in Odje’s statement: 
‘in Nigeria, the basis for interaction by government and agencies is between the local, state and 
federal governments…traditional kingdoms, clans or communities are not given legal capacity 
to sue, unless they are represented by a registered organisation, company or governmental 
body’ (Odje, April 2014). Thus, clans and kingdoms are considered dormant in usurping 
political authority over their geographical and traditional constituencies, and NDCs are viewed 
as partaking as constituents of the clan or kingdom with the mere reason of keeping the traits 
of their origin (Bekesu, April 2014; Laka, April 2014). Analysis shows that current NDCs 
108 
 
would have maintained the same ancient community autonomy if they had not been subjected 
to current LGAs introduced by Western political systems. This is contingent on the notion that 
newly emerged NDCs possess the same characteristics of ancient autonomous kingdoms or 
clans, and they also constitute a geographical and political part of a single LGA. Considering 
this, the absence of LGAs in the ND would mean newly emerged and current NDCs would be 
autonomous, because there would be no superior authority curtailing their independence. Thus, 
since the nature of current NDCs characterises ancient autonomous and independent clans and 
kingdoms, current NDCs are inherently autonomous. 
Based on the analysis of respondents’ evidence regarding the similarities and dissimilarities 
between current and ancient NDCs, communities are categorised as having the same features 
of clans and kingdoms in the ND. Augustine Ikelegbe a Principal Lecturer at the University of 
Benin, ND-state of Edo, attempting to explain the features of old and new NDCs, expresses 
that: 
Most of the current communities we are talking about are old communities, they 
were already existing before the Europeans came to Nigeria. However, the new 
communities that started existing after the advent of Europeans were already in 
Nigeria, and regarded as settlements that existed within ancient communities. 
(Ikelegbe, April 2014). 
This suggests that current NDCs existed prior to European advent, accruing autonomous status 
before the introduction of LGAs. However, new NDCs such as the Okere-Urhobo, created in 
2003, existed within the Okere community (Uku, April 2014), as well as the Kilama 
community, founded in 1927, which existed within the Biseni clan as part of the Tein 
community (Igiran, April 2014). It is believed that before these communities emerged as 
independent communities, they were a group of people that constantly moved from one place 
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to another (Hope, April 2014). This carries the notion that this group of people existed prior to 
the advent of Europeans, and therefore existed within parent communities that predate recent 
political dispensation. 
However, there are NDCs who historically were part of other communities due to agricultural 
practices. Among the Ijaw sub-ethnic group, there were communities located along the ND 
coastal line that became independent because of internal conflict between settlement leaders 
within the NDC to which they belonged. Therefore, certain groups within the Ijaw sub-ethnic 
group moved to separate places in order to maintain peace, thereby creating their own 
independent communities from the parent community to which they initially belonged (Otavie, 
April 2014). This shows that, although these communities have the same lineage, the parent 
community has no constitutional authority over the community that emerged. Thus, over time 
the newly emerged community has become a parent community to other NDCs. These parent 
communities are also described as clans or kingdoms when they have a clan head or king, 
which can also be the case for newly emerged communities if they find themselves in the same 
situation. An example of a newly emerged community that attained kingdom status is the 
Okere-Urhobo community (Okumagba, March 2014), with its parent community being Okere, 
an NDC without clan or kingdom status, since it has no lone clan head or king. On the other 
hand, the Kilama community, which was founded in 1927 from the Biseni clan, did not attain 
the status of a clan or kingdom since it did not have a clan head or king (Igiran, April 2014). 
Thus, a newly emerged NDC can attain the status of a clan or kingdom while its parent 
community remains a community, while, also, a parent NDC can have the status of a clan or 
kingdom while its newly emerged NDC maintains community status. Therefore, what 
distinguishes an NDC from clans or kingdoms is that NDCs are geographical and political parts 
of LGAs, as well as the geographical and traditional parts of clans or kingdoms; some NDCs 
are clans or kingdoms themselves: a clan or kingdom expanding over two or more LGAs is not 
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considered a community. This being the case, current NDCs are perceived as characterising 
ancient autonomous clans and kingdoms, and are considered inherently autonomous, since it 
exists in their nature. Current NDCs being inherently autonomous means that it naturally exists 
within them, and that such autonomy is curtailed with the introduction of the current political 
dispensation that divided NDCs into different LGAs and ND states for administrative 
convenience by the European colonial powers. 
As discussed previously, in the fourteenth century, Europeans brought Christianity, 
international slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, and Western education and political 
economy to the area. In 1960, Nigeria became independent and adopted Western politics that 
saw the introduction of FGN, ND states and LGAs, which subsequently undermined the 
traditional and political powers of NDCs. Thus, the political idea of LGAs and ND states in the 
ND are not home-grown, but were introduced by the Europeans and adopted by the Nigerian 
government, which saw the subjugation and separation of the same ethnic groups, clans, and 
kingdoms under different political units (Rodney, 2012). Considering the respondents’ 
comments, the effect of separating these groups into different LGAs and ND states was to force 
the emergence of a whole new NDC, in the form of geographical and political constituents of 
the new political system of LGAs (Nalaguo, April 2014). The new political system is accused 
of curtailing and subduing the traditional and political autonomy that NDCs previously 
exercised (Igiran, April 2014). However, not all NDCs were said to have exercised political 
autonomy as some new communities like Okere-Urhobo were existing within the Okere-
Itsekiri with no autonomy of their own (Iniku, April 2014). Thus, whilst such cases abound, it 
should be noted that prior to the colonisation of Europeans and the introduction of the new 
political dispensations in the area, ancient communities were politically autonomous (Alagoa, 
1971). As an example of this, the Okere-Urhobo community, which emerged during the period 
of the current political dispensation, could have been taking a politically autonomous stance if 
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it had emerged prior to the arrival of Europeans in the area. This suggests that Okere-Urhobo, 
which currently holds a kingdom as well as an NDC status, would have been independent from 
any political subjugation. However, such political independence is currently blurred, 
considering that the current political dispensation does not recognise NDCs as autonomous or 
as having a governmental authority. 
NDCs political autonomy is considered blurred because they inherently perceive themselves 
as independent due to their experience prior to the introduction of LGAs and ND states. NDCs’ 
experience of political autonomy and subjugation prior to and after the Europeans’ arrival in 
the area is reflected in Iniku’s words when he said that, 
before the white men came we had traditional autonomy, but the arrival of the 
Europeans brought Christianity and new political administration. Although the 
Niger Delta man was not educated then, we were enlightened, and the only way 
they could curb us was to bring an umbrella of administration, a colony, so that 
they can control and subdue us into submitting to their whims and caprices (Iniku, 
April 2014). 
What can be deduced from the NDCs’ experience prior to and during the new political 
dispensation is that groups began to respond to the authorities of LGAs and ND states by 
consolidating themselves into newly identified communities, which since then have lost 
independence. In this way, several characteristics can be deduced from the way that an NDC 
is formed in the new political dispensation. Such characteristics include but are not limited to 
overpopulation, strangers living alongside a kinship lineage with the same dialect, having their 
own territory made up of streets or quarters, separated from one another by boundaries, 
different cultures and languages, community laws and administration, as well as constituting 
the constituents of LGAs and clans/kingdoms. Whilst these are being argued and examined as 
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characteristics that constitute NDCs, it is also viewed that they sustain inherent political 
autonomy that has been submerged by the new political dispensation. The above characteristics 
are the distinctive features that define an NDC as being functional for the study, differently 
from and as an expansion of the existing literature’s understanding of what forms and defines 
a community in the ND. 
5.4 The Establishment of a Niger Delta Community 
The existing literature definition claims that NDCs are constituted or composed of kinship units 
having the same dialect and their own territory (Peterside 2007), and that they are essentially 
formed of sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006). This kind of composition can be considered as 
rational characteristics that make up a community in the ND. However, community leaders’ 
comments suggest that the characteristics that make up an NDC go beyond Peterside and 
Ikelegbe’s views. Among such characteristics put forward by respondents include that of 
overpopulation. The view of NDC leaders is that the factor of overpopulation is a valid reason 
for forming a community in the ND. As Peterside argues, communities are formed by families 
that are related and who trace their origin to the same descendants (Peterside, 2007). However, 
the respondents’ comments suggest that overpopulation has forced certain people from the 
same family origin to separate, with some making decisions to relocate to another part of a 
town or to form a new community (Okumagba, April 2014). Furthermore, Okumagba implies 
that the Okere-Urhobo community traces its origin to Okpara-Olomu, which is in the Ughelli 
South LGA of Delta state, but that it relocated to its present location in Warri South LGA 
because of overpopulation (Okumagba, April 2014). Similarly, overpopulation is ascribed to 
be the main reason why the Kilama community in Yenagoa LGA exists today. This is 
exemplified in Rankin Igiran the Paramount Ruler of Kilama Community of Yenagoa LGA, 
ND state of Bayelsa words’ when he said that ‘initially, there were three communities namely 
Tein, Tebere, and Tuwon…we later had a big population expansion after 1926 whereby my 
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community (Kilama) was founded’ (Igiran, April 2014). This type of overpopulation leading 
to community establishment is also described as community expansion. 
The respondents’ comments convey that overpopulation has seen different communities that 
had settlements together later become separated because of an increase in population growth 
that widens their location gap. The bigger communities where the smaller settlements emanate 
from are identified as a parent community (Otavie, April 2014). This correlates with Nalaguo, 
there are a few new communities which because of commerce, the development of 
new townships, oil exploration and exploitation have been founded, but it is the 
same people with ancestral ties from older communities. They call them new 
communities, new fishing villages, new farming villages but they have their origins 
next to them often from older communities (Nalaguo, April 2014). 
Thus, this suggests that one community is formed out of another due to overpopulation. 
However, what is significant to each NDC, whether designated as parent or child, that makes 
each a community, are segments that make up an NDC. These segments are how a community 
is constituted, with different constituent units within each NDC having its own law. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the existing literature’s definition claims that NDCs are 
constituted of kinship units having the same dialect, and their own territory (Peterside 2007), 
and that they are essentially formed of sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006). However, the 
respondents’ comments suggest that, depending on its size, NDCs’ constituents go beyond 
blood ties to the number of streets, quarters and divisions with strangers living therein. Thus, 
the Owhor community is made up of eleven streets (Ikipi, April 2014), the Okere community 
contains five main quarters (Uku, April 2014), and the Okunno community is constituted of 
three divisions that are understood to be different large families, namely Eketepe, Imije, and 
Ejikie, which do not have the same descendants (Oyolo, March 2014). According to Ikipi the 
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secretary of Owhor Community in Ughelli South LGA, ND state of Delta, these streets have 
strangers residing therein, but they are still part of the Owhor community (Ikipi, April 2014), 
while quarters and divisions are described as family lineage mixed with strangers (Uku, April 
2014; Oyolo, March 2014). 
Quarters and divisions are given family names, and can become independent communities 
when there is overpopulation (Otavie, April 2014; Nalaguo, April 2014). This view, shared by 
Jeremiah Otavie a Community Development Officer of Academic Associates Peace Works, 
ND state of Rivers and Nalaguo, correlates with Okumagba, 
the Okere-Urhobo community is made up of five major families. The Olodi, the 
Oki, the Ighogbadu, the Imakro and the Etifo families…our history makes these 
families a quarter of their own, we are not even in the same place. For example, we 
have the Ighogbadu quarter residing around Iyara and other areas of Warri, while 
the Olodis resides in Otolori which is the administrative hub of the community 
(Okumagba, April 2014). 
The families that make up the Okere-Urhobo NDC are already identified groups with names 
that could become a community in the future when there is overpopulation. These family 
names, which are used to identify the quarters and divisions of a NDC, are its constituencies 
that together make up one community in the ND. For example, Ayimebele community is made 
up of three different families together with strangers who have lived on the land since 1932 
(Tamunor, April 2014). These family lineages, together with some strangers, agree to uphold 
and abide by the community’s laws. 
The respondents argue that a community’s ‘laws’ are understood to be the rules and regulations 
that govern each NDC, and depending on the community in question, this is called its 
‘traditional constitution’ (Bekesu, April 2014) or ‘native laws’ (Otavie, April 2014). These are 
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described as unwritten laws that are passed on from generation to generation through oral 
means (Iniku, April 2014). This extends the notion that prior to the arrival of Western 
education, the ND indigenes were mostly illiterate with the history of the region being passed 
on by oral communication through storytelling stored in people’s memory; indeed, people with 
good memories play a vital role in storing and disseminating information (Meyer, 2005). Thus, 
such dissemination of information on the community’s laws has been a continuous process for 
years, with each NDC practising and understanding their different laws. Nengi’s view on the 
practising of community’s laws is that, 
everything is obtained by practice over centuries, so that is how it has been in our 
communities. Nothing is written down, but there is a general understanding 
between the various language groups and various individual communities or 
villages, that this is how we should conduct ourselves (Nengi, April 2014). 
Although the system of passing information on the code of conduct of each community from 
one generation to another is the same, the laws differ from one NDC to the other. Thus, Otavie 
states that ‘in the rule of law, the law binding the Akumoni community is different from that 
of Ayimabele community and the Agbongbe community, we have our rules and regulation that 
is only binding on Akumoni community’ (Otavie, April 2014). Similarly, Lucky Mahone youth 
president of Akumoni Community, Yenagoa LGA ND state of Bayelsa, argues that 
‘communities differ in terms of the laws that binds them, for example in Akumoni community 
where I am the youth president, if a thief is caught, we punish him/her by flogging, but in 
another community, that might not be done based on their leadership system’ (Mahone, April 
2014). Similarly, Otavie contends that, 
in most communities, they have their norms and practices. And these norms are 
distinctly just for them. However, because of political governance, the Nigerian 
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constitution also binds on them but any other law that is different is based on their 
traditional beliefs (Otavie, April 2014). 
Thus, each NDC differs in terms of the laws that they abide by. However, given that all NDCs 
fall under the Nigerian government, the national constitution, which gives political power to 
the states and to LGAs over their constituent NDCs (Anyanwu, 1999), means that whatever 
constitution LGAs uphold is imposed on NDCs. This means that the Nigerian constitution is 
supreme and binding on all NDCs, while all traditional laws and customs of NDCs, clans or 
kingdoms are not constitutionally binding or recognised by the Nigerian government, but are 
only apply to the members of a specific community. For example, the traditional laws of 
Owhor-Olomu community are only binding on its indigenes, whilst the Nigerian federal law 
abounds in all communities. 
Similarly, some NDCs that emerged from parent communities continue to play the role of 
subjects to these communities, while maintaining other laws that are only applicable to their 
indigenes. Thus, the scenario in the Owhor community is that, 
the Owhor community have a parent community where we emerged from that is 
called Okpara-Olomu community, which is the administrative hub of Olomu 
kingdom. We have a king who supersedes all 15 communities. Any traditional and 
festive practice that is carried out by the kingdom is what we abide by, and that is 
a general tradition for the kingdom. Then each community has its own ruling 
councils and laws, which it abides by (Ikipi, April 2014). 
Similarly, Silva Ofughara the Chairman of Ekpan Community Development Committee, 
comments that ‘the king is the ruler of Effurun community, however, the laws of Nigeria state 
that a Councillor [the lowest elected political office] is higher in authority than that king, 
therefore a community cannot be viewed as a sovereign unit because the Nigerian government 
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supersedes its authority’ (Ofughara, November 2016). Another respondent argues that, ‘the 
awareness or recognition of communities in the Niger Delta came up because of the emergence 
of politics…that is when these politicians came into power in local governments, they use 
communities as a means of political administration, meaning that communities are 
automatically under the supervision of the politicians’ (Omoseye, November 2016). The 
significance and similarity between the respondents’ evidence are that NDCs’ administrative 
structures are not autonomous, but are subjected to the LGA political administration. Another 
respondent argues a similar point from a different perspective when he comments that NDCs 
do not have their own law enforcement, but rely on the Nigerian police authority, which does 
not take directives from community leaders (Ojuwu, November 2016). Thus, though 
respondents perceive communities in the ND to be subject to the Nigerian government’s 
administration, this administration does not solely define what characterises a NDC, as there 
exist community administrative units. Thus, apart from the supremacy of the Nigerian national 
constitution, which binds all NDCs, and those communities who together have strong 
affiliations to one parent community, each community has its own peculiar laws that are 
administered independently of one another. 
From one NDC to another, the administrative structure is different, with each upholding 
independence from the other. Some consist of three structural hierarchies, while others are 
made up of two or one. According to Igiran, communities in the ND state of Bayelsa usually 
consist of three stages of administrative structures: the council of chiefs with the paramount 
chief at the apex, the CDC with a presiding chairman, and the YEC with a president as its head 
(Igiran, April 2014). This differs from most communities in the ND state of Delta, which are 
structurally composed of two parts with different forms, such as the elders’ council, which is 
presided over by the chairman of the traditional council of chiefs, and the youth body, which 
is run by a democratically elected government having a youth president at its peak (Popo, April 
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2014). Like the ND state of Delta, in the ND state of Rivers, NDCs mainly consists of two 
types of governance structure: the traditional and the executive structure. In the traditional 
arrangement, there is the king or chief who passes and makes laws on behalf of the community, 
whilst the governance structure is headed by the CDC, which has its chairman, secretary, and 
other executive members that executes the law (Duumaa, April 2014). Apart from these three 
to two structural governance systems, NDCs like Effurun-Otor in the ND state of Delta 
maintain a one-structure pattern where they have a king at the apex with palace chiefs assisting 
him in the daily governance activities (Eyakade, March 2014). 
These diverse structural governance patterns are independently run by each NDC. Regarding 
NDCs’ governance structures, Jelicho Okpeya the eldest man and ruler of Okunno-Jesse 
community, Ethiope West LGA, ND state of Delta states that, 
each community has its own ruler. Like in Okunno community, where I am the 
head as well as the most elderly man, we have chiefs and youth leaders who 
combine to run the day to day activities in the community. This is different from 
the way Otumara community operate their administrative activities (Okpeya, 
March 2014). 
This view differs from the administrative structure, but is commensurate with the independent 
nature of the Okere-Itsekiri NDC. Thus, Godwin Uku the Secretary General of Okere-Itsekiri 
community, Warri South LGA, ND state of Delta’s words, 
the administration of the Okere-Itsekiri community is made up of the Ogeboro, 
which is the highest authority of the council. Ogeboro in council is made up of 
elders from various quarters that make up the community. Next is the advisory 
council which advices the Ogeboro. The Ogeboro then administers the community 
with the help of advisers (Uku, March 2014). 
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Thus, the notion here is that the Ogeboro as the head of the community is independent of other 
NDC administrators that constitute the Warri South LGA. This idea is buttressed by Olu-fubara 
a news reporter from the Yenagoa Broadcasting Station, ‘Akenfa community have a chief to 
rule its community, the Okutukutu community also have a chief to rule its community, so these 
are the things that makes them different’ (Olu-fubara, March 2014). Thus, as these NDCs are 
administratively independent, the different structures within the NDCs’ administrative setting 
have different roles to play in fulfilling the administration’s duties. 
The responsibilities of taking overarching administrative decisions rests on the council of 
chiefs, the elders’ council, and the traditional peak level, which usually are at the apex of a 
community’s governance. Similarly, Lucky Duumaa, the Head of Community Development, 
at the Academic Associate Peace Works, argues that ‘traditional structures consist of the chief 
ruler who oversees how the cultures and norms are decided in the community’ (Duumaa, April 
2014). Accordingly, Samuel Ighedu, former Secretary of Ugbuangbue community, states that 
‘in Ugbuangbue community, the Olaraja is the head, he is the paramount ruler as well as the 
most elderly man of the community… so, all administrative operations take directives from as 
well as report to him (Ighedu, April 2014). Apart from such high-ranking decision makers, 
there are the CDCs who represent the community externally, discussing with third parties such 
as private companies on matters relating to MNCs (Otavie, April 2014), as well as taking 
charge of affairs relating to infrastructural development (Bekesu, April 2014). Following this 
is the YEC, which serves as a spokesperson and a militia going to war (Alagoa, March 2014; 
Bekesu, April 2014), as well as representing those who labour and carry out environmental 
sanitation duties (Oyolo, March 2014). Thus, these different duties carried out by the various 
structural sects work together in showing that their NDCs are distinct from other communities, 
thereby laying emphasis on where their administrative border ends. 
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NDCs being administratively independent means there exist administrative borders within 
communities that demarcate one administration from the other through geographical 
boundaries. Accordingly, Uku states that, 
geographically, in the olden days, two communities can be two miles apart. But, 
with civilisation and modernisation it is becoming difficult to know where the 
boundaries of these communities are. Only the core traditional communities where 
you have ancient structures on the ground can easily identify such boundaries (Uku, 
April 2014). 
Thus, geographical boundaries, though they exist, can be blurred. Thus, Nzorka Tombare youth 
president of K-Dere community in the Gokana LGA in Rivers, conforms to Uku’s view of 
difficulties in identifying community boundaries, 
typically, you will not see much of a difference in the community settlement in 
Gokana LGA, because of the way we are settled. It is quite difficult to even 
differentiate two communities. For example, it is just a major road that demarcates 
K-Dere and B-Dere communities (Tombare, April 2014). 
However, others disagree that community boundaries are blurred, but claim that they can be 
easily identified. Atutu a youth president of Okunno community, states that ‘my community 
Okunno has a boundary with Otumara community by an electric pole’ (Atutu, March 2014), 
while Variside emphasised that ‘we Luusue-Sogho community have boundaries with the 
communities of Kaani 1, Tamba, and Kpom by a massive banana plantation’ (Variside, March 
2014). The ability of these NDC indigenes to identify their boundary patterns urged Ibaba to 
say that ‘the indigenes know where their boundaries lie and that affects their trading 
relationship with other communities, as well as defining their resource control patterns’ (Ibaba, 
March 2014). Thus, since natural resources are geographically located on land, they have 
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become a major feature that clearly demarcate one NDC’s border from another’s. A typical 
example is the Kato NDCs, which demarcate themselves from neighbouring NDCs solely 
because they have MNCs drilling oil on their lands. As such, each community has its own land 
and boundaries, and are different from one another in terms of landmarks. Such differentiation 
indicates the distinction between one NDC and another. 
This distinction occurs in various ways, one being cultural differences. Uku states that, ‘it has 
been the structure that we have various communities with different names, thinking, reasoning 
and ways of doing things’ (Uku, April 2014). Similarly, Duumaa states that, 
Nyonkuru community, where I come from does not have any affiliation with their 
neighbour, Taaba community where the king resides. The only relationship 
between both is that they share boundaries, but are completely different in culture 
and traditions (Duumaa, April 2014). 
However, other communities’ leaders are less convinced that there is any difference between 
their communities and neighbouring NDCs, apart from minor cultural distinctions. For 
Variside, 
the difference between my community and other communities is our culture. 
Though we are one Ogoni people and speak the same language, we practise slightly 
different cultures. It was someone from Sogho that founded Kaani 1 & 2, so we 
and the Kaanis are brothers (Variside, April 2014). 
Similarly, Peter Oyolo, the Deputy Leader of Okunno Community, states that, ‘the difference 
between Okunno and surrounding communities is that we have ways of greeting in this village 
which is different from other villages… other than that we all are farmers’ (Oyolo, March 
2014). Thus, what is significant to these respondents is that their NDCs and neighbours have 
cultural differences that perceive NDCs as different entities. These differences are bluntly 
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emphasised by Laka the youth president of Kaani 1 Community, Okpeya: ‘these are different 
communities that are heterogeneous in nature, leadership at different levels, not subjected to 
any other, they are on their own and perform whatever they feel without answering to any 
other’ (Laka, April 2014), and ‘the communities in the ND have their own founders, origin, 
management, and rulings different from one another that makes each a distinct entity’ (Okpeya, 
March 2014). 
This distinction is also linguistically delineated. Thus, the Okere-Urhobo community speaks 
the Urhobo language, while the Okere-Itsekiri community speaks the Itsekiri language (Ojuwu, 
March 2014), thereby indicating that they are distinct entities. Similarly, the Ugbangbue 
community are an Itsekiri speaking group, while the neighbouring Ekurede-Urhobo NDC 
speaks the Urhobo language (Ighedu, April 2014), thereby emphasising the distinction between 
NDCs through language differences. Synonymous to language differences, a distinction in 
dialects is perceived as a means of differentiating NDCs. Thus, the difference between the 
Effurun-Otor community and other neighbouring communities in Ughelli South LGA is that 
the Effurun-Otor has its own dialect, which is known as Uvwie, whilst other neighbouring 
community like Owhor-Olomu have a different dialect (Ighoriemuse, March 2014); they speak 
different dialects of the same Urhobo language. Accordingly, Nyowii community which 
belongs to the Gokana LGA perceives no difference between Nyowii and the surrounding 
NDCs except for slight differences in the dialects amongst surrounding communities (Barile, 
April 2014). Thus, languages and dialects alongside administrative independence, geographical 
& resource boundaries, and cultural differences appear to constitute factors that differentiate 
one NDC from another. However, the respondents suggest that there are different NDCs that 
consist of the same characteristics except that they are administratively independent. 
Among such NDCs are those of the Okere-Itsekiri, Ekuruede-Itsekiri and Ugbuangbue NDCs, 
who speak the same Itsekiri language, are in the same geographical area of the Warri South 
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LGA, share the same culture, and belong to the same ethnic group and kingdom but have 
different community administrations (Okumagba, April 2014). Similarly, the NDCs in the 
Gokana LGA, such as K-Dere and B-Dere, share the same characteristics except that they have 
independent administrations (Uzoribarima April 2014; Tombare, April 2014). Thus, this 
situation where NDCs have the same characteristics, except for administrative purposes, 
indicates that the different administrations have arisen because of the need to respond to the 
geographical and political constituencies within the LGAs. What is argued here is that these 
NDCs share the same characteristics, yet function as distinct communities due to the mandate 
of LGAs to constitutionally administer their constituencies. This expands on Peterside and 
Ikelegbe’s position that communities are kinship and sub-ethnic groups. 
NDCs have been defined in the scholarly literature as kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages 
(Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 2003), kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), sub-ethnic 
groups (Ikelegbe, 2006), or a people with common interests (Frynas, 2000). Other scholars 
argue that current NDCs are the same as ancient autonomous communities, clans or kingdoms 
(Alagoa, 1971) that predate the arrival of Europeans. The argument advanced in this chapter 
based on analysis of the respondents’ evidence bearing on the definition of NDCs, determines 
that either kinship units, villages, towns, clans, kingdoms, sub-ethnic groups, or a people with 
common interests can be defined as communities in the ND. However, this is only when they 
possess the characteristics of the geographical and political parts that make up LGAs and in 
some circumstances, make up the traditional and geographical parts of clans or kingdoms. It 
also determines that current NDCs are not the same as ancient autonomous communities, clans 
or kingdoms in the ND as claimed by Alagoa, but that they all sustain similar characteristics of 
autonomy, which predates the introduction of LGAs, and whose present constitutional 
authority relegates such autonomy to the status of ‘inherent’. In this light, inherent is taken to 
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mean that though NDCs are not constitutionally autonomous, they demonstrate elements of 
autonomy within them. 
5.5 A Working Definition of Niger Delta Communities 
The thesis’ definition of NDCs is a functional one for the study and does not explicitly seek to 
undermine other scholarly definitions of communities in the ND. The definition aims to 
effectively respond to answer the aim of the thesis to determine the cause of inter-community 
conflict. It seeks to expand on existing definitions. Following an analysis of different scholarly 
definitions of what constitutes an NDC, the chapter constructs a workable definition aimed at 
achieving the aim and objectives of the study by through connecting the realities of ancient and 
modern communities. The chapter argues that NDCs are inherent autonomous units that 
represent the geographical and political parts of an LGA and in some cases clans/kingdoms. 
This draws on ancient communities as previously explored by Alagoa (1971), Jones (1963) and 
Horton (2013) who define NDCs as political autonomous villages with their own unique types 
of independent administration prior to colonialism. Whilst, these scholars define precolonial 
ancient NDCs as politically autonomous, the thesis analyses current NDCs to be inherently 
autonomous from the view that both share common traits of unique traditional administrative 
structures.  
One difference between both is that ancient communities were functional in precolonial times 
when there was no superior administrative entity known as Nigeria. It is the modern construct 
of Nigeria that has eliminated current NDCs’ independence. Another difference is that ancient 
communities are described as autonomous villages, clans and kingdoms, whereas such 
descriptions can be viewed as modern communities only when they constitute the geographical 
and political parts of an LGA. This is due to the notion that certain ancient villages, clans or 
kingdoms, such as the Itsekiri kingdom, have grown beyond the modern NDC category by 
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having constituent communities that make up its geographical and traditional parts. For 
example, Itsekiri has expanded over time and now straddles more than 3 LGAs’ borders. On 
the other hand, an ancient kingdom like Effurun-Otor remained a modern NDC because it 
makes up a geographical and political part of the Ughelli South LGA and does contain any 
geographical and traditional constituents. Thus, it is communities like Effurun-Otor that 
exemplify the inherent autonomous nature of modern NDCs from the view that it exercises 
political autonomy prior to colonisation and the establishment of Nigeria. Hence all NDCs 
would have had political autonomy, which is inherent in them, if not for the current 
constitutional federal, state and local governments.         
The thesis’ definition of an NDC as inherently autonomous is based on a self-sufficient nature 
that exists within current communities, which in turn drives them to perceive one another as 
entities struggling and fighting for survival at the expense of one another. This connotes a vital 
part of the study’s definition of NDCs, because it does not only constitute a knowledge that 
contributes towards achieving the first objective of the study to define and delineate Niger 
Delta Communities, it also helps the study to analyse the third objective to evaluate social, 
economic, and political forces shaping inter-community conflict by demonstrating the inherent 
nature that drives communities to fight one another over social, economic and political factors. 
Thus, the study’s definition of NDCs as inherent autonomous units not only differs from 
Alagoa, Jones and Horton who define NDCs as autonomous entities, it also connects ancient 
and modern communities by dissecting different definitions of modern NDCs in ways that help 
achieve the aim and objectives of the thesis. 
Deducing from the thesis’ definition of NDCs as inherent autonomous units that represents the 
geographical and political parts of an LGA and in some cases clans/kingdoms, the aspect of 
current communities representing the geographical and political parts of an LGA reflects what 
constitutes a modern NDC. Though this differs from other definitions of modern NDCs as 
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kinship units (Peterside, 2007), villages (Ite, 2004), towns (Omeje, 2004), clans (Bisina, 2003), 
kingdoms (Ibaba, 2009), sub-ethnic groups (Ikelegbe, 2006), or a people with common 
interests (Frynas, 2000), it demonstrates how communities’ functions and their inevitable 
social, economic and political interact with one another, as well as with their respective local 
government authorities. This element of the definition helps in achieving the second objective 
of the study to delineate the characteristics of inter-community conflict through exploring inter-
community relations and how such relationships are affected by the leadership of their 
respective LGAs in ways that inform causality of inter-community conflict.  
The different definitions of modern NDCs in the existing literature are credible in their own 
ways. However, the study seeks to refine these definitions. NDCs can indeed be kinship units, 
villages, towns, clans, kingdoms, sub-ethnic groups, or a people with common interests if they 
constitute the geographical and political parts of an LGA. It is this relationship with the LGA 
structure, combined with the corrupt maladministration within LGAs, that lead to rivalry and 
conflict between NDCs. Since the aim of the thesis is to understand causality of inter-
community conflict, the definition of NDCs as inherent autonomous units that constitute the 
geographical and political parts of LGAs, and in some cases clans and kingdoms, becomes a 
functional definition for achieving the aim of the study. The study’s definition does not seek to 
controvert existing definitions, but rather to introduce new elements that address the aim of the 
thesis by incorporating the ideas of inherent autonomous nature from precolonial independent 
ancient communities and the geographical and political parts of LGAs from the way modern 
NDCs are set up in which they act as subdivisions of LGAs, the existing literature on ancient 






NDCs are conceptualised as any identified place sustaining inherent autonomous traits that 
constitute the geographical and political parts of LGAs and, in some circumstances, the 
traditional and political parts of clans and kingdoms. This differs from the two existing schools 
of thought regarding the definition of NDCs. Peterside, amongst others, defines NDCs as 
kinship units, villages, towns, clans, kingdoms, sub-ethnic groups, or a people with common 
interests. Alagoa, Jones, and Horton argue that communities in the ND are independent ancient 
clans or kingdoms settled in a village structure. These two positions are distinct. The first 
suggests NDCs are dependent, whilst the second suggests that NDCs are independent. Though 
the two positions are credible in their own ways, evidence from the respondents indicates that 
it was the introduction of a non-indigenous, European system of administration that removed 
the communities’ constitutional independence, but that an independence continues to resurface 
in the form of traditional governance. Moreover, in the context of Peterside’s argument, 
although an NDC can be a family kinship, villages, towns, clans, kingdoms, sub-ethnic groups, 
or a people with common interests, the study defines it in a way functional for achieving its 
aim and objectives as constituents of LGAs, and in some circumstances of clans or kingdoms. 
The chapter further argues that clans, kingdoms or sub-ethnic groups can extend beyond the 
community level when they have NDCs as traditional constituents and expand to two or more 
LGAs, but become NDCs themselves when such traditional constituencies are absent, which 
makes them a part of the constituencies that make up a LGA. In the context of Alagoa, Jones 
and Horton’s arguments, NDCs are not necessarily independent ancient villages (clans or 
kingdoms), as some of these now have communities as traditional constituents. Whilst some of 
these clans or kingdoms, such as Effurun-Otor, remain classified as NDCs as well as 
communities, others such as the Itsekiri kingdom have expanded over two LGAs, and have 
‘children’ communities such as Okere-Itsekiri and Ugbuangbwe, which have become 
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constituent communities of the Warri South LGA. Thus, whilst this takes the Itsekiri kingdom 
to a level above the NDC category, the chapter’s analysis determines that the newly emerged 
communities operate a traditionally autonomous way and are constitutionally independent from 
the Itsekiri kingdom. Though newly emerged communities are not constitutionally dependent 
on their parent NDCs, they are politically dependent on LGAs, but maintain an inherently 
autonomous nature. 
The chapter concludes that the defining characteristics of an NDC must remain a fluid and 
evolutionary process. First, NDCs are formed by overpopulation. Second, they are composed 
of family units alongside strangers, whose structural environment is made of streets, roads, 
quarters and divisions that form the constituent parts of the place called a ‘community’ in the 
ND. Third, these NDCs have their own peculiar laws which are administered by each 
community’s unique and independent administration and are demarcated by boundaries that 
make them a distinct entity. Fourth, these distinct NDCs are constituents of LGAs, and in most 
cases also clans/kingdoms. Fifth, NDCs were politically autonomous prior to the arrival of 
Europeans in the ND, who introduced the mechanisms of governance and administration 
leading to the introduction of the LGA system that constitutionally removed the autonomy of 
the NDCs. The chapter argues that NDCs’ autonomy is inherent and continues to resurface in 
emerging communities in the present political dispensation. NDCs are constituents of LGAs as 
well as clans/kingdoms simultaneously. They also maintain and possess the autonomous nature 
of ancient communities in the ND thereby making current communities in the ND inherently 




Chapter 6: The Characteristics of Inter-Community Conflict in the Niger 
Delta  
Introduction 
The previous chapter analyses the definition and delineation of communities in the ND 
concluding that NDCs are inherently autonomous, and independent entities. Building on this, 
the current chapter examines the characteristics and circumstances that breed and harbour inter-
community conflict in the ND. The chapter explores the nature and scope of inter-community 
conflict as being characterised by incompatibility between modernity and the traditional. 
Whilst modernity represents the modern style of governance where NDCs interact under the 
constitutional authority of LGAs, the traditional depicts the autonomy that communities 
possessed prior to the introduction of the modern administrative system. Scholars and others 
have severely critiqued the effectiveness of governance in the ND, highlighting failures based 
on poor government practice and corruption.  However, by failing to access those involved at 
the grassroots level in conflict between communities in the ND, the literature avoids focussing 
on the fundamental causes of conflict. This chapter fills this gap by exploring the reasons why 
and how inter-community conflict plays out in ND states and LGAs drawing on evidence and 
data from the study’s respondents. This will lay the foundations for a deeper analysis of the 
social, economic and political factors instigating violent conflict between NDCs in subsequent 
chapters.   
There is a strong body of opinion across academia, the media and the NGO community that 
lays the blame for conflict in the ND, and Nigeria as a country, on corruption, poor governance 
and poverty (Watts, 2007). This chapter, however, argues that there are other features that lead 
to violent inter-community conflict in the ND. These are firstly, the inefficacy of LGAs’ role 
in maintaining peaceful inter-community relations due to their untrustworthiness as a result of 
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being artificial ‘modern’ constructs leading to NDCs’ resorting to traditional violent ways of 
settling disputes. Secondly, corruption within LGAs’ allows the marginalisation of one 
community by another due to the modern administrative system whereby NDCs now are forced 
by the Constitution to interact within the same LGA. The research contends that the 
combination of both these realities are relative factors that facilitate other factors i.e. social, 
economic and political factors that create inter-community conflict, and as such produce a 
dilemma of modernity against the traditional. The dilemma of modernity against the traditional 
is the strained relationship between LGAs and NDCs, which appears to be more pronounced 
in the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers than the other six ND states.  
The current chapter analyses how communities’ act as parts of LGAs, ND-states, the FGN, and 
how NDCs have lost trust in these modern means of governance. The loss of trust in the LGAs 
is largely the result of the prevalence of corruption as an accepted culture that allows some 
NDCs to marginalise others over shared resources. The issue of the forced interaction of NDCs 
within the same LGAs necessitates an assessment of whether communities inevitably interact 
because of geographical proximity and the constitutional role of LGAs.  
6.2 An Ungoverned Space? 
The scope of inter-community conflict in the ND is between and within ND states and LGAs. 
There are, however, permutations. The inter-community conflict between ‘Kilama vs 
Zarama/Akumoni’ which erupted on 1st December 2001 lasting until February 2003 was a case 
of conflict between two NDCs located within the Yenagoa LGA axis in the ND state of Bayelsa 
over an alleged killing of a Kilama youth by some members of the Zarama/Akumoni 
communities (News Agency of Nigeria, 2003). Similarly, the violent conflict between the 
NDCs of B-Dere and K-Dere in Gokana LGA, ND state of Rivers on the 21st March 2013, 
where two persons were allegedly killed following an inter-community clash, was also a case 
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of two different communities from the same LGA as well as the same ND state (Ogoninews, 
2013). These differ from the case of the inter-community conflict between Kere-bangha and 
Nyowii-bangha in late 2007, where the former is in Gokana LGA whilst the latter is situated in 
Khana LGA, with both belonging to the same ND state of Rivers (Opukri & Ibaba, 2008). The 
inter-community conflict between Soku and Oluasiri which dates to 1992, and re-ignited in 
2013, was a conflict between a NDC from Brass LGA in the ND state of Bayelsa and a 
constituent community of Akuku-Toru LGA in the ND state of Rivers, hence crossing a state 
border (The Sun, 2015).  
ND states being the level of administration above LGAs have a remote, but important role in 
inter-community relations that subsequently affect conflicts between NDCs. Though ND 
states’ interference in inter-community matters is rare it is significant when conflict between 
NDCs goes beyond LGA level, especially in cases where communities involved are in two 
separate LGAs which automatically puts conflict resolution above the power of a single local 
government authority. Such is the case of the recent inter-community conflict between Okrika 
and Alesa-eleme Okrika, where the former belongs to the Okrika LGA whilst the latter is in 
Eleme LGA, both belonging to and depending for resolution on the ND state of Rivers’ (Daily 
Independent, 2015). ND states involvement is of a different order when the conflicting NDCs 
are in different LGAs and different ND states. These conflicts require the intervention of the 
FGN.  
According to Igiran, ‘the responsibility of inter-community matters rests on the chairman of 
the LGA authority’ (Igiran, April 2014). Similarly, Nengi states that ‘LGA officials have a 
responsibility to be fair in terms of the distribution of amenities, appointments and allocation 
of resources to every community that is under its jurisdiction’ (Nengi, April 2014). This 
evidence indicates that LGAs are responsible for supplying welfare goods to their respective 
constituencies. However, contrary to these assumptions of fair treatment, Ojuwu argues that, 
132 
 
‘yes from the guidelines and the responsibilities of the LGA, every community should be 
treated equally and fairly, but we are currently witnessing otherwise, and not being recognized 
by our LGA, that is why we have been asking for our own separate LGA for decades, …until 
we have our own LGA we will continue to be marginalized’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). Ojuwu 
articulates the frustration experienced by NDCs not valued at the LGA level.  
Watts contends that the Niger Delta region is corrupt at all levels including at the level of the 
electoral commission (2007). Aghalino, goes further describing a form of ’institutionalized 
corruption’, arguing that nepotism has become commonplace (2009). Further, Ibaba argues that 
corruption impedes property rights and disrupts development procedures which in turn bring 
about further grievances and frustrations (2011). These human rights abuses often underpin the 
resort to conflict. However, whilst Watts, Aghalino, and Ibaba emphasise the egregious poor 
government practice in the region, they do not explicitly explain how this translates into 
conflict between communities. There is a fundamental distrust of LGAs and their officials 
demonstrated from the grassroots evidence collected from the respondents. In the core ND 
states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, NDC leaders and residents object to the way in which the 
needs of their members are handled at local government level, notably the levels of prejudice 
and corruption demonstrated by local government officials and politicians. However, this 
prejudicial response to different NDCs can impact not just the members of that NDC, but also 
the relationship between individual NDCs. Discussing one corrupt official, Laka complains, 
he is so selfish, and hails from a community called Banu. He openly tells people 
that he will be returning to Banu by the end of his tenure. Everybody in Khana 
LGA knows that he is bias, corrupt and marginalizes other communities in favour 
of Banu. The bulk of supervisors and working staff in the local government council 
are people from his community. There are ghost workers on his payroll of which 
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the salary goes to his private account. His level of partiality and corruption is as 
high as a very tall tree (Laka, April 2014). 
Laka argues that Banu community members benefit from the prejudiced decisions made by one 
of their residents to the detriment of other NDCs. Okumagba supplies a further example, 
‘government have predominantly been occupied by the Okere-Itsekiris of the Warri South LGA 
which motivates them to make almost all decisions and actions in favour of the Itsekiris’ 
(Okumagba, March 2014). In these cases, there is a clear perception that LGAs are a means 
used by some NDCs to dominate others.  
However, other respondents put this in historical perspective.  Omavonwan argues that, 
in the 1950s, communities were distinct from each other, but they were not 
conscious of ruling or dominating one another. They were just satisfied with having 
their head of clans or kings and that is all, then they go about their normal day to 
day business. It is just recently that politics started gaining grounds that made them 
to have the interest and their awareness of wanting to be supreme to others, this 
struggle for leadership started coming up, it was never there, it was what came with 
domination and eventual withdrawal of English rule. (Omavonwan, November 
2016). 
Similarly, Omoseye maintains that, ‘communities as they seem to dominate one another today, 
but this was not so from the beginning, these communities came up because of politics and 
leadership in local governments, so they can be recognized at that level’ (Omoseye, November 
2016). These two perspectives seem to argue that NDC’s drive to dominate does not have along 
historical provenance, but rather appears to date from the establishment of the LGA system of 
local administration.  
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Favouritism leads to, ‘territorial tension’ whereby non-favoured NDCs feel marginalised. 
Reflecting the frustration-aggression trap analysed in the literature review, Kew and Phillips 
link the frustration-aggression analysis to the impoverished condition of most NDCs, 
describing them as a people living in failed conditions who strike out neighbouring NDCs and 
the government alike (2013). As mentioned earlier, Oluduro and Oluduro (2003) combine the 
frustration–aggression hypothesis with Rasheed Draman’s (2003) relative deprivation analysis 
that proposes that not only does conflict lead to poverty but that poverty leads to conflict. Ibaba 
describes the frustration-aggression trap where NDCs trapped by environmental degradation 
and ethnicity-based political domination, have no option but to go into violent conflict with the 
NDC responsible for driving them into the trap (2011).  
The argument that there is a suspicion of authority being exercised by administrators from 
systems that are perceived as alien, imported and not traditional and ‘home-grown’ was made 
by several respondents. From a scholarly perspective Alagoa argues,  
the Local Government administration has not been married to the traditional 
system, it is still an alien thing. All the communities still have traditional offices 
like the Amanayenabo, compound chiefs, titled chiefs and so on. These institutions 
are very effective and still in practice (Alagoa, March 2014).  
Similarly, Nengi states that ‘the communities do not have to wait for the government before 
acting, because they were in existence before the creation of the current Nigerian 
administration’ (Nengi, April 2014). Alagoa and Nengi contend that NDCs resort to inter-
community conflict as a traditional way of settling disputes with which they are more 
comfortable. There is a sense here that not only do NDC leaders and their members perceive 
the LGAs as corrupt, prejudiced and inefficient, but that they do not necessarily recognise this 
modern system as a legitimate form of governance, that their NDC and the other NDCs with 
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which they are forced to interact exist in an ungoverned space. Other respondents stress the 
untrustworthiness of LGAs and that this drives a propensity to self-help. For Nalaguo,  
Well at the base of the situation, the problem is trust. It is when trust go haywire, 
basic conflict erupts. For example, the present Nigerian government lacks vote of 
confidence. Because the way these governments are installed, becomes the main 
cause of conflict and divisions considering the malpractices involved. Because of 
this, the people cannot take their problems to them. In the local parlance, it is like 
you are expecting the rat to take its problems to the cat for solution. So, in most 
cases that is the situation… (Nalaguo, April 2014).  
A further corollary of Nalaguo’s analysis is that neither LGAs nor ND-states’ have the capacity 
to resolve conflicts between communities in the region. Odje emphasises,   
It is a case of trust. There is lack of trust by the people on the government 
authorities. Like I said, where there is a community bias ruler or administrator in 
government’s office, other community groups do not look upon him as a saviour. 
They perceive him as punishment inflicting more harm on them, therefore they 
resort to self-help rather than consulting his/her office (Odje, April 2014). 
The thesis argues that LGAs play an active role in allowing for conflict in the ND. However, 
LGAs are not the only factor leading to inter-community conflict. The analysis indicates that 
LGAs are corrupt, alienated and lack the trust of indigenes from their constituent NDCs. This 
accounts for NDCs resorting to self-help, which serves as a motivating factor for engaging in 
inter-community violence. Also, this explains the high level of inter-community conflict in the 
three ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. These three states are the most conflict-prone 
states in the ND (Ibaba, 2011; UNDP Report, 2006) amounting to 56 community conflicts 
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between 1997 to 2006 which is double the number of conflicts in their sister states in the ND 
put together (Ibaba, 2011; Conflict Bulletin, 2014).  
This is not to argue that these states are without violent activity. Amongst the other six ND 
states, the ND state of Abia has a low level of inter-community conflict, but high rates of 
abduction, armed robbery and violent cult rivalry activities (Ogbonnaya, 2011). In the latter 
part of 2014, there were reports concerning connections between criminal gangs involved in 
abductions and political parties (Guardian Newspaper, June 2015). The significance of such 
activities is the dominance within the relevant LGAs of political leaders with criminal 
backgrounds. Arguably, corruption within these LGAs, rather than leading to inter-community 
violence, manifests itself in alternative forms of violence. Aba North and Aba South LGAs are 
notorious for corruption that often attracts violent street protests (Ogbonnaya, 2011). In 
Umuahia North and Umuahia South LGAs, political abductions, political thuggery and cases 
of cult violence are rampant (Niger Delta Watch, 2015).  
The disconnection between LGA leadership and inter-community conflict in Abia reflects 
Adeyemo’s view that the ‘nature and structure of transactions or interactions between the three 
tiers of government determines the degree of autonomy of a local government’ (Adeyemo, 
2017 p.2). Local government in Nigeria are rooted in historical reform whereby the state and 
federal governments constantly restrain their financial and political ability to coordinate their 
communities. Such scenarios are typical in the eastern ND states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross 
River, and Imo where the chieftaincies that constituted local governments at that time, lost their 
constitutionally active role under the current Nigerian constitution (Afigbo, 1972). In these 
eastern states, local governments are more detached regarding inter-community affairs since 
the communities were, and remain, more self-sustaining detaching them from relying on the 
state and federal government (Afigbo, 1968).       
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Similarly, whilst Akwa Ibom is reported to have the second lowest inter-community conflict 
rate after Ondo according to the Niger Delta Conflict Tracker (2016), it scores highly in terms 
of the prevalence of rival cult gangs and abductions of political figures (Conflict Bulletin, 
2014). Between 2012 to 2014 the level of violent activity was high in 8 of its 31 LGAs, Mbo, 
Uyo, Ibesikpo Asutan, Ikot Ekpene, Oron, Ini, Abak, Ibeno (Conflict Bulletin, 2014). 
According to Afigbo’s view, Akwa Ibom is also notable for absence of connectivity between 
its LGAs and their constituent NDCs due to loss of its chieftaincies’ powers (Afigbo, 1972). 
Thus, the low numbers of inter-community conflict in these LGAs indicate that NDCs in Akwa 
Ibom do not have a close relationship with their local governments, the absence of a 
relationship stifling inter-community conflict unlike the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers.  
Cross River, another eastern ND state has the highest level of inter-community conflict after 
the core ND states. Between 2012 to 2015, its LGAs, in particular, Abi, Bakassi, Calabar South, 
Odukpani, Ogoja and, Yakurr suffered border disputes, political violence, cult clashes and 
criminality (Conflict Bulletin, 2015). Inter-community conflict is reported to cause the death 
of 32 persons and the destruction of over 15 houses (Guardian, October 2015). Nonetheless, 
these figures are less than a quarter of the ND state of Bayelsa, the core ND state with the 
lowest rate of inter-community violence between 2012 to 2015.  The level of inter-community 
violence between the core ND states and other ND states clearly diverges. However, there is 
significant and deadly inter-community violence in non-core states. Moreover, there are 
indications that the type of corruption and administrative malpractice found across the Niger 
Delta manifests in other forms of serious violence outside the core states. However, supporting 
the contention of this thesis, an underlying reason for the divergent rates of violence between 
core and non-core states lies in the relationship between LGAs and their constituent 
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communities with non-core states historically less reliant on the government and government 
resources.  
6.3 Corruption as a Culture  
As previously mentioned, Watts stresses the corruption that permeates the ND region 
evidenced by the lack of transparency and accountability within the LGA administrative system 
(2007). Aghalino has called this ’institutionalized corruption’ (2009b). These accusations 
complement Ukiwo’s argument that the local governments have transformed patronage into a 
system where resources in their gift are reserved for favoured groups, such as those who are in 
the same political party. This alienates the unfavoured who do not have access to these goods 
(2006). The thesis argues that corruption has become a culture in the modern LGAs thereby 
allowing the marginalisation of one NDC by another, forcing communities to traditional violent 
means of settling disputes. The issue of corruption enabling marginalisation is a socio-cultural, 
economic and political reality, a fact of life, in the ND (Ibaba, March 2014). The LGA is often 
perceived by those at the grassroots as a metaphor for power and powerlessness.    
Odje argues, ‘LGA treatment of its constituent communities has never been on equal basis, 
especially the local government that harbours more than one ethnic group…there is always 
favouritism of the ethnic group that produces the local government chairman and executives 
(Odje, April 2014). This is supported by Onobrekpeya in his example from Warri, ‘the Warri 
South LGA’s executives is always predominantly from Itsekiri ethnic group, making majority 
of their decisions and actions in favour of the Okere-Itsekiris over the Okere-Urhobos 
(Onobrekpeya, April 2014). According to Duumaa, the cause of the 2011 inter-community 
conflict between Iluekun and Nyokuru of Khana LGA in the ND-state of Rivers was the 
domination of local government posts by Iluekun over twenty years which led to retaliation by 
Nyokuru (Duumaa, April 2014). As Ikelegbe argues ‘participation and representation at the 
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LGA level were forcefully taken from weaker communities by stronger ones back in the days, 
nowadays some of these formerly weak communities with the acquisition of arms are now 
contending with the stronger communities that forcefully kept them away from being relevant 
at these levels’ (Ikelegbe, April 2014). This form of contentious collective action is an attempt 
to find redress following the wrongful denial or violation of social or human rights (Tarrow, 
1989). According to Nalaguo, ‘the court cannot dispense justice properly, at times, especially 
in the litigation system you see a judge passing judgement on a very sensitive issue, by 
manipulation, hence an average man now thinks the justice system is a failure’ (Nalaguo, April 
2014).   
A key type of corruption practised in the ND is nepotism. A major grievance of the Okere-
Urhobo community which instigated the 2003 inter-community conflict with Okere-Itsekiri 
was that nepotism in the Warri South LGA had become the default method of filling 
government posts (Ojuwu, March 2014). This dismissal of the culture of corruption within 
LGAs can lead to an effective schism between NDCs and their local administrators. Alagoa 
states that ‘there are large sections of the rural communities from which the LGA authority is 
completely absent because these rural communities perceive the LGA as irrelevant, hence when 
disagreement occur, the local warlords are free to engage in violent inter-community conflict’ 
(Alagoa, March 2014). The implication is that familiarity with the LGAs’ corrupt practices has 
bred a deep contempt that has impelled a withdrawal to a form of self-determination where 
traditional violent dispute settlement methods are prioritised.  
Some respondents argue that the LGAs are not institutionally corrupt, but rather that it is 
influential individuals within LGAs that pervert administrative processes. One respondent 
linked this to a wider failure of governance in Nigeria. For Ibaba ‘it is a Nigerian thing, that is 
the issue, from the local government to the federal level, the man in power shows some 
preferences for his people, in terms of contract appointments and projects allocation’ (Ibaba, 
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March 2014). Some LGAs have recognised their limitations and the reality of their fraught 
relationship with their constituent NDCs. Otavie raises an initiative by one LGA, ‘the Sagbama 
LGA in the ND state of Bayelsa established the institution comprising the communities’ 
traditional chiefs which is known as the conflict management committee, made up of various 
chiefs because of the crisis that evolved at Agbiri town over chieftaincy title in 2007 (Otavie, 
April 2014). This well-meaning effort to incorporate familiar community personalities into the 
conflict resolution process has, however, described by other respondents as ineffective as a 
result of insufficient engagement by the chieftaincies (Nalaguo, April 2014; Okumagba, April 
2014). This is rejected by the chiefs who point to the inefficiency and corruption of the LGAs. 
For Iniku, ‘the inter-community conflict between Okere-Itsekiri and Okere-Urhobo in 2003 
caused chaos and anarchy where attention was distracted, people were looking at the war while 
government officials were stealing money, claiming they were spending it on security, whereas 
the funds were going into their pockets (Iniku, April 2014). Corruption at local government 
level is also held by respondents to be a brake on development (Omotola, 2009). Ibaba argues 
that corruption impacts traditional property rights and disrupts development processes which 
in turn bring about grievances and frustrations (Ibaba, 2011). According to Uzodike and Isike, 
NDCs cite a litany of impacts to the livelihoods of their residents resulting the effects of 
corruption including unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation, disease, and 
illiteracy (Uzodike & Isike, 2009). The pervasive corrupt environment fostered by the LGAs 
can have unforeseen consequences.  The 2011 inter-community conflict between Luusue-
Sogho and Kaani 1 in Khana LGA, ND-state of Rivers resulted from an attempt by local 
administrators to sequester large tracts of farmland from both NDCs for a banana project being 
run with a private Mexican partner (Ogoninews, 2013). According to Watts, the NDR 
constitute an environment that is ungovernable both at the ND state and LGA levels where the 
residents of the NDCs in the region have little or no trust in the way in which their needs are 
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supplied. This leads to a situation of quasi-insurgency. For Watts, this lack of trust largely 
stems from the pervasive culture of corruption (Watts, 2004; Watts, 2007). The Vanguard 
newspaper reports that grassroots’ government institutions consistently fail to handle the 
developmental and environmental crisis in the region due collaboration between FGN, ND 
state and the LGAs (Vanguard Newspaper, 2009). This is manifest in the inability to provide 
roads, health facilities, development projects, and power, termed by one NGO as ’social 
irresponsibility’ (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014)    
The core states of the ND are also prone to the phenomenon of ‘godfatherism’. Odje describes 
LGAs as incapable of managing inter-community conflict (Odje, April 2014). Respondents 
gave numerous examples of poor practice in conflict management whereby LGAs more often 
foster conflict than seek to address it. The conflict between Luusue-Sogho and Kaani in 2011 
is one example (Winniman, April 2014). Godfatherism is a relationship between individuals in 
which an individual provides protection to another individual or group of individuals (Amana 
& Ogwu, 2014; Edigin 2010). Human Rights Watch describes a godfather as someone whose 
authority comes not just from wealth, but also the capacity to instigate violence in order to 
manipulate national, state or local political systems on behalf of the politicians they sponsor 
(Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
It is to this phenomenon of godfatherism that Duumaa refers: ‘over the years, the LGA has 
never effectively managed community crisis, because of their sympathy or affiliation with 
some of the communities [and personalities within these communities] at war’ (Duumaa, April 
2014). Iniku reinforces this connection between prominent individuals and the LGA, ‘when 
two communities are at loggerheads, and one of them happens to provide the ruling chairman 
of the presiding LGA, then the one without such chairmanship will be punished’ (Iniku, April 
2014). Iniku argues that for a NDC to be preferred by its LGA, there needs to be an explicit 
connection or affiliation between personalities/politicians from that NDC and its LGA. Iniku 
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also claims that in his experience it is the NDCs that lack this explicit affiliation that usually 
initiate conflict.  
This is the disconnection between constitutional responsibility and corruption (Igiran, April 
2014; Ibaba, March 2014). For Prince Uzobarima, a youth president of B-Dere Community in 
Rivers, ‘what we operate here cannot be classified as proper democracy, because there is 
diversity of interest…the chairman of a LGA might support a community, and may not support 
another based on what he/she is going to gain from them’ (Uzobarima, April 2014). For 
Eyoroko, the President General of Owhor Community, Ughelli South LGA, ND state of Delta, 
‘the Owhor community do not have to wait for the LGA authorities before they launch an attack 
on an offensive community, because sometimes the chairperson might be wayward in nature, 
irresponsible and not interested in community affairs’ (Eyoroko, April 2014). Others argue that 
the decision-making of individual chairpersons depends on where he/she receives political and 
electoral support. As Laka contends ‘during the 4 years of inter-community fight between 
Luusue-Sogho and Kaani 1 in 2007 to 2011, the LGA chairman did not step into my community 
any day, because he feels that you never voted or supported him to get to his position, hence 
he does not owe you anything’ (Laka, April 2014).  
Thus, NDC environment is described as one of grave neglect. According to Alagoa, 
government at the state level persistently fails to use the LGA to reach out to the grass-roots. 
He further states that ‘at the village level we have already seen that the people are still going 
with their traditional system, the government is not there, there are large sections of the local 
and rural communities that the state government is completely absent’ (Alagoa, March 2014). 
Monday gives an example, ‘for instance there is an abandoned project in Effurun-Otor 
community by the government such as bridge and road, if my community are a violent people 
they will be mounting road blocks against government to press on their demands and 
marginalization’ (Monday, March 2014). An incapacity to fulfil their constitutional role can 
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lead to communities taking matters into their own hands, ‘the government was unable to 
provide the killer of a boy belonging to my community, and they were not willing to make any 
arrest because they do not take our matters seriously, therefore we confronted Zarama and they 
started fighting us’ (Bekesu, April 2014). This dereliction of constitutional responsibilities 
leads Ojuwu to complain with exasperation, ‘I do not see any reason why we pay taxes and 
water is not provided in our community, we cannot have the opportunity to go to school close 
enough, except we trek 2000 miles before someone can get to classes’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). 
Aghara maintains that Kaani 1 community in Rivers has, virtually no amenities, ‘there are none 
of life’s basic amenities in our communities, and that is why we hear of violence sometimes, 
to get the attention of the government’ (Aghara, April 2014).  
A further factor, however, is the reluctance, in some instances, of elected politicians to support 
home communities. According to Alagoa ‘the Opobiri community is a highly neglected area in 
the ND-state of Bayelsa, which constantly protested the government in the late 2000s, but had 
no idea that these government officials hardly develop their homeland as a result of self-greed’ 
(Alagoa, March 2014). And Nalaguo claims that ‘it is like when most LGA chairperson are 
elected they send them for induction in a school that teaches them nothing but selfishness’ 
(Nalaguo, April 2014). This reflects a speech made by former president Obasanjo in 2003,  
What we have witnessed is the abysmal failure of the Local Government system. 
It is on record that at no time in the history of the country has there been the current 
level of funding accruing to the Local Governments from the Federation Account, 
yet the hope for rapid and sustained development has been a mirage as successive 
Councils have grossly under-performed in almost all the areas of their mandate 
(Obasanjo, 2003).  
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Whilst respondents’ comments concentrate on the inadequacies of LGA officials 
in the three core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers that results in the 
unpopularity of the LGA system within constituent NDCs, Obasanjo’s speech 
relates to the failure of LGAs in Nigeria. However, despite such a poor record of 
administration across the ND and Nigeria, there is no evidence of inter-community 
conflict comparable to the levels extant in the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers. For example, as analysed earlier in this section, the three ND states of Abia, 
Akwa Ibom and Cross River, whilst also prone to violent activity, see more political 
abductions and gang rivalry than inter-community conflict.  
Violence in the state of Edo tends more towards political tension and abductions, intra-
community disputes, cult clashes and violent protests against government institutions. 
Amongst its constituent LGAs, in Akoko Edo there were intra-community conflicts within the 
Igara NDC over whether a banned festival should be held in secret (Conflict Bulletin, 2015). 
In February 2015, Esan North LGA witnessed violent political tension between the People’s 
Democratic Party and All Progressive Alliance party members over election fraud (Vanguard, 
March 2015). During the same period, there were violent protests in Oredo and Etsako Central 
LGAs over access to post-natal care for women in Benin City, and over governance issues 
within the Niger Delta Development Commission. Two people were killed (Conflict Bulletin, 
2015). Among the violent conflicts recorded in the ND state of Edo’s LGAs between 2012 to 
2015, there were no significant fatal inter-community conflicts.  
In the ND state of Imo, there are frequent violent clashes between traders and herdsmen, inter-
personal disputes involving assassination, as well as political unrest. Inter-community 
conflicts, however, have a low fatality rate (Niger Delta Watch, 2015). Between 2012 to 2015 
its LGAs, Ngor-Okpala, Obowo, Oguta, Mbaitoli, Ohaji/Egbema, Aboh Mbaise and, Ehime-
Mbano witnessed violent disputes between traders/villagers and Fulani herdsmen resulting in 
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the deaths of 12 individuals (Conflict Bulletin, 2015). During this period, only two incidences 
of inter-community conflict are recorded. The first at Oguta LGA between two NDCs over an 
oil well location with no recorded casualties, although a second conflict at Ohaji/Egbema 
between two communities over a disputed market barricade led to the death of seven people 
(Conflict Bulletin, 2014).  
Among the nine ND states, Ondo has the lowest rate of violent conflict with most disputes 
centred around protests against government institutions, political tensions, cult violence (Niger 
Delta Conflict Tracker, 2016). Between 2003 to 2016, its LGAs, Akure North, Akure South, 
Idanre, Odigbo, Okitipupa, have recorded the least fatalities of any ND state (Conflict Bulletin, 
2015; Niger Delta Conflict Tracker, 2016). Among the conflicts occurring in Ondo are protests 
against government institutions on employment fraud and local government electoral 
malpractices. This suggests a tense relationship between the LGAs and their constituent NDCs 
which, nonetheless, does not convert to the levels of inter-community violence seen in the core 
ND states, but rather manifests as other forms of violence.  
The disparity between the incidence of inter-community violence between the three core states 
and the six non-core states, despite similar levels of corruption and malpractice within their 
respective LGAs, might be explained by two key factors. Firstly, the core ND states are the 
locations for more oil exploitation than the non-core states. As analysed earlier in the thesis, 
rivalry and competition over the location of oil wells and MNOC facilities has historically been 
a source of inter-community conflict in, especially in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers where LGAs 
play a key role in recommending NDCs as the location for oil production.  
Secondly, the higher prevalence of inter-community conflict in the core states might result from 
the geographical proximity between the three core ND states, where conflict between two core 
ND states/LGAs i.e. NDCs located in LGAs from Bayelsa and Rivers indicate that these LGAs 
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are more active in NDC’s affairs to protect their state’s interests. Examples are the 2013 inter-
community conflict between Soku and Oluasiri, the former Brass LGA in the ND-state of 
Bayelsa and the latter belonging to Akuku-Toru LGA in the ND-state of Rivers. Thus, though 
LGAs in the core ND states are more involved in influencing the outbreak of inter-community 
conflict than in the non-core states, LGAs are a possible factor influencing the immediate 
social, economic and political factors that causes inter-community conflict in the ND that will 
be explored in subsequent chapters.                
6.4 Geographical Proximity and Political Fusion 
Rodney argues that the current Nigerian political system is a continuation of the administrative 
policies originally imposed on the region by the Europeans colonists to separate people of same 
ethnic groups, clans, and kingdoms, and subjugate them under different political units, which 
in turn forced the coexistence of disunited groups (2012). In the post-colonial context, this led 
to the geographically proximate communities being politically fused becoming constituents of 
a particular LGA. This study argues that NDCs proximity and political fusion under LGAs has 
resulted in the dichotomy of traditional and modernity that underpins inter-community conflict 
in the ND.  
According to Laka, ‘if two communities do not coexist and share common geographical 
boundaries, then they cannot fight…it is when two communities come together that they have 
differences, because they are close to themselves’ (Laka, April 2014). Another respondent state 
that ‘as my community remain, people from other communities came to live with us, not in our 
own community but living close to us, therefore we had to create a boundary for ourselves’ 
(Iniku, April 2014). In a similar view, Ojuwu states that ‘it is just that we found ourselves close 
to each other, if not, there is no direct link between my community and our neighbors except 
that we do inter-marry occasionally’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). This evidence emphasises 
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boundaries and difference. Given that NDCs are constitutionally administered by LGAs, and 
LGAs fail to provide fair and equitable welfare for their citizens, the interaction of communities 
within this geographical and political space makes inter-community conflict, at some level, 
inevitable.  
Geographically NDCs are close and demarcated by boundaries (Tombare, April 2014), 
politically NDCs’ proximity brings them under the jurisdiction of LGAs as stated in the 
Nigerian constitution (Odje, April 2014). According to respondents, the political implication 
for NDCs’ proximity is that they must succumb to the constitutional mandate of LGA’s 
authority, thereby inevitably making NDCs to politically coexist. The sharing of resources 
becomes a source of inter-community conflict from a political standpoint, considering the 
sensitivity of the LGA authority’s distribution of benefits and amenities to NDCs. According 
to Eyakade,  
if you look around Effurun-Otor, we do not have anything to show that we are part 
of the Ughelli South LGA, because no developmental project or amenities is there. 
The LGA has never done anything for Effurun-Otor community, yet they keep on 
bringing their officials to come and collect revenue… The LGA authorities favour 
some communities over others, by collecting revenue from one community to 
develop another’ (Eyakade, March 2015).  
Agreeing with Eyakade, another respondent state that unprincipled politicians at local 
government level, use demographics to acquire political positions which they then abuse by 
denying minorities access to benefits (Monday, April 2014).  
Some respondents are less critical of the LGAs and their officials, pointing to insufficient 
allocation of funds to the region from central government (Aghara, April 2014). Nengi, the 
former speech writer to President Jonathan, perhaps unsurprisingly claims that the oath 
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government officials swear prevents favouritism (Nengi, April 2014). Oyolo takes this a step 
further claiming that even the president of Nigeria is not able to favour one part of the country 
over others irrespective of his origin, and that lower ranked LGA officials are even less able to 
do so (Oyolo, March 2014).  
NDCs’ proximity and interaction as a factor instigating inter-community conflict makes sense 
only when communities are recognized as separate entities. According to Okumagba, ‘it is the 
benefit that we have as Nigerians that we identify and differentiate ourselves’ (Okumagba, 
April 2014). The idea of the inherent autonomy of NDCs was analysed Chapter 4. It is this 
inherent autonomy that differentiates NDCs from their neighbours (Ehoroko, April 2014; Laka, 
April 2014).  
Otavie describes differing ‘cultures’ in different NDCs, ‘communities have different norms, 
practices, and traditions which are distinct for them’ (Otavie, April 2014). An example is the 
distinctive cultural land tenure systems practiced in Delta and Edo (Ikelegbe, April 2014). The 
cultural land tenure system between Okere-Itsekiri and Okere-Urhobo NDCs belonging to the 
Warri South LGA was a major factor in the 2003 inter-community conflict. For Onobrekpeya, 
‘the Okere-Itsekiri wanted to show act of ownership of the land occupied by Hussey College, 
which originally belong to us and that was a problem between us’ (Onobrekpeya, April 2014). 
On the other hand, Itemeoki from the Okere-Itsekiri side insisted that they settled and owned 
the area long before neighbouring communities arrived, ‘we remain there, people were coming 
to live with us…we did not create a boundary for ourselves’ (Itemeoki, March 2014). The 
underlying factor is that as time elapses the differing cultural land tenure systems between both 




The notion of differing autonomous cultural systems between NDCs raises the question, do 
communities perceive inter-community conflict a necessity considering their interaction in the 
same geographical and political unit? In response, members of the Akumoni community in the 
ND-state of Bayelsa perceive violent conflict to be a means of making other communities, as 
well as third parties succumb to their needs (Tyger, April 2014). Zarama of Yenagoa LGA in 
Bayelsa and Kaani 1 of Khana LGA in Rivers claim that violence is an effective way of 
achieving community goals (Igiran, April 2014; Laka, April 2014). Zalik raises the issue of 
youth militarisation, where those between 16 and 45 rallies to militias primarily according to 
Zalik to enrich themselves, but also to fulfil community goals through violence (Zalik, 2004).  
6.5 Governed Groups and Sovereign States? 
According to William Wohlforth, ‘governed groups’ subject to no higher authority find 
themselves trusting solely on self-help for survival, and as such the distribution of power 
among these groups becomes the most important factor dictating the outcome of their attitudes 
and interactions (1993). This is commensurate to what Robert Gilpin describes as patriotism 
and loyalty to a group by its members, arguing that the goal of a group is to serve the interests 
of its members, which in turn inspires their loyalty and patriotism in achieving the goals of that 
group (1986). Synonymously, NDCs have administrative structures render them ‘governed 
groups’ and yet are subject to the administrative authority of untrustworthy LGAs. What 
differentiates Wohlforth’s view of governed groups from NDCs, is that communities in the ND 
are subject to the higher constitutional authority of the LGAs. However, this study argues that 
corruption and mismanagement have rendered the authority of the LGAs redundant and that 
NDCs have resorted to the inherent autonomy that reflects their pre-colonial independence as 
proto-sovereign states. This allows NDCs to prefer to settle disputes using rational violent 
means rather than the conciliatory means intended by the constitution, but in practice not 
effectively administered by local government.    
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NDCs are defined and delineated as constituents of traditional kingdoms/clans, as well as of 
modern LGAs which gives them a dual status. Identity is important as NDCs collectively 
campaign for goods disbursed by the tiers of Nigeria’s government. This need to belong to a 
group to campaign for potential benefits place the onus on individuals to prove their right to 
belong. Individuals associating and identifying with a NDC are usually born into that 
community (Laka, April 2014). Identity can translate into singular form of ‘patriotism’. 
Duumaa describes the attachment of one chairperson to his community,  
The local government chairman domiciled all projects of the local government in 
his community called Banu. Meanwhile, there are about 105 communities in the 
LGA. All the infrastructures are built in just that community called Banu. You 
witness where a local government chairman donates houses and cars to his 
community members, and calls it local government project, while the other 104 
communities are left out (Duumaa, April 2014). 
Likewise, Ojuwu remarks on the absence of health provision in his NDC, ‘I must confess to 
you that until now we do not have a good health centre in our area because we do not have 
people representing our community at the LGA and that is one of the thing we are trying to 
work on and overcome’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). It was the unequal distribution of goods and 
benefits that lead to the conflict that split Okere in 2003.  
The Okere case also informs the line of argument that NDCs, autonomous before colonisation, 
and arguably quasi-autonomous today more closely resemble in their inter-relationships 
sovereign states than neighbouring villages and towns. As quoted above, Ojuwu argues that ‘it 
is obvious, the Okere-Urhobo and Okere do not speak the same language, do not have the same 
background, administration and cultural lifestyle… it is just that we found ourselves close to 
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each other, if not, there is no direct link except that we do inter-marry occasionally’ (Ojuwu, 
March 2014).  
The idea of comparing NDCs to sovereign states reflects the capacity of NDCs to govern 
themselves and to preserve a collective identity and the incapacity of LGAs although bolstered 
by a legal constitutional authority to effectively exercise authority within their territory. This 
reflects the discourse in IR theory concerning the position of sovereignty in the international 
system.  
For Goldsmith and Posner, ‘international law has no life of its own, has no special normative 
authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively 
discrete problems of international cooperation’ (2005). In a similar vein, Hurd insists that the 
international system does not possess an overarching centre of political power to enforce rules 
(Hurd, 1999). Hurd’s view appears to complement Franck’s notion which upholds that states 
only voluntarily comply with international law when they perceive competition from other 
states that might be restrained by sanctions imposed by international law (Franck, 1990).   
LGAs are the third-tier of Nigerian governance with authority to enforce local laws within its 
constituent communities. Scholars of sovereignty such as Stephen Krasner and Francis 
Fukuyama have argued that the inability of many developing world governments to impose 
their writ on their territory and population, renders their claims to exercise de facto sovereignty 
fictitious. Respondents to this study nuance this comparison between states in an anarchic 
system and NDCs interacting within the LGA legal space. Ojuwu contends that ‘from the 
guidelines and the responsibilities of the LGA, every community should be treated equally and 
fairly, but we are currently witnessing otherwise, it’s like we are not being recognized by our 
LGA’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). Others state that their communities, for example Ayimebele and 
Kaani 1, are completely left out of their LGA’s development agenda as a result of corruption 
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(Tamunor, April 2014; Laka, April 2014). The distinction is that whilst sovereign states might 
have reservations about signing treaties and conventions they make this decision voluntarily 
based on an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages. However, NDCs, as many 
respondents argue, have not got access to a responsible, honest system of laws to opt into. 
Effectively, they have been left behind by the authority, the LGA, meant to administer their 
territories and people and enforce the rule of law.    
Having lost faith in the LGA, NDCs resort to self-help which can mean settling disputes 
traditionally by entering into conflict (Variside, April 2014; Igiran April 2014).  On the ground, 
the decision as to whether to accept all or a measure of their LGA’s authority is dependent on 
many of the factors explored in this thesis including their capacity to influence the LGA  
Certain respondents describe NDC’s synonym to sovereign-states as very minute, because 
communities are smaller, closer and without borders, whilst nation-states are much larger, 
further apart with consolidated territorial borders (Omavonwan, November 2016). He 
exemplified this by stating that, ‘you cannot compare a country to a community, for example 
if you are crossing America into France you must have done it internationally there is no 
mistake about that, that is very much unlike crossing from Okere-Urhobo to Okere-Itsekiri in 
Warri South LGA which can be done by mistake because of their closeness, therefore their 
similarities are very limited due to idea that they have common traits of group identity’ 
(Omavonwan, November 2016). Similarly, another respondent state that, ‘inter-community 
conflict cannot be compared to international conflict because the communities are very small, 
matters can be settled very quickly between them, but for international conflicts, it takes longer 
time, so it cannot be the same’ (Omoseye, November 2016). Thus, these views contrast those 
earlier in this section that perceives NDCs to be synonymous to nation-states such as Nigeria 
and Ghana. Although, Omavonwan and Omoseye disagree that NDCs are synonymous to 
nation-states and the international system, they succumb that both share similarities on group 
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identity. In this light, it can be deduced that NDCs sustain group identity like that of nation-
states with similar environmental characteristics. Referring to both governmental 
environments, whilst international law has no enforcer which makes sovereign-states to act 
voluntarily, modern LGAs lack legitimate implementation of their primary responsibility of 
catering for its constituents’ communities, which invariably resurfaces NDC’s traditional ways 
of dealing with affairs. The indication of this is that both the international system and LGAs 
lacks legitimate enforcer, that results in making sovereign states and NDCs to voluntarily 
respond to the laws, and where otherwise, becomes conflictual. In this light, modern LGAs 
governance is deemed untrustworthy and alienated from NDCs’ traditional inherent 
autonomous nature (traditional versus modernity), of which when assessed constitutes a major 
force that drives inter-community conflict over social factors.  
Literature in the chapter contends that the Nigerian government oversees community affairs in 
the ND, and have not been able to curtail inter-community conflict due to ineffective 
governance resulting from corrupt practices (Watts, 2007). The literature further demonstrates 
the Nigerian government as being introduced by the Europeans, which saw the separation of 
people belonging to same ethnic groups, clans, and kingdoms, and subjugated them under 
different political units that forces the coexistence of disunited groups (Rodney, 2012). 
Accordingly, governed groups subjected to no higher authority find themselves trusting for 
survival solely from self-help, and as such the distribution of power among these groups 
becomes the most important factor dictating the outcome of their attitudes and interactions 
(Wohlforth, 1993). Alternatively, this describes what dictates loyalty and patriotism to a group 
by its member, through arguing that the goal of a group is to serve the interests of such members 
(Gilpin, 1986).  
Drawing from the chapter’s analysis, the argument presents the conclusion that the 
incompatibility between modernity and traditional are a fundamental building blocks that 
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characterises inter-community conflict in the ND. It determines this by presenting, 
demonstrating that the Nigerian government does not only oversee community affairs, but that 
such responsibility rest directly from LGAs to NDCs. It analyses the Nigerian government 
inability to prevent and curtail inter-community conflict as not only emanating from corruption, 
but that it is a situation where the LGA’s mandate is not being respected by NDCs due to the 
notion that it is not home-grown and trustworthy, thereby brandishing it alienated and 
untrustworthy, that makes the corrupt LGA administration a relative factor that influences the 
immediate social, economic and political factors triggering inter-community conflict in the ND. 
This connotes the difference between modernity (LGAs introduced by foreigners) and 
traditional (NDCs are home grown).  Furthermore, it presents the case that the coexistence of 
disunited groups under same government does not only reflect NDCs’ situation under the 
auspices of LGAs, but that corruption creates a culture and environment where one community 
marginalises the other, thereby activating communities’ inherent autonomous nature to act as 
a catalyst that puts them at loggerheads with one another in the local government they co-habit. 
It went further, extending Wohlfort and Gilpin’s view of governed groups with loyalist 
members, existing with no superior government in which they become self-determined through 
intergroup power tussle to protect their members’ needs, to portray NDCs that engages in inter-
community conflict to satisfy its members’ interests, since LGAs’ ineffective governance is 
liken to no governance. It presents these as the characteristics of inter-community conflict in 








The chapter explores the nature and scope of inter-community conflict as being characterised 
by incompatibility between modernity and traditional. The modern LGA system of 
administration fails to provide trust for communities, but rather fosters the traditional violent 
means of settling disputes between NDCs. The chapter argues that it is this tension between 
the traditional and modern which has strained the relationship between LGAs and NDCs. The 
chapter further notes that the relationship between LGAs and their constituent NDCs is more 
controlling and manipulating in the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers than the other 
six ND states, potentially explaining the higher prevalence of inter-community violence in the 
core states. Thus, whilst LGAs are a relative causal factor, NDCs’ inherent autonomous nature 
over social, economic and political factors are the major cause of inter-community conflict.  
The role of LGAs, notably their corruption and malpractice, as the core driver of conflict in the 
core ND states aha s been under-stated in the existing literature. Among such reasons are that: 
(i) NDCs are inherent autonomous entities with traditional ways of settling irreconcilable 
disputes among themselves; (ii) they perceive the direct responsibilities of modern LGA’s 
authority over NDCs as not being home-grown; and (iii) geographical proximity that 
necessitated political fusion of inherent autonomous groups with different beliefs under one 
corrupt and untrustworthy leadership, which causes political domination and resource benefits 
marginalisation. Thus, whilst these extend the understanding of the Nigerian government’s 
careless attitude that breeds community conflict in the ND, it also helps to further particularise 
the term ‘inter-community conflict’. It does this by showing the limited scope of inter-
community conflict, which is violence between NDCs irrespective of their locations. For 
example, conflicted communities located in same or different LGAs and ND-states, are classed 
as inter-community rather than inter-LGA nor inter-ND-states. The significance of this is that 
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NDCs are literally understood to be organized governed groups that identifies with a certain 
course, as well as located in same or different LGAs or ND states.  
The chapter further analyses the characteristics of violent conflict between NDCs by exhibiting 
the intense tension highlighted by a corrupt community member (i.e. corrupt government 
official with political authority) that usurps authority over the shared territory or LGA that has 
constitutional control over its constituent communities. The implication of this is that, other 
NDCs who lack control over the shared territory or LGA happen to suffer grave marginalisation 
from corrupt communities that have the advantage of making decisions which subsequently 
affects all NDCs belonging to that territory or LGA. Thus, in a bid to forestall community 
marginalisation in the LGA, NDCs increasingly become self-determined by losing trust on the 
local government system. This presents LGAs as a relative factor that facilitates the social, 
economic and political factors instigating inter-community conflict in the ND.  Thus, 
community’s members organize themselves into governed groups that turns out to be the NDC 
that they pay loyalty to and as such characterize where they can receive the service of a trusted 
government. The enduring result is that NDCs lay more trust on its traditional ways rather than 
the modern administration of LGAs. NDCs’ traditional ways depict its inherent autonomous 
nature that portray the need to gain control over social, economic and political factors, which 
becomes the immediate causes of inter-community conflict since such factors are 
constitutionally meant for sharing with other communities in same LGA. The social factors 




Chapter 7: Sociological Shift: The Environment of Inter-
Community Conflict 
Introduction 
The previous chapter concludes that inter-community conflict in the ND is characterised by the 
incompatibility between modernity and the traditional. These characteristics are contingent on 
NDCs being inherently autonomous and distinct units that strive to survive independently of 
one another within their alienated and untrustworthy LGAs. The result of such a situation is 
the emergence of violent competition between communities over resources managed by these 
untrustworthy LGAs, which leads to suspicion of one NDC’s intentions towards the other, 
connoting independent entities that struggle for benefits in a fragile environment. Such 
struggles emerge over access to social, economic and political benefits or goods. The chapter 
concentrates on the social aspects of these struggles and reflects the community issues, such as 
prestige and status differences that acts as a major factor causing inter-community conflict in 
the ND. 
Scholars such as Ukiwo (2007) and Aghalino (2009a) argue that different interests in social 
factors from diverse ethnic groups in the ND make inter-community conflict more likely. ND 
groups with opposing interests in these sociological factors can agree or disagree, depending 
on how many benefits they can obtain, but there exists little consensus among scholars 
exploring inter-community conflict on when, how and in what circumstances inter-community 
conflict is triggered. Researchers tend to conform to the notion of ethnic and cultural groups 
attempting to exploit a failed government as the major criteria for inter-community conflict, 
without considering the view that NDCs are inherently autonomous groups, irrespective of 
ethnicity and cultural affinity, which makes social differences between them an important 
factor when it comes to intergroup relations. This chapter assesses such social matters by 
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analysing and exploring them as community status distinctions triggered by the environment, 
and investigates this in relation to the causes of inter-community conflict. This is achieved by 
analysing NDCs as being categorised into higher and lower status, with the former having 
better accesses to, and the privileges of, social amenities through the influence of corrupt LGA 
authorities, which is likely to aggravate the lower status communities into triggering inter-
community conflict. It assesses these status distinctions as constituting the culture created by 
the environment in the area, and as such motivates NDCs to strive for domination of their 
respective LGAs or territories seeking an edge over other NDCs.   
This chapter analyses status distinction between NDCs and how the consequences of this status 
distinction lead NDCs to resort to violent means of settling disputes rather than following the 
rule of law. The attempt to change status leads to inter-community conflict. Status is attained 
based on the level of internal cooperation achieved by an individual NDC. Whilst some NDCs 
have strong internal ties, and others weak, both inform inter-community conflict. The 
significance of different NDCs’ internal ties appears to represent their desire to be identified as 
a separate entity that can only be established through community identity based on inherent 
traits that enable social demarcation. Thus, since NDCs are identified with specific names that 
demarcate them from one another, social identity becomes a yardstick for differentiation, which 
has economic and political implications for NDCs’ attitudes towards inter-community conflict.  
7.2 NDCs as Status-based Societies  
Ukiwo and Aghalino argue that sociological issues such as status and cultural differences, when 
brought into the decision-making process of resource allocation, instigates geographical 
inequity. This is contingent on ethnic groups belonging to the same geographical territory 
tending to be disadvantaged in resource allocation decisions and policies in the ND (Ukiwo, 
2007). This is consolidated by violent conflict between ethnic groups in the ND being based 
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more on social injustice and the inequity in the allocation of scarce resources by the government 
and the oil industry (Aghalino, 2009a). Ukiwo and Aghalino’s understanding of ethnic groups 
implies that NDCs’ conflict over social factors is because they belong to different ethnicities. 
However, NDCs can with both identical and different ethnicities fall into conflict. In some 
cases, inter-ethnic strife has degenerated into inter-community conflict. In other cases, NDCs 
of the same ethnicity can fall into conflict such as the communities of K-Dere and B-Dere, both 
belonging to the Ogoni ethnicity (Tombare, April 2014), and Ayimebele and Akumoni both 
belonging to the Ijaw ethnicity (Tamunor, April 2014). As previously examined, NDCs can 
belong to the same or different ethnicity in that the definition of an NDC is based not on 
ethnicity but on a NDC constituting the geographical and political structure of a LGA. Thus, 
whilst agreeing with Ukiwo and Aghalino’s sociological approach, this thesis further 
emphasises the role of social factors as drivers of violence in the ND. 
LGAs are responsible for the fair allocation of resources to their constituent NDCs. This is not 
the case in practice. Rather the allocation of resources to NDCs is dependent on their status, 
and takes place through processes which are not transparent. A prominent resident of 
Ayimebele community in Yenagoa LGA in Bayelsa argues that in 2011 his LGA allowed 
Yambri, a neighbouring NDC to control the construction of roads within the LGA, a process 
that should have been centralised, as a result of its higher status based on the presence of 
socially prominent individuals, resident in Yambri. The LGA council apparently constructed a 
road between Agbobiri and Akumoni communities bypassing the neighbouring NDC of 
Ayimebele (Tamunor, April 2014). This corrupt and socially discriminatory behaviour on the 
part of this LGA emphasises both the prevalence of status distinction between NDCs and the 
potential for social distinction to metastasise into violent conflict.  
Higher status NDCs often have wealthy and influential residents with the military and political 
elites, and connections with local, state and national government officials (Bekesu, April 2014). 
160 
 
These influential persons work together within an NDC to ensure their community’s continued 
prosperity (Barile, April 2014). Onobrekpeya states that, 
We were peacefully living together, until the Okere-Itsekiri community brought up 
their domineering influence of wanting to enforce the Ogishi family leadership on 
us. They tried to use their communal land trust policy as an instrument to take our 
land. They oppressed us, and used their communal land trust policy to acquire our 
land on the Hussey College side, which we leased to them. They got into power in 
the Warri South LGA and exercised the council’s authority of taking over our land. 
They were the only members of the land committee of the local government, 
therefore took advantage by showing an act of ownership on Hussey College. 
Because my community believe in the rule of law, we sued them in court’ 
(Onobrekpeya, April 2014). 
A brief overview of why NDCs resolve inter-community conflict through violent conflict and 
not by trusting in the ‘rule of law’ and taking rival communities and members of rival 
communities to court results from and inherent distrust of the concept of the ‘rule of law’ based 
on its evolution and practice in the Nigeerian context.  
Firstly, as analysed in Chapter 6, local residents believe the justice system is a failure since it 
is an arm of the three organs of government, the executive, legislative and judiciary, whose 
officials are considered biased and corrupt. Secondly, the rule of law is generally considered 
to be intrinsically connected with the organs of government, it is also perceived as alienated 
from NDC’s precolonial and traditional ways of settling disputes. This is due to the notion that 
the organs of government in Nigeria are an untrustworthy borrowed concept or practice from 
the colonial power(s) rather than homegrown (Alegbeleye, 1998). Such untrustworthiness 
stems from NDCs’ belief and trust in their traditional and customary ways of settling disputes 
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(Alegbeleye, 1998). The traditional and customary ways of settling disputes are often based on 
diplomacy when involved parties have a long cordial relationship and settled by war when they 
have no ties in common (Dike, 2008). The difference between NDC’s traditional ways of 
settling disputes and the current rule of law are contributory to why NDCs resort to violent 
conflict among themselves. 
Thus, whilst NDC’s traditional ways of settling disputes are based on customary laws based on 
the day to day life of community members (Otite, 1972), the rule of law reflects what a civilised 
society should look like (Rodney, 2012). Hence, judgments based on customary laws are more 
seen as more legitimate by the members of an NDC, whilst a ruling based on the rule of law is 
seen as less legitimate. Dike assesses precolonial ancient ND communities involved in long 
distance trade from the coastal lowlands to the hinterlands, to be a people engulfed in unique 
traditional and customary laws from one community to another according to their festival 
practices (Dike, 2008). Moreover, these customary laws did not need the services of 
professional lawyers like the rule of law, a resentment given that the inability to pay for legal 
counsel can deny the members of an NDC access to justice. Thus, apart from the notion that 
the rule of law is not home grown, wealthy and influential members are better placed to hire 
the best lawyers, perceived as the lawyers best placed to twist the law in their favour. Hence, 
poorer communities and members of communities prefer to resort to traditional ways or violent 
means of settling disputes.  
Furthermore, wealthy and influential individuals often subvert the law to serve their interests, 
and in cases where they consider the rule of law to be unfavourable they use money to bribe 
corrupt officials to render the case null and void. Also, wealthy residents belonging to certain 
NDCs perceive violence as a quicker and surer way to achieve their communities’ aims. There 
is evidence that these wealthy and influential residents are directly responsible for facilitating 
violence through the purchase of ammunition, subverting government authority to protect their 
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interests, and covering up cases that should ordinarily go to court. A typical example is the 
inter-community conflict between Ewoama and Okpoama in 2006, where the latter had very 
prominent residents including judges and army officers who used their influence to promote 
the interests of Okpoama over those of Ewoama (Ibaba, March 2014). A similar case is that of 
the inter-community conflict between Kilama and Ayimebele in 2003, where the LGA 
chairman was from the latter (Igiran, April 2014). These put together sums up the agitation of 
NDCs’ members in boycotting the rule of law to taking up violent means in settling disputes 
between communities.  
The capacity of prominent individuals to influence resource allocation is maximised when 
these individuals act as LGA chairmen. According to Duumaa ‘in the Niger Delta, a LGA 
chairman is influenced by his community when making a decision, because he must come from 
a community amongst the various constituent communities making up the LGA’ (Duumaa, 
April 2014). This tallies with another respondent’s statement about Opokoma LGA in Bayelsa, 
where a prominent person named Timi Alaibe, a former adviser to the late President Yaradua, 
is alleged to influence decisions made by the LGA on community affairs (Otavie, April 2014). 
Influence relates to status. Some NDCs’ ‘identities’ are more prominent than others. Omoviri 
community, which includes residents closely connected with MNCs operating in the area, 
declared itself to be superior to the other seven communities located in the Rumuekpe kingdom 
leading to a protracted inter-community conflict between 2005 to 2009 that claimed over a 
hundred lives (Social Action Group, 2013). This concept of community ‘superiority’ is linked 
the favouritism of certain NDCs within their own LGA and can instigate a self-fulfilling cycle 
whereby these privileged NDCs become wealthier, more favoured within their LGA, and their 
superior status more entrenched.  
This position is supported by Tajfel who argues that social identity theory in social psychology 
focuses on how members of groups are biased in favour of their own group, their so-called in-
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group, and that how perceived threats from out-groups to the interests of the in-groups can lead 
to strong negative reactions from group members (Tajfel, 2010). Similarly, Kew argues that 
for groups to maintain their positions in a corrupt environment lacking legitimate business 
opportunities, the ones with influential politicians have every incentive to steal public funds 
and oppress political opponents. Moreover, under this arrangement these groups also have a 
strong incentive to keep competing counterparts impoverished and to fan ethnic resentments to 
keep them passive and afraid of neighbouring groups. This in turn maintains the status quo that 
benefits the political monopoly of an elite social group (Kew, 2010).  
Thus, communities understood as groups are complex cultural units, which serve such a rich 
variety of fundamental social identity, security, and members’ interests, particularly in the 
context of failed state conditions, where perceived threats from one ethnic group against 
another can elicit strong aggressive responses from aggrieved members. This type of 
provocation appears to be instilled by the upper status on the lower status NDCs. It is in this 
regard that Ojuwu states that, ‘most of the civil servants at the Warri South LGA’s offices are 
from Okere-Itsekiri, and they use the privilege to deny us from Okere-Urhobo our fundamental 
human rights, as well as refuse any opportunity for our candidates to be interviewed for job 
offers within the council’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). The 2003 inter-community conflict ignited 
over a dispute within the local branch of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PPD) (Okumagba, 
April 2014). According to these respondents’, such governmental influence by powerful 
communities can result in an aggressive response from weaker, yet aggrieved, NDCs. 
However, other respondents disagree, arguing that such grievances are rather stirred by the 
imbalance within the ND administrative structure that allows one NDC to dominate the other. 
Accordingly, Odje portrays the LGAs in the ND as ill-equipped to manage inter-community 
relations (Odje, April 2014). Another respondent state that the administrative structure of the 
LGA authorities is designed in such a way as to allow prejudice and marginalisation of one 
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community over another (Winniman, April 2014). These alternative perspectives suggest that 
community ‘status distinction’ is not to be blamed; rather it is the fault of the ineffective ND 
governmental system. However, what can be deduced from respondents’ views on powerful 
communities or the imbalance of LGAs’ administrative structure, is that NDCs classed in the 
higher social status aggravate those of lower status through biased decisions made at the 
governmental level, which are often perceived as unfair by lower status communities. As such, 
relationships between the higher and lower status NDCs have often been a case of the 
denied/oppressed revolting or attempting to attain social status. According to Eyakade: ‘people 
like to say how can this small village here threaten us, let us go and show them that we are 
more than them,’ (Eyakade, March 2014). The role of ‘pride’ as an instigator of conflict is 
raised often by the respondents. For example, according to a youth leader from B-Dere, a 
dispute between two individual landowners from K-Dere and B-Dere in 2013 escalated into a 
wider dispute in which the landowners’ respective communities became involved (Tombare, 
April 2014). Tombare, considers the idea of defending community pride as crucial to the nature 
of inter-community relations, extending the notion beyond NDCs to incorporate sovereign 
states: ‘it is the same pride that Nigerians have in agitating and protecting the Bakassi Peninsula 
from Cameroon, that our communities have in protecting its borders against neighbouring 
NDCs’ (Tombare, April 2014). 
The issue of a community’s pride in its social status reflects the status distinction between 
NDCs, itself a measure of inferred poverty or wealth. Nengi, a journalist based in Goodluck 
Jonathan’s State house in Bayelsa argues, 
Odioma and Obiokwu are two sister communities within the same ND state of 
Bayelsa, but there is an oil well located in Obiokwu, and Obiokwu in times past 
used to be a geographical part of Odioma. Odioma community is saying it is 
superior to Obiokwu, and Obiokwu is saying ‘no’ you cannot tell us that we are 
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inferior because the oil well that has just been discovered happens to be located on 
our land, therefore we have as much right to the proceeds from the oil, which makes 
us financially stable as you’ (Nengi, April 2014). 
Access to wealth, notably oil wealth, underpin claims to social superiority. This represents a 
sociological extension of Von Kemedi’s argument that, ‘the location of oil production has 
become a factor engineering envy and disagreement among different groups over that land 
which makes an oil community’ (Kemedi, 2003). Conversely, Osaghae argues that it is the 
environmental degradation that the exploitation of oil brings that depletes fertile lands, leading 
to the reduction of fishing and farming space which instigates inter-community conflict 
(Osaghae et al., 2007). Such scarcity of productive territory leads to poverty in communities 
and subsequently dictates the social status of rich or poor NDCs. An example of a conflict 
enflamed by such scarcity is clash in 2005 between Alesa-eleme and Ogbunabali communities 
in Port Harcourt LGA (Vanguard Newspaper, 2005). Thus, whilst the existing literature 
prioritises the presence of oil in a particular territory as a driver of conflict, this research rather 
emphasises internal and external ties within and between communities as instigating, or 
otherwise, the outbreak of conflict.  
7.3 The Effect of Internal Ties within NDCs on Inter-Community Conflict 
An argument exists that the inter-community conflict is linked with the relative strength of 
internal ties within a NDC. According to Biebelade, cooperation and unity within his 
community, Kere-banga, seen in terms of persuading members of the community to buy 
weapons, encouraged conflict with the Nyowii-Bangha community in 2009 over a disputed 
area of land (Biebelade, April 2014). Others insist that cooperation within a community is a 
necessary factor needed to boost their readiness for an anticipated violent inter-community 
conflict that would bring freedom and prosperity. Ojuwu argues that, ‘if there was no 
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cooperation within my community, it would have been more difficult for us to engage the 
Okere-Itsekiri in the 2003 inter-community conflict that established our freedom; in fact, most 
of us that were far away had to come back home to support [our fellow community members] 
because that is our identity, we do not have any other place to call home’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). 
To buttress this, Tyger states that, ‘we were cooperating, that was why we could wage the war 
against the Kilama community in 2003. When there is no cooperation between us we cannot 
defend our land’ (Tyger, April 2014). This suggests that the level of cooperation within a 
community is a strong motivator of conflict, whereas disunity discourages conflict. However, 
not all respondents subscribe to such view, with some perceiving disunity within a NDC to be 
a major factor instigating conflict. For Laka,  
In Kaani 1 community, there is no cooperation among us. If records could be 
followed, one of the reasons for the war between us and the Luusue-Sogho 
community is factional leadership within us. This has made us unable to agree on 
a peaceful pact with our neighbouring community on how to settle the conflict. In 
my community, some people assume themselves to be among the ruling elites of 
political parties, whilst others seem to belong to a class of non-partisan, radical and 
modern leaders. It is common in my place to hear the phrase, ‘Ameni, Amanameni’. 
Ameni means new class of chiefs, Amanameni means old class of chiefs. So, it is 
a struggle between Ameni and Amanameni. There is no cooperation at all, even 
today. But sometimes people come out to say that there is cooperation in our 
community; if you are not in a class of leadership, you will not know. As I am 
talking to you now, I am a chief, I am just looking for somebody to hand over the 
youth leadership to. I am Meninzuguru, one of Kaani 1. Meninzuguru means chief 
of the youth. So, there is no cooperation among the ruling class. Most leaders 
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mobilise and instigate people against other ruling classes in order to have their ways 
in the community (Laka, April 2014). 
Reciprocally, the opposing community, Luusue-Sogho, is also engaging in the same conflict 
because of discord between its members. Winniman claims that ‘my community cannot 
cooperate, because they believe that the land in contention belongs to one particular family, 
hence no support is supplied by the ruling class. But when the opposite community, Kaani 1, 
attack, they injure anybody from Luusue-Sogho’ (Winniman, April 2014). There is agreement 
on both sides of this conflict that it is internal discord that has instigated inter-community 
conflict.  
The inter-community conflict between Ewoama and Okpoama in 2006, where the latter was 
destroyed by the former over a chieftaincy disagreement, also suggests discord within the 
Ewoama community. According to an interview with Ibaba, 
By history the Ewoama were a little bit subordinated to the Okpoama 
chieftaincies. At one-point Ewoama thought that they should be autonomous and 
have their own chiefs, but there were factions amongst them. One group disagreed 
with the plan, and insisted that the tradition had to be kept. Thus, violent conflict 
erupted. There were people from Ewoama conniving with persons in the 
Okpoama group in a bid to ensure the failure of the former. Ewoama was 
destroyed totally; even today the place is still deserted. This happened close to a 
decade ago. The lack of unity among the Ewoama people, in that some of them 
supported Okpoama, made the conflict inevitable because of betrayal and lack of 
consensus within their members’ (Ibaba, April 2014). 
Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, whilst some NDCs’ leaders and members perceive unity as 
a motivational factor to engage in inter-community conflict, others view disunity as preventing 
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consensus. Conflict can result both from internal unity and internal disunity. The key factor is 
social identity as a means of social demarcation, signifying the shift in sociological boundaries 
that drives inter-community conflict. 
7.4 Social Identity & Identity Distinction: Instigating a Socially-Driven Inter-
Community Conflict 
Asuni argues that communities in Ogoniland have a history of being torn apart by socially-
driven power struggles. She contends that the people in these communities are united by a sense 
of grievance about the exploitation of their region, which they perceive as infringement on their 
social status, hence they go into conflict with MNCs and Nigerian state officials, who they 
consider as appropriators of what rightfully belongs to them, in order to protect their social 
rights (Asuni, 2010). This type of community conflict is linked to what has been described as 
the marginalisation of Nigerian minorities, which invariably connotes inequality. Thus, 
inequality from a community’s perspective undermines its social identity. It is in this regard, 
that scholars like Ukiwo analyse the 1976 inter-community conflict between the NDCs of 
Gbaramatu and Ugborodo over ownership of oil-bearing locations, arguing that intergroup 
inequalities and ethnic marginalisation accounted for the Gbaramatu community fighting for 
its survival in a hostile environment. His analysis of the causality of the conflict is based on the 
view that the Nigerian authorities favoured the Ugborodo community over Gbaramatu NDC 
due to ethnic differences, by placing the headquarters of the MNCs in the former’s territory, 
whereas the drilling and hazardous activities took place in the latter’s territory, leading to 
Gbaramatu instigating conflict with Ugborodo (Ukiwo, 2007). This rationale for conflict 
provides a further layer of motivation beyond the self-determination rationale, explored earlier 
in the chapter. The Gbaramatu community belong to the Ijaw ethnic group whereas the 
Ugborodo NDCs belong to the Itsekiri ethnic group. Ukiwo (2007) claims that it is different 
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ethnicity that impels the conflict, although he fails to explain why NDCs from the same ethnic 
group are also prone to conflict. The quest for social identity, breaking away from a former 
community to gain community autonomy, can trigger inter-community conflict. According to 
Alagoa, ‘within a community, very soon, when the population expands, the different dialect 
spoken by different groups increases; people then move out to settle in a new community, 
identifying as a unique social group and so on, but the next settlement will have to demarcate 
boundaries, so these [new boundaries] lead to inter-community wars’ (Alagoa, March 2014). 
This suggests that the origin of communities is marked by a small number of persons that 
dominate certain areas and multiply thereafter. However, Alagoa’s view is not widely accepted 
amongst community leaders. For Ibaba, a researcher on inter-community conflict in the ND, 
‘communities are formed by ancestors, and so that is one reason for demarcation; from history 
someone settles in a place, he lays claim to the land and then a community begins to evolve, so 
the boundary he claims demarcates his land from the others, and becomes the boundary 
between his and another community’ (Ibaba, March 2014). Thus, whilst Alagoa talks about 
population expansion and how a boundary between two NDCs can cause conflict, Ibaba is 
concerned with how certain ancestral persons start up a community with pre-existing 
boundaries acting as a peaceful demarcation of territory. Boundaries imply differences and 
demarcations between NDCs whether they bring about conflict or peaceful existence. Both 
positions identify a new community acquiring the social identity of a group. 
Such a scenario and the process of gaining social identity is also associated with the protection 
of this identity. Nalaguo emphasises,  
Well, the essence of a distinct identity is because there are different interests to 
protect and these different interests are many; sometimes in terms of small 
communities, they want to protect their ancestral dialect and culture, hence they 
fend for a distinct area within which they practise all these, and sometimes their 
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boundaries are encroached on by other communities, which results in inter-
community conflict (Nalaguo, April 2014). 
This type of social identity distinguishes a community from the ethnic group it belongs to, as 
well as conforming to what is known as a social group attracting special attention and 
recognition from Nigerian government authorities. Accordingly, Hope argues that, 
We all have our identity. Once a people is identified as a community, it tends to 
give some element of attention or recognition, so everybody wants to be identified 
by that light. That is just the truth. If you say you come from the Ijaw ethnic group 
or town, people will understand what you are talking about. But when you say you 
come from the Ijaw community of Ogbe-ijoh or Okerenkoko, for this person to 
have used the word ‘community’, means there is something there that needs special 
attention. That is just the way it is, that it is a social identity; community tends to 
give special identity to a group of persons’ (Hope, April 2014). 
This ‘special attention’ that comes from being recognised as a social group is linked to the 
alleged cause of the inter-community conflict in 2003 between the Okere-Urhobo and Okere-
Itsekiri, when the former struggled to assert social identity (Ojuwu, March 2014; Iniku, April 
2014). Thus, the drive to gain social identity affects a community in ways that urge it to respond 
violently to those perceived as constraining their social ambitions. Such social identity is even 
more conspicuous considering that NDCs are co-exist within the LGA to which they belong. 
In other words, one NDC can be more socially inclined than another within the same LGA. 
Accordingly, some respondents believe that within the Warri South LGA, some communities 
are more developed than others, and that the developed NDCs are more likely to control the 
council’s resources, which they use to treat neighbouring community members as second-class 
citizens (Ojudirere, November 2016). Another respondent claimed that the location of Delta’s 
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administrative capital within the Asaba community in Oshimili South LGA was influenced by 
Maryam Babangida, the wife of former President Ibrahim Babangida, and former member of 
the Asaba community (Ofugara, November 2016). However, the flagrant social climbing of 
certain NDCs is disputed by other respondents such as Nengi and Oyolo who cite the 
effectiveness of constitutional checks and balances to prevent such misuses of power.  
However, the majority perception amongst the respondents is that NDCs exist in reality and 
that some consider themselves socially superior to others. Also, inter-community conflict exists 
and is based on remote, and immediate factors that impel inter-community conflict.  Socially, 
NDCs can be related to a remote factor that gradually impels NDCs towards inter-community 
conflict. Thus, Nengi and Oyolo’s understand social factors that lead to conflict as remote, 
rather than immediate factors. In other words, the issue of social identity exists for a reason, 
which could be a remote or immediate factor instigating inter-community conflict in the ND. 
Social identity is a subtle factor, especially in circumstances where NDCs belong to the same 
LGA requiring co-existence within a space subject to ineffective governance.  
NDCs’ identity is significant when differentiating one from another in the same LGA. This is 
contingent on the view that groups identified with the status of a community stand in a more 
advantageous position to gain prestigious recognition from the LGA than reckoned groups or 
quarters which make up a section of recognised communities, as well as those parts of a 
community with ambitions to become discrete NDCs (Aghe, March 2014; Igiran, April 2014). 
Moreover, some NDCs have a more prominent identity than others ascribing them a higher 
social status (Onobrekpeya, April 2014). As stated earlier, such socially accredited status is 
associated with a community possessing high status individuals. According to Eyakade, a small 
community can be more influential in LGA affairs than a big community if it has wealthy and 
influential members capable of manipulating military and governmental decision-making. He 
cites the case of the Zaki Biam community crisis in Benue state where prominent people 
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belonging to the Jukun communities conspired with the Nigerian military to invade and 




















Certain ethnic groups within the ND are disadvantaged in resource allocation decisions and 
policies (Ukiwo, 2007) both by the government and oil industry alike (Aghalino, 2009a). The 
result of mis-allocating scarce resources based on social injustice and inequity are intergroup 
inequalities and ethnic/tribal marginalisation (Ukiwo, 2007). By synthesising the analyses of 
primary data from ND community leaders, the chapter determines that social inequity between 
inherent autonomous communities, accounts for inter-community conflict, rather than 
ethnic/tribal inequality as argued in the existing scholarly literature. NDCs are more responsive 
to their inherent autonomous nature than to the ethnic group to which they belong. The chapter 
concludes that the marginalisation of one inherent autonomous community by another, based 
on social factors, constitutes a major driver of inter-community conflict. 
This chapter scrutinises the social aspects of the environment in which NDCs exist propelling 
them into inter-community conflict. Failures in the Nigerian justice system and the advantages 
of traditional self-determination to maintain their social status between NDCs motivate them 
to promote, maintain or defend their prestige against one another through means of violent 
conflict rather than believing in the rule of law. Such motivation is augmented by the corrupt 
culture, whereby LGAs neglect their primary duty of effectively administering their constituent 
communities. As a result of this administrative vacuum, NDCs fall back on their inherent 
autonomy, in so doing becoming vulnerable to inter-community tensions and ultimately 
conflict based on perceived social distinctions. As such, the quest for social domination in a 
vulnerable environment becomes a catalyst for violent inter-community conflict in the region. 
NDCs can be categorised into ‘higher and lower status’ communities within a shared territory. 
The mis-governance of such a shared territory precludes some NDCs claiming superiority over 
others. Socially dominant NDCs have wealthy and influential members, stronger internal ties 
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and greater cooperation between their members. Yet, NDCs without strong internal ties and 
where cooperation is absent, nonetheless, are also prone to falling into conflict as a result of 
the absence of consensus between community members. In circumstances where both strong 
and weak social identity can provoke conflict, the enabler of corruption as LGA level is 
particularly harmful. This chapter argues that NDCs are distinct and inherently independent 
entities which strive through violent and other means to socially dominate one another within 
an ineffectively governed LGAs. They seek to do this through dominating the sectors that 
connect them and make them co-exist. Such sectors include the social factors embedded in the 
LGA from which accrues social prestige. However, such domination cannot and does not 
happen without an NDC having strong internal ties invariably based on wealth. The economic 




Chapter 8: Economic Drivers of Community Conflict in the Niger 
Delta 
Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed how social factors can instigate inter-community conflict in the 
ND, scrutinising how evidence from NDC leaders brings into question arguments addressing 
the causes of conflict made in the scholarly literature. It concludes that social inequity between 
inherently autonomous communities transforms social relationships between communities in 
the ND into inter-community conflict. This transformation of peaceful social relations into 
inter-community conflict is facilitated by the notion that NDCs are inherently autonomous. 
This reflects the status of individual NDCs, or the social hierarchy between communities 
seeking social dominance. This dominance is abetted by pervasive corruption in the governance 
of the NGAs (and other layers of the Nigerian polity) and the actions of influential and 
ambitious individuals within socially dominant communities. Thus, the economic dimension 
to inter-community conflict in the ND is linked with the seeking of privilege and wealth of 
NDCs within their LGAs.  
Ikelegbe argues that individuals looking to enrich themselves are responsible for recruiting 
people to ignite inter-community strife in the ND (Ikelegbe, 2006), whilst Osaghae et al. 
contend that elite manipulation is responsible for NDCs engaging in conflict (Osaghae et al., 
2007). However, this chapter disagrees with Ikelegbe and Osaghae, rather proposing that it is 
NDCs’ inherent autonomous nature as a collective force that drives inter-community conflict 
in the ND. It supports this argument by building on gaps in the existing scholarly literature, 
and adds layers of evidence, notably concerning disputes over land resources that subsequently 
cause conflict between NDCs. Such economic issues are a major driver that determines how 
disputes over land resources, for example space for building houses, for farming or for business 
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can lead to conflict between communities in the ND. This chapter investigates how certain 
NDCs adopt a violently competitive relationship with other NDCs more explicable through 
intrinsic autonomy than their modern status as constituents of LGAs and ND states. The chapter 
further explores the main resources over which conflict occurs: mineral and oil resources. The 
chapter concludes by examining how economic factors driving conflict are inextricably linked 
to political influence and the capacity to exercise political power within the Nigerian 
administrative and governance system.  
8.2 Land as a Source of NDC Frustration-Aggression 
From an economic perspective, Ikelegbe argues that unemployment gives rise to poverty 
thereby resulting in grievance amongst residents of affected NDCs leading to a reservoir of 
disaffected youth easily exploited by corrupt business and political elites (Ikelegbe, 2006). This 
type of ruthless behaviour dates to the era of imperialism and the slave trade. Similarly, 
Osaghae associates inter-community conflict in the ND with the inequity in the way in which 
the dividends from oil revenue has been distributed. He argues that this was made possible with 
the help of elite manipulation allowing MNCs to ignore their social responsibility towards 
NDCs. This has resulted in environmental degradation and unemployment, which 
impoverishes the region exacerbating resource competition (Osaghae et al., 2007). These 
economic factors precipitating inter-community conflict in the ND are specifically understood 
by these scholars from the perspective that elites or prominent individuals are principally 
responsible for instigating inter-community conflict. This, however, largely ignores the central 
contention of this study that NDCs are inherent autonomous groups that act collectively in 
defending the course of their community. 
The respondents’ evidence suggests that NDCs contend over land ownership not only as a 
result of potential profit for individuals, but because they are separate and inherently 
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autonomous communities.  Having autonomous control over their own economy is crucial for 
communities’ existence. Variside, the prince of Luusue-Sogho, states that ‘each of the 
communities in Khana LGA have their own economic interests to protect and one of the major 
interests is our land, which is the reason each community has boundaries, and the encroachment 
of our boundaries and land by Kaani 1 in 2013 brought the conflict between us’ (Variside, April 
2014). This proposes that an NDC protects its resources from another NDC, highlighting the 
sense of independence within these communities. Duumaa maintains that his community, 
Babee has its own language and land space, which makes it unacceptable for them to claim 
lands belonging to another NDC, since it is geographically and culturally demarcated (Duumaa, 
April 2014). Ebimo states that ‘communities normally have crises because of land disputes; 
when Evwrheni community crosses their boundary to work in Uweru community’s space in 
2006, they insisted that the land belongs to them, and that they do not want Uweru people to 
cross to that land, which brings to the fore conflict over land, subsequently leading to fighting 
between the two communities’ (Ebimo, April 2014). Boundary encroachment breaches a 
NDC’s inherent autonomous identity leading to inter-community conflict underlining the 
position of this research that a NDC acts collectively in ways that seeks to protect its members’ 
interests.  
Community boundaries and identity are linked with economic growth, towards which land 
resources contribute a significant amount. Ebimo states that ‘the cause of conflict between 
Evwrheni and Uweru communities in 2006, was a result of farmland dispute in the dry season, 
a time that is normally marked for harvesting crops that yield economic benefits’ (Ebimo, April 
2014). Economic disputes of this type also motivate groups within a community to campaign 
for autonomy when they feel economically marginalised. The Okere-Urhobo maintained group 
status within the Okere community until 2003 when, following intra-community conflict 
resulting from a dispute over the poor income that they were receiving from the land they lived 
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on, before they became autonomous. Itemeoki states that, ‘in the beginning there was a land 
dispute in the 1970s and again boundary adjustment and changing from the original Okere 
community which has been in existence to the present communities of Okere-Itsekiri and 
Okere-Urhobo’ (Itemeoki, March 2014). Such demarcation is assessed as a lease of economic 
life for the Okere-Urhobos, who see community identity and autonomy as a means of achieving 
economic growth for the group. It is in this light that a youth leader of the Okere-Urhobo 
community states that ‘authority over land is what makes a community strong and powerful 
which brings wealth and properties’ (Ojuwu, March 2014). 
Whilst scholars such as Ikelegbe and Osaghae are concerned about individuals’ struggles over 
resources accrued from land, respondents such as NDC leaders and residents are concerned 
with how their autonomy and control over land resources can add to their economic growth as 
a group of people with a common identity. Though these contrasting views uphold economic 
factors as being responsible for causing inter-community conflict, the evidence from the 
interviews is not corroborated by evidence from elsewhere. For example, reports from the 
Vanguard newspaper detail the conflict within the Ogborodo community in Warri Southwest 
LGA that have been recurring since 2012 due to a disagreement over the distribution of 
financial benefits such as contracts and bursaries within the community (Vanguard, 2012). This 
periodic conflict indicates, contrary to the positive assessments advanced by local respondents, 
that community autonomy and identity do not automatically economically benefit all members 
of a NDC. Thus, individual interests, and factions seeking a higher share of income than other 
factions within the same NDC, are the elements facilitating intra-community conflict, conflict 
within a community. This arises as a result of acquisitive individuals and/or factions attempting 




It is with this in mind that Zalik suggests that participatory practice and partnership 
development are the result of a wider penetration of individualised regulation. This involves 
the focus on solutions rather than problems, for example, suggesting a move away from the 
legal procedure for claim-making to the offer of compensation to militants within a community 
and the engagement with influential individuals and youths within communities rather than 
operating through communal authority structures (Zalik, 2004). Zalik argues that powerful 
leaders have become wealthy under the pretext of fighting for community members’ rights 
regarding the activities of the MNCs. The MNCs act as accomplices for these individuals, 
dealing directly with them rather than the NDC’s agreed representatives. In these instances, 
MNCs deny all residents a share of the profits from the commercial activities taking place on 
their community’s territory (Emeseh, 2011). Thus, though such individual and factional 
ambitions within a NDC undermine the evidence from the respondents from Okere-Itsekiri and 
Okere-Urhobo that community autonomy and identity automatically economically benefit all 
members, it should be noted that intra-community and inter-community conflicts are separate 
topics.  
According to Igiran, ‘most of the problems that arise between communities are caused by land 
disputes especially in situations where you have oil wells, when MNCs come they tend to create 
clashes between communities…imagine a situation where a company comes and sites an oil 
well on your land and name it with my name, you would be troubled, so most of the disputes 
we have in Niger Delta are caused by oil companies because they create land dispute by wrong 
naming’ (Igiran, April 2014). This reflects how MNCs are instrumental to inter-community 
conflict and is also an extension of Zalik’s view that they contribute to community crisis by 
enriching a few and neglecting most NDC members (Zalik, 2004) who then seek alternative 
ways of meeting their economic demands, and often end up in committing violent acts to 
achieve them. This is exacerbated by the scarcity of land in the region.  
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However, whether NDCs struggle over land resources, see themselves as a collective 
autonomous group with unique identity, or are dissatisfied with the distribution of wealth, what 
is conspicuous is that they are economically motivated to instigate inter-community conflict in 
a way that splits interests between groups or communities. Such economic motivations prompt 
the notion that autonomous groups or inherent autonomous communities, are what drives them 
into inter-community conflict. This contrasts with Ikelegbe and Osaghae’s argument that inter-
community conflicts are primarily instigated by individual ambitions and actions. The evidence 
from the interviews is that conflict between NDCs is caused by a community’s collective 
interests.  Aghara states that ‘communities are basically formed by interests, one community 
may be sited near a river that may be a fishing community, the other community maybe sited 
in open farmland such as Kaani’ (Aghara, April 2014). Thus, as NDC’s interests are different, 
so are their environments. In Nalaguo’s words, ‘one community cannot just go into another 
community and start farming on its land or start hunting there, as a clan, the boundaries are 
clearly spelt out, there are certain activities you can carry out as long as you are a native of that 
clan or you have authority to live and do things there, but there are other things that are 
restricted by boundaries, for instance, going into a neighbouring community to pick up a good 
piece of land for development, is prohibited’ (Nalaguo, April 2014). This shows the disparity 
of NDCs as distinct entities which Olu-Fubara exemplifies, ‘the Southern Ijaw area, have some 
communities such as Olobia and Asiswama that have a history of being torn apart by claims to 
particular portion of land’ (Olu-Fubara, April 2014). Thus, resources accrued from land are 
one factor that divides groups or communities based on economic gains which accelerates 
violent conflicts between them.  
8.3 Mineral Resources a Source of Inter-Community Conflict 
Ikelegbe argues that from an economic perspective, ‘economies of war’ are a major driver of 
conflict between NDCs in the region (Ikelegbe, 2006). From a similar perspective, as explored 
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in chapters 2 and 7, Ukiwo analyses the 1976 inter-community conflict between the NDCs of 
Gbaramatu and Ugborodo over ownership of oil-bearing locations, arguing that intergroup 
inequalities and ethnic marginalisation led to the marginalised Gbaramatu community fighting 
for its survival in an unfriendly marginalised environment (Ukiwo, 2007). His analysis of the 
causality of the conflict is based on the view that the FGN favoured the Ugborodo NDC over 
the Gbaramatu NDC by placing strategic locations and headquarters of MNCs in Ugborodo 
zones, whereas the drilling and hazardous activities took place in mostly Gbaramatu areas. 
Whilst Ikelegbe argues that the interests of oil stakeholders are a factor instigating inter-
community conflict, Ukiwo argues that ethnic marginalisation resulting from unfair 
distribution of oil proceeds is responsible for the marginalisation of one NDC over the other. 
However, this does not address the issue of NDCs’ inability to co-exist in a harmonious, 
peaceful and mutual way even when they are from the same ethnic group within the same LGA 
or why oil and mineral resources have exacerbated conflict in the region 
Two respondents argue that proximate NDCs within the same LGS should be living as a single 
extended family and should not be divided in the way that they are. In Uzobarima words, 
‘communities in the Niger Delta are having problems because of crude oil, which makes us 
argue over oil pipelines, oil wells; outside that, traditionally, we are supposed to be living like 
brothers and sisters’ (Uzobarima, April 2014). In a similar vein, Olu-Fubara states that ‘the 
faulty community is greedy because it is obvious that the place belongs to a different 
community, but because there is an oil flow station there, and them wanting to be a partaker of 
that oil, refused to be sincere enough to come openly to say let us eat together, instead they 
intend to forcefully take over the place’ (Olu-Fubara, April 2014). The phraseology used in 
these two accounts such as ‘brothers and sisters’ and ‘eating together’ imply a sense of 
fraternity and kinship shattered by the desire to profit from oil wealth. Thus, the scrambling for 
oil locations is perceived by NDC leaders as key to inter-community conflict. Nengi states that 
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‘since the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, communities that used to be on the best of terms 
have now started squabbling over oil and gas resources in their area’ (Nengi, April 2014). 
Whilst these respondents perceive the disagreements between NDCs over oil and gas locations’ 
ownership as incidents that shatter a supposed previously mutual and cordial relationship, 
others take the disagreements as events requiring the establishment of new communities. 
Identity becomes the way to gain access to oil wealth. 
Duumaa, from an NGO researching Rivers state NDCs, states that, ‘some communities were 
created because oil that was found in that place, they decided to move there to claim ownership 
of the facilities, which made them have boundary problems with their traditional neighbouring 
communities’ (Duumaa, April 2014). This suggests NDCs’ quest to differentiate themselves is 
embedded in their natural tendency to sustain autonomy and independence from one another. 
An example of this is demonstrated in Bekesu’s statement about how five communities that 
called themselves ‘the Kato’ became detached from their entire clan of Biseni, which originally 
consisted of ten NDCs. This split was a result of the idea that the Kato possessed oil resources, 
which made them identical to the Bisneni, and they therefore demanded their own agreement 
with the MNCs drilling the crude oil. In Bekesu’s words: 
for the ten communities making up the Biseni clan, we have one interest to protect, 
which is to work towards one goal in terms of protecting our language, culture, and 
land from trespassers. In Biseni itself, we have Kato which is made up of five 
communities, and they operate separately from the entire Biseni clan, because that 
is what they have been fighting for from Agip and Shell to have their own 
Memorandum of Understanding with these oil companies operating under the Kato 
communities. They do not want a global system that will cover the entire clan. The 
reason for this is that, if any project will come from these companies, it will be 
sited in their own community and they would be the ones to decide what should be 
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carried out. If it is for the whole clan, it is only the clan head and cabinet that will 
decide how crude oil project will go and it will not favour some communities that 
are less populated. For that reason, we decided to have our own identity by forming 
Kato which gives us a personal MOU with the oil companies so that each 
community will be fully represented and these projects will be there in the 
communities (Bekesu, April 2014). 
This scenario regarding the formation of a new NDC illustrates the importance of having access 
to economic opportunities and defending these opportunities. Therefore, oil money not only 
encourages NDCs to establish their own identity and distinguish themselves with unique 
names, but it also leads to the NDCs viewing the names of oil facilities as something that proves 
a community’s right to financial claims over oil proceeds. Thus, according to Igiran, ‘most of 
the problems that arise between communities are caused by land naming disputes especially in 
situations where you have oil wells which are wrongly named, like the situation where Shell 
named the oil well located at Oluasiri as Soku oil well, and has been the main cause of conflict 
between both communities since the 1950s’ (Igiran, April 2014). Uzobarima states that ‘since 
oil exploitation came to Gokana LGA, money has started coming in, and people have started 
claiming oil lands which brought the 2008 inter-community conflict between K-Dere and B-
Dere, which are neighbours known for peaceful co-existence over the years since they share 
practically same language and culture and are descendants of two brothers, Okegbara and 
Ibarayan, of the same father’ (Uzobarima, April 2014). It can be deduced from the above that 
whilst some NDCs broke mutual friendships because of oil and gas, others sought a complete 
new community identity altogether. Thus, broken friendships and the emergence of a new 
community are rightly perceived as being motivated by the same goal of seeking to secure oil 
and mineral revenues. 
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This view of NDCs as being motivated by their inherently autonomous nature and desire to 
gain access to oil wealth, leading to inter-community conflict, reflects and extends the research 
undertaken by inter-governmental, non-governmental organisations and investigative 
journalism. In 2006, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) concluded that the 
Olomoro and Oleh conflict, and the Okere-Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri conflict, both of which 
occurred in 2003, had been exacerbated by disagreements over land boundaries (UNDP, 2006). 
Likewise, the Social Action Group, a local NGO known for its community activists’ 
programme since the establishment of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, published a report that 
concluded that the inter-community conflict between Luusue-Sogho and Kaani 1 in 2011 
resulted from confusion over the boundary that demarcates both NDCs as separate entities 
(Social Action Group, 2013). The Punch newspaper reported that the intermittent conflict 
between the communities of Nembe-Ogbolomabri and Nembe-Gbasamabri, which has existed 
since the period of colonisation, can be traced back to claims of ownership over the Nembe 
kingdom (Punch Newspaper, 2005). The above reports show that causes of inter-community 
conflict in the ND are closely associated with NDCs attempting to differentiate themselves. 
However, these reports do not explicitly scrutinise why and how NDCs seek to differentiate 
themselves with regard to oil reserves on their territory. Ikelegbe’s ‘economies of war’ 
approach emphasises the role of ambitious individuals whilst Ukiwo argues that ethnic 
marginalisation is a prime instigating factor leading to conflict. This is at odds with the 
evidence presented by some respondents who argue that it is NDCs’ traditional autonomous 
nature that drives them to seek self-determination, which leads to completion, and sometimes 
conflict over oil wealth in the ND. The impact of crude oil money is evident from the statistics, 
oil and gas resources constitute 75% of Nigeria’s national income and over 85% of the ND’s 
income (Wall Street Journal, 2015). It follows from these base figures that NDCs and their 
members are highly reliant on oil-related economic activities in order to obtain employment, 
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contracts, scholarships and other forms of financial security. The absolute primacy of oil as the 
source of financial well-being, or indeed survival, dictates the lengths to which NDCs will go 
to protect access to this source of income.  
8.4 Access to Benefits  
Economists such as Ostby argue that completion over economic advantage lies at the heart of 
conflict between groups. He contends that it is scale of the perception of potential opportunity 
that determines the decision to go to war or to pursue peace (Ostby, 2008). Cederman et al.  
maintains that rebel groups will fight if perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion 
(Cederman et al., 2010). It is in this light that Nafziger maintain that intergroup conflict 
between the elite and the masses, precipitating from the absence of economic opportunities, 
income inequality, pervasive rent-seeking, contributes to emergencies of economic downturn. 
As such, economic downturn brings about relative deprivation, arising from a growing 
discrepancy that fuels intergroup conflict whereby the deprived group weighs between what 
they expect and what they receive (Nafziger, 2002). The contention made by these scholars 
relates to the tipping point that results in rebels choosing to start a civil conflict. However, this 
section will extend this thinking to the motivation of NDCs to enter into inter-community 
conflict.  
Ojuwu states that, ‘access to economic benefits such as job employment in the communities 
that are surrounding Warri South LGA, are denied by the dominant Itsekiris’ NDCs, which do 
not allow participation of any other group, and in turn makes us, the Urhobos, who are the main 
inhabitants of these denied places, become hostile and aggressive towards them’ (Ojuwu, 
March 2014). This is a major factor leading to the inter-community conflict between Okere-
Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri in 2003. Another respondent state that the Okere-Itsekiri community 
were trying to establish ownership of Warri town, an area in the Warri South LGA regarded as 
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the commercial headquarters of the ND-state of Delta, which intermittently results in conflict 
between Okere-Itsekiri and Okere-Urhobo (Okumagba, April 2014). Thus, the denial of 
economic opportunity by one NDC over another prompted Aghara to name economic factor as 
the major driver of communal conflicts in the ND (Aghara, April 2014). The evidence from 
respondents suggests that the denial of economic opportunities by other NDCs is crucial to 
precipitating inter-community conflict, apparently corroborating Cederman et al. However, 
despite this corroboration, the disproportionate advantage enjoyed by NDCs who benefit from 
oil-related revenue also needs to be taken into account.  
The BBC reports that SPDC has agreed to an $84m (£55m) settlement with residents of the 
Bodo community in the ND for two oil spill incidences (BBC News, 2015). Such massive 
compensation stems directly from the oil sector, albeit as a reparation for the despoliation of 
Bodo’s natural environment. Other NDCs that have gained economic opportunities from oil-
related activities include those communities that have a well-educated population readily 
recruited by a MNC located in a community with fewer well-educated residents. This results 
in unrest from host communities against MNCs for employing members from other NDCs. For 
example, the riverine communities, mainly Ijaw and Itsekiri, believe that members of the 
Yoruba NDCs in the western ND have taken the most lucrative jobs offered by MNCs located 
in the Ijaw and Itsekiri’s areas (Guardian Newspaper, 2006). This suggests that the claim made 
by some of the respondents for this study that some NDCs are denied economic opportunities 
is not justified since a proportion of oil benefits are tied to oil spill incidents such as 
compensation for environmental pollution, and other benefits tied to the human resources 
needed for oil production activities. Whilst benefits that accruing from oil spill incidents and 
human resources exist, they are not as salient as the movement of workers from well-educated 
communities to less well-educated communities, which challenges these communities’ self-
image as autonomous and independent.  
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In order to guard territory against encroachment by another NDC, some communities go on the 
offensive. Onobrekpeya makes this point in the context of the Itsekiri communities: 
generally, what brings about crises is the attempt of one community to dominate 
the other, the attempt by one community to lord it over the other. The Itsekiri 
communities are selfish, their belief and their approach to life is all about stealing 
from and dominating others. When other communities sharing LGAs with the 
Itsekiris want to develop at their own pace, the Itsekiri NDCs will say no, you 
cannot develop at your own pace, your development must be dictated by us. That 
is where conflict comes in, that is where the crises is ignited. When you are 
pushed to the wall, even as a lazy man you would make every effort to fight back. 
There is a saying in the Urhobo language, owieleojeketebieoen, which means that, 
the fact that you are weak does not preclude you from preparing for an 
eventuality. At least you must stand to defend yourself before you die. That is the 
ordinary meaning of the Urhobo phrase that I used, owieleojeketebieoen 
(Onobrakpeya, April 2014). 
Onobrakpeya claims that Itsekiri communities always seek to expand their authority over 
neighbouring NDCs in the same LGA which they see as an effective strategy for achieving 
their economic ambitions. Okumagba likewise alleges that the Itsekiris have maintained and 
protected their wealthy lifestyle since the colonial period by continually seeking to dominate 
four strategic administrative positions in the Warri South LGA: the chairman, vice chairman, 
secretary and the speaker at the local government level (Okumagba, April 2014). This shows 
that domination can be a form of economic expansion and consolidation that the dominated 
NDCs perceive as belligerent and as such a reason for conflict. 
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This aggressive strategy is viewed by other respondents as an intentional move to cause inter-
community conflict with the view of using existing wealth to gain further economic expansion. 
According to Onobrekpeya, the Itsekiri NDCs are known for using such a strategy to influence 
the outcome of inter-community conflict between them and communities in the same LGA. He 
claims that, ‘the Itsekiris’ influence and affluence in terms of crises is a great advantage, their 
affluence is wealth and their influence is the connections that they have with federal 
government, and when a particular community have people that are well connected, they will 
always have an edge in any communal conflict’ (Onobrekpeya, April 2014). Okumagba states 
that wealth is usually a factor that leads to domination. He argues that ‘there are some 
communities that are financially stronger than other communities, that have produced more 
prominent people in government, and these persons aids the community they come from, 
through the connection they have with the upper government, and such status determines who 
prevails in a crises’ (Okumagba, April 2014). The term ‘connection’ describes means used to 
achieve targeted goals (Monday, March 2014). NDCs initiating inter-community conflict to 
expand their economic ambitions are those capable of using their ‘connections’, that is wealth 
and influence, in order to sway the outcome of the conflict. 
Those NDCs that do not possess such ‘connections’ are unlikely to go on the offensive, but 
rather adopt a defensive posture. As Onobrekpeya asserts: 
so many factors made the Okere-Itsekiri community attack us in 2003. They had 
the financial resources, they had weaponry, they are well connected, and they know 
those who have influence in society. So, their plan was to disgrace those who know 
nobody, those who have none of these capabilities, and if you do not have capacity 
do you go to a war? Of course not, because that will be a war to annihilate yourself. 
That has been the problem in the Warri area between the Urhobos and Itsekiris. 
The Urhobos do not have the capacity, so they do not initiate war, they do not start 
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any crises. It is those who think they can overrun others that normally engage 
themselves in causing troubles. The Okere-Itsekiris are always advancing to cause 
trouble by pouncing on us the Okere-Urhobo people. We have never initiated any 
crises, because me as the president general and the Agwutuwi of the Okere-Urhobo 
community, is always in the picture about anything that is ongoing. But I can vouch 
and swear that there is no time we initiated the fight (Onobrekpeya, April 2014). 
Similarly, a newspaper reporter who had investigated numerous cases of inter-community 
conflict states that communities that do not have influential residents and that are less 
privileged are always prone to attack by powerful ones (Olu-Fubara, April 2014). Nengi 
additionally argues that less privileged NDCs are those with the smallest populations. NDCs 
with small populations, unable to exert influence over the MNCs, are liable to fight those 
communities that use their larger populations numbers to marginalise them in their shared LGA 
by using their numbers to vote in councilors and chairpersons (Nengi, April 2014). The above 
seems to argue that inter-community conflicts result from assertive NDCs going on the 
offensive to expand economic ambitions resulting in the encroached community reacting 
violently to protect its interests.  
According to Nengi, these economic positions equally reflect political influence and authority. 
For example, a LGA chairman, who is a political head presiding over a juridical NDC, is wields 
political powers that affect his community economically (Nengi, April 2014). This is 
contingent on the notion that the LGA chairman is responsible for allocating resource benefits 
that accrue from the FGN to NDCs (Odje, April 2014). Thus, Nengi states that the minority 
NDCs in the Yenegoa LGA, in the ND-state of Bayelsa, are often denied the chance of 
producing the local government chairman by the communities with a majority population, 
because the minority NDCs do not want to give up the chance of winning government 
positions, as this would negatively impact them in terms of economic advantages (Nengi, April 
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2014). Irrespective of the offensive-defensive dichotomy, the argument from both sides is that 
economic gains are accessible through political authority, and that NDCs sustain political 
interests that consequently set them at loggerheads against one another. Such scenario reflects 
Ostby’s theory of one group dominating the other and Cederman’s argument that intergroup 
conflict results from situations where the benefits of violence outweighs the costs of peace. In 
this light, the offensive NDC seeks to dominate in order to protect and expand its economic 
ambition, whilst the defensive community seeks to violently defend its financial lifeline as long 
as such defence outweighs the costs. Whilst both Ostby and Cederman’s explanations reflect a 
community’s motivations for entering into conflict, it should be emphasised that this study 
conceptualises NDCs as inherently autonomous groups, rather than as the autonomous and 
non-autonomous groups recognized in the existing literature, extending Ostby and Cederman’s 
explanations of causes of intergroup conflict to inter-community conflict.   
Existing research into conflict between NDCs argues that individual economic interests 
facilitate inter-community conflict (Ikelegbe, 2006), with MNCs serving to enrich these 
individuals (Zalik, 2004), thereby avoiding their social responsibilities to the communities in 
which they operate (Osaghae et al., 2007). Secondly, it asserts that oil proceeds necessitate 
ethnic marginalisation which subsequently leads to inter-community conflict (Ukiwo, 2007). 
Thirdly, the existing literature contends that rebel groups will enter into intergroup conflict 
when the perceived the benefits outweighing the costs of conflict (Cederman et al, 2010).  
However, evidence collected from respondents leading and living in these communities 
supports the argument that community collectiveness resulting from these communities’ 
inherent autonomous nature is key to driving inter-community conflict based on community 
economic interests rather than the ambitions of individuals. Secondly, communities populated 
by people from the same ethnicity will enter into conflict over mineral and oil resources due to 
their inherently autonomous nature and their need to protect their own interests, thereby 
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explaining causality of inter-community conflict within an ethnic or ethnic group which ethnic 






















The chapter explores the economic factors that lead to inter-community conflict in the ND by 
critiquing the claims of scholars in the field and research undertaken by the actors in the 
international community that the primary driver of land disputes and ethnic agitation over 
mineral resources in the ND are the ambitions and actions of individuals. Rather, this study 
argues that it is the inherently autonomous nature of NDCs that drives inter-community conflict 
over economic resources. The chapter concludes that the marginalisation of one inherent 
autonomous community by another, based on economic factors, constitutes a major driver of 
inter-community conflict. Thus, each NDC protects its own interests by striving to achieve 
economic gains, reflecting consolidated groups with an identity synonymous to that of rebel 
groups, protecting their own interests at the expense of each another. 
The chapter arrives at this conclusion by exploring NDCs’ inherently autonomous nature, 
which analyses communities as traditionally distinct entities fighting over scarce economic 
resources emanating from a modern and single LGA comprised of co-existent communities. It 
argues that assertive NDCs that exert influence within their respective LGAs adopt offensive 
strategies to economically dominate other communities who necessarily respond defensively 
resulting in inter-community conflict. The next chapter will explore the link between the 





Chapter 9: The Politics of Inter-Community Conflict in the Niger 
Delta 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored how economic factors can be a major factor instigating inter-
community conflict in the ND by emphasising NDCs’ inherently autonomous nature as a driver 
for conflict over economic resources. However, these economic rationales are intrinsically 
linked to the politics of Nigeria, and in particular the politics of the Niger Delta. This chapter 
analyses political manoeuvring as a major factor that ignites inter-community conflict arguing 
that NDCs are inherently autonomous and unified groups that compete, sometimes using 
violence, for positions of authority in government. This contrasts with the argument made by 
Akpan that political motivations for inter-community conflict is driven more by individual than 
community ambition (2010).  
The chapter assesses the motives and economic benefits behind political ambition. The first 
section analyses how NDCs compete over political positions for the wealth that political 
authority brings given weak, corrupt and partial governance within the LGAs in the ND. It then 
analyses this competition alongside militants detached from political offices to understand the 
causes of inter-community conflict from a different political perspective. It assesses how 
NDCs’ members using advantages, in the form of population, political power and the LGA’s 
weak governance, to marginalise opposing communities, to understand causes of inter-
community conflict. Furthermore, it scrutinizes political acrimony at the LGA level and the 
scrambling for traditional positions of paramount rulership, as two distinctive type of politics 




9.2 Local Government Authority 
Akpan argues that NDCs resort to violent conflict amongst themselves to gain political power 
which gives them control over oil rents which in turn enriches prominent personalities within 
a community (Akpan, 2010). The significance of this argument is that individual political 
interest is the primary motive for wrest political power from neighbouring NDCs in order to 
co-opt the economic benefits that accrue from political influence. Although benefits to 
prominent residents could be a reason for communities engaging themselves in violent conflict 
to win political power, this section argues that the political benefits accruing to the community 
are paramount in instigating inter-community conflict. 
The evidence from the interviews conducted for this research affirms that NDC members prefer 
politicians to come from their community rather than from other communities in the belief that 
there will be economic benefits across the community and not just to the individual.  
Accordingly, Ibaba states that ‘political positions in LGAs have always been an issue because 
of ethnic politics, you get more when your brother is in power; at each point in time everybody 
wants his brother to be in office, so, it is usually a fierce struggle to see that your clans man, 
your community man is the local government chairman or even the councillor, as such, this has 
always been a source of conflict’ (Ibaba, April 2014). Similarly, Biebelade states that ‘politics 
always go with interest and you have to protect your interest before the interest of others; when 
someone from Kere-banga becomes the chairman, he or she will always use official power to 
intimidate the Yonwii people, and even the Yonwi people also use that power when they 
become the chairman of the local government council, to also intimidate the Kere-banga 
people, so it is very clear that in times like this, if you have political power, you can also gain 
economic power’ (Biebelade, April 2014). This implies that once a community member 
ascends to a political position, economic benefits readily accrue to his/her NDC. The 
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implication of this is that NDCs without such political positions feel marginalised and this acts 
as a catalyst for inter-community conflict.  
An example of a conflict mainly instigated by political appointments is the 2003 conflict 
between Okere-Urhobo and Okere-Itsekiri. Onobrekpeya describes feeling slighted, ‘for a very 
long time, the Okere-Urhobo and the Okere-Itsekiris were living together as brothers, but for 
political reasons by which the Okere-Itsekiri’s politicians felt they could dominate us, cracks 
started developing between both communities which made the crisis to be purely political’ 
(Onobrekpeya, April 2014). Odje states that ‘political contention is a catalyst for inter-
community strife, political position, wealth creation, oil and gas have been among very many 
issues that propel ethnic and communal conflicts; it is usually the case where one community 
wants to out-will the other in regards to political short-changing that brings about an escalation 
of a crisis; such incidences are always connected with the struggle for councillorship or 
chairmanship or any political positions that connects the involved communities’ (Odje, April 
2014). The issue of political dominance of one NDC by another is also reflected by Bekesu, 
‘everybody wants his community to have political power in terms of future problems and 
trouble, at least you will have somewhere you will go to, you will know there are people you 
can call that will come and deliver your community, for that reason, everybody likes to protect 
its own interest in contesting election or in giving political positions to their own people’ 
(Bekesu, April 2014). This evidence from grassroots leaders indicate that NDCs engage in 
inter-community conflict in order to achieve political benefits for the entire community rather 
than for certain individuals. The evidence further points to communities uniting behind 
community candidates for political posts such councillorships, chairmanships and senatorial 
constituencies. Again, these contests are perceived as raising tensions between NDCs. Variside 
states that ‘the councillorship position in Khana LGA used to have a zoning system concerning 
which community should produce the counsellor for each ward, but when that agreement was 
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breached in the 1990s, it created a war that lasted for over 10 years between Kaani and Sogho 
communities in ward 1, and about five hundred persons were killed, alongside one part of the 
Kaani village being destroyed’ (Variside, April 2014). 
Similarly, Duumaa implies that the ward 3 councillorship constituency of the 
Khana LGA is made up of eleven autonomous communities, ten of which are 
traditional NDCs belonging to the Iluekun ethnic group, whilst the remaining one 
belongs to the Nyonkuru ethnicity. The Iluekun communities have held the 
councillorship position for 20 years until 2008. The Nyonkuru community, which 
is in the minority, then held the same post in 2008 for four years, which made the 
Iluekun people to violently agitate that the Nyonkuru people had occupied the seat 
for too long, subsequently causing conflict amongst the communities (Duumaa, 
April 2014).  
From this evidence, it might be argued that inter-community rivalry to win political posts is 
often the catalysts for conflict. Whilst, community leaders are intuitively liable to support 
candidates from their own NDCs, their insights do indicate that the authority of LGA 
governance in the ND is sufficiently weak to allow for manipulation.  
As analysed previously, NDC reliance on political positions for economic security is a 
symptom of underdeveloped governance structures that is only too vulnerable to political 
manipulation. Nigeria as a country has been plagued by ‘institutionalized corruption’, implying 
that corruption has been officially incorporated into public activities (Aghalino, 2004). The ND 
as a region has been described by Watts as anarchic and ungovernable due to the level of 
community violence (2007). A modern construct that was established during a period of 
institutionalised corruption and community violence, the LGA mode of governance and 
administration is not ‘home-grown’ and alienates the people who live in the region. 
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Unable to control their own politicians, LGA’s have become the crucible for political rivalry 
that often turns to violence as these corrupt politician recruit unemployed youths from their 
communities to back their candidacies and campaigns with menaces (Variside, April 2014). 
This can extend to the hiring of professional mercenaries (Olu-Fubara, April 2014). For 
example, according to Otavie, in the Ekeremo LGA elections in 2011, the Kolokoma 
community, home to an influential political elite, used external militia to inflict terror on the 
Pokoma community, culminating in the Ekermo candidates winning the available 
councillorship positions (Otavie, April 2014). This becomes a vicious circle as politicians 
increasingly rely on hired muscle to win political posts with the LGA, in so doing further 
hollowing out the legitimacy of the LGA.  
Variside contends that during elections, politicians make promises of jobs and financial 
remuneration to young men from their community to co-opt them into joining militia to support 
them during election campaigns (Variside, April 2014). These promises are often not kept. 
Variside argues that ‘the failure to fulfil promises earlier made by politicians to the militia 
youths, makes the militia fall back to their various communities and start criminal activities 
with possessed arms, and even when such crimes are reported to the politicians, they fail to 
carry out disciplinary actions because of the agreement they had while using youth members 
for thuggery’ (Variside, April 2014). This use of favouritism to reward previous militia service 
in lieu of jobs or money ultimately hamstrings both the individual politician and the LGA. It is 
with this in mind that Otavie maintains that ‘the local government has not been able to curtail 
crises because of their biased nature, which makes most of today’s inter-community conflicts 
politicized and the local government chairman tends to favour community leaders that have 
political affiliations with his administration’ (Otavie, April 2014). Thus, the weak local 
governance becomes self-perpetuating with corrupt politicians encouraging inter-community 
violence. A consequence of this enduring weak governance is that communities by necessity 
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emphasise their own autonomy and self-determination. Weak governance and the unfitness of 
LGAs also result in the politicisation of community leaders, kings and chiefs, installed by local 
politicians as proxies. Duumaa contends that, ‘some of these communities’ traditional leaders 
are politically appointed, it is just a nomenclature, the kings are gazette rulers appointed by the 
government’s officials thereby making them politically motivated’ (Duumaa, April 2014). One 
example would be the immediate replacement in 2003 of the Pokoma community leader when 
the Ekeremor LGA chairman took office (Otavie, April 2014).  
9.3 The Politics of Militancy  
In March 2003, violent tensions between the Itsekiri and Ijaw’s communities in the ND states 
of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers were reported to be instigated by militant leaders who had no 
political affiliations with the then government for the sole purpose of fighting over disputed oil 
location territories (Global Securities News, 2007). In a similar vein, militant members of the 
largest paramilitary groups in the region, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 
led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom, both 
of which are primarily made up of the Ijaw ethnic group, were reported to have clashed over 
bunkering routes in the ND state of Rivers. This led to conflict between communities located 
in Port Harcourt and outlying towns. Both the NDPVF and the NDV have smaller militias 
supposedly numbering more than one hundred in diverse locations (Human Rights Watch, 
2005). More recently, it is reported that a group of unidentified militants shot and killed nine 
people on in Obrikom and Obor communities, in the state of Rivers, leading to conflict between 
these NDCs (Reuters, 2015). The activities of these militant groups, leading to conflict between 
communities, are not motivated by competition for local government political posts, and seems 
at odds with the emphasis in the interviews for this study that political completion lies at the 
heart of inter-community conflict. This parallel ‘scramble for power’ between militant groups 
is the result of a different completion for supremacy with different rewards.  
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The tussle for supremacy between militias recognises that people living in the ND are willing 
to use different strategies to achieve their economic ambitions. However, the rivalries between 
militant groups are more detached from the political struggles for power within the LGAs since 
it is the LGAs that, at least ostensibly, are constitutionally empowered to administer the 
communities within the ND.  
Whilst corrupt politicians make money out of their abuse of office, they are also accused of not 
representing the interests of their communities. Variside argues that ‘the people at the helm of 
affairs in the government council play politics of the pocket and not of the people, so when 
there are crises they do not come in to manage it on time’ (Variside, April 2014). Similarly, 
Igiran contends that ‘local government chairmen, councilors, and officials are politicians who 
have a tenure, when they are there they only struggle to get something for themselves, I regret 
to say that Nigerian politicians are a group of greedy people, they are not interested in the good 
of all, they are only interested in the good of themselves’ (Igiran, April 2014). Despite 
Variside’s ‘politics of the pocket’, most communities and their residents prefer an individual 
from their community to succeed in being appointed rather than an individual from another 
NDC, seemingly in the, quite probably misplaced, hope that some benefits might accrue to the 
community as a result of their man’s success. The other dimension to rivalry between would-
be politicians and the abuse of office by politicians when appointed as causes of inter-
community conflict, is the disparity between those NDCs that perceive themselves as favoured 
and those that perceive themselves as marginalised.  
Monday maintains that ‘people in government use population size as a gimmick to allocate 
dividends to their communities’ members…for example any community larger than Effurun-
Otor that has no equal mineral status with us, will benefit more from the LGA if that community 
is having about three wards in the LGA, which automatically gives them more funds and 
benefits than Effurun-Otor that has only one ward’ (Monday, March 2014). Similarly, Duumaa 
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states that ‘a contributing factor to inter-community conflict is politics, because some wards 
such as ward four of Khana LGA contain more than three communities, and during the 
choosing their councillors, who allocate funds to the various communities, they continually 
marginalise the two communities belonging to Iluekun which subsequently causes inter-
community conflict in the area’ (Duumaa, April 2014). This evidence supports the argument 
that smaller NDCs are disfavoured in the inter-relationships that they have with other 
communities, having the financial benefits of their natural resources diverted, as well as less 
populated communities being marginalised by those more populated in the same ward. 
Intuitively, this further example of the ‘politics of the pocket’, the manipulation of funding 
between communities, should instigate inter-community conflict. However, the manoeuvring 
of funds from one community to the other does not seem capable of causing inter-community 
conflict, because NDCs co-exist in the same LGA. In other words, the evidence from the 
respondents laid out above does not provide a persuasive rationale for instigating inter-
community conflict, but rather for NDCs’ negative approach to weak and ineffective LGAs.  
NDC frustration comes from being less favoured in a LGA structure where communities co-
exist. It is also a plea, albeit a violent plea, against the ND’s unfit system of governance that 
allows the exploitation and marginalisation of some communities at the expense of others, 
essentially those communities that are able to exercise influence in the ways discussed in this 
chapter. The ability to employ people is a key benefit exploited by these corrupt politicians. 
This includes finding employment in the local public sector for residents from the NDCs who 
supply the local political class (Laka, April 2014), employment for the political class’ friends 
and family members regardless of whether they are community residents (Duumaa, April 2014) 
and employment for ghost workers whose pay is diverted to the political class (Alagoa, March 
2014). It is within this sclerotic local government political structure that inter-community 
manipulation by corrupt ND politicians needs to be assessed.  
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Political bias in disbursing economic goods should also be placed in the context raising a 
community’s social standing as previously discussed. It is also contingent on this study’s 
position that NDCs are separate and distinct entities who consistently demonstrate inherent 
autonomy and independence from one another. Previous chapters have analysed and explained 
how NDCs co-exist due to their geographical proximity and political affiliations within the 
LGAs, the mechanism constitutionally established to administer local communities.  Inherent 
autonomy is seemingly a product of self-determination that prevents communities perceiving 
themselves as a holistic whole. As analysed earlier in this section, this inherent autonomy leads 
Tombare and Okumagba, instinctively adopting a Realist conceptualisation of international 
relations, to compare the difference between NDCs to the difference between sovereign states 
such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon, emphasising the group identity of NDCs (Tombare, 
April 2014) and the priority to protect the communities’ interests over those of other 
communities (Okumagba, April 2014). Following on, these NDCs can be seen to have separate 
political ambitions and developmental trajectories drawing on an autonomy that has it vestigial 
roots in pre-colonial times. And it is this group identity, autonomy and collectivity that 
primarily prompts offensive and defensive violence between communities rather than actions 
of individuals as argued by Akpan.  
Part of the strategy NDCs use to maintain their group identity is defend their ‘official’ name. 
NDCs supply the electorate for LGAs and LGA chairmen must come from a constituent 
community. This often leads to conflict, ‘where one ethnic group wants to out-manoeuvre the 
other in terms of winning political positions in a LGA, the escalation of conflict is normally 
the outcome’ (Odje, April 2014). In a similar vein, Onobrekpeya states that the causes of inter-
community conflict in the ND ‘are mainly political, such as who is going to oversee shared 
political areas, who will produce the next chairman, who will produce the next house of 
assembly member… who will produce this and that, you know, these are the major reasons that 
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make community go into war and crises against each other’ (Onobrekpeya, April 2014). Bekesu 
adds that, ‘most of the problems that lead to inter-community conflicts in the Niger Delta are 
land and political issues, those are the things that lead to either families or communities going 
into conflict with each other, because they feel that the opposing community is underestimating 
their power, so they must fight for their right’ (Bekesu, April 2014).  
Although NDCs’ group identity can be a strong motive for engaging in inter-community 
conflict, identity comes in different forms and can be attributed to personal reasons than those 
in favour of the community as a group. The concept of group identity plays a central role in the 
inception and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when political factors are also at play 
(Seul, 1999). However, individual identity is considered paramount and the foundation on 
which a group identity is built.  
This rests on the notion that individuals’ psychological efforts to satisfy basic 
human needs are what drive people to form a group. These psychological needs 
contribute to cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and 
other identity-supporting content that answer individuals’ needs for psychological 
stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem and 
self-actualisation. This peculiar desire to obtain human identity thus may partially 
explain why individuals fuel intergroup conflict in order to achieve the shared 
values of members belonging to the same group (Seul, 1999, p.553). 
 The concept of identity competition can be broken into three major parts: a sense of belonging, 
self-esteem and self-actualisation. It is seen as a phenomenon that stirs individuals to form or 
join the groups that give them individual protection against others. Whilst group identity is 
instrumental in causing inter-community conflict, where individuals’ identities or interests are 
not protected within that group, the group’s identity is unlikely to be a motive for such 
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individuals. However, as analysed previously, many individuals trust community identity to 
serve their individual interests, thereby making community identity a crucial instigator in inter-
community conflict over political powers. 
NDCs strive to dominate the LGA as the authority that determines the location of 
developmental projects. Bekesu states that ‘if I, a Biseni man, becomes the Yenagoa local 
government chairman, I will site more projects in my communities than other areas, so it 
becomes a political problem, that makes everybody want to be in that position in order to assist 
his or her own community and in terms of employment they use to employ people from their 
place more than outsiders’ (Bekesu, April 2014). Similarly, Uzobarima contends that 
government officials at the LGA level are biased in terms of favourable decisions: ‘of course 
as a politician once you are in office you must consider where you got more votes from’ 
(Uzobarima, April 2014). An example is the Warri Southwest LGA where the Itsekiri and Ijaw 
communities constantly compete over the LGA’s councillorship, chairmanship and 
headquarters. 
Though this emphasises that communities contend for supremacy over one another at the LGA 
level, which accounts for some of the most acute inter-community conflicts in the ND, there 
are contrasting factors that suggest that contention for political power entails more than that. 
For instance, there is the problem of when and how legitimate membership of a community is 
determined.  The requirements that spells out legitimate membership of an NDC are not clearly 
set out, hence it is difficult to know which NDC an individual belongswhen establishing who 
is eligible to politically represent a community for councillorship or chairmanship election.  
(Igiran, April 2014).  Some individuals contesting councillorship or chairmanship elections can 
have a dual with parents from two different communities.  
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for instance, the immediate past Warri Southwest LGA chairman, Maruwi George 
Okpenkolo, his father was from Okeronkoko, which meant he is an indigene of 
Ijaw soil of the Isonrotu. His mother is from Jaala, Ikpomi and Patele, which also 
makes him an indigene of the Itsekiri soil. He has ruled his first tenure as the 
political chairman of Warri Southwest as a member of the Ijaw soil. Such formula 
had brought peace to the Itsekiri and the Ijaw dominated communities, which is to 
say, if Itsekiri rule one tenure, the Ijaw rule another tenure. However, such formula 
appeared to be undermined, because Maruwa George has ruled his first tenure, as 
the chairman from the Ijaw stock, now, his own maternal people are telling him, 
‘your mother is an indigene of Jaala’ which makes him an indigene of Itsekiri soil. 
Let us assume ourselves as the Itsekiri people who are awaiting their turn, then the 
incumbent takes the position again from his mother’s side. I do not know if you 
understand the point I am trying to make? It is not a bad idea, but not many people 
will accept that (Hope, April 2014). 
Hope claims that contention over who governs a LGA is a major source of conflict among 
NDCs located in the same jurisdiction. There appears to be a blurred line over the membership 
of each community. It is also necessary to point out that although communities take pains to 
clearly delineated themselves from other NDCs membership does not appear to be quite so 
distinct. However, in the context of rivalry over LGA elections, NDC membership disputes 
regarding political positions are rare. Only two out of fifty respondents for this study were 
concerned with NDC membership.  
Indeed, there is disagreement amongst NDC leaders and residents over the way in which rivalry 
for political power influences inter-community conflict. Whilst some respondents considered 
this rivalry to be an instigator for conflict, others perceive LGAs as a force for accord.  
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The introduction of LGAs created an overlap of political interests amongst NDCs in which 
they co-operate to elect councillorships and chairmanships. Nengi states that, ‘in terms of 
political, economic and social phenomena, there is an overlap of interests across the board, and 
that is why they are all grouped under the Yenagoa Local Government Area, which is the 
political space that they share’ (Nengi, April 2014). Barile states that some LGA wards consist 
of up to eight communities, which means that NDCs that are distinct from one another must 
produce one councillorship to represent them at the LGA level, which is often done peacefully. 
He gives an example, ‘like in my ward we have eight communities, so most times we are not 
able to unanimously choose a candidate, so we vote and whoever wins represents us, and when 
this is done, it ends the contention for representation’ (Barile, April 2014). In addition, the 
zoning system referred to by Hope, which failed to resolve inter-community conflict over 
councillorship and chairmanship positions in the Warri Southwest LGA, is being commended 
as encouraging for good relations between NDCs in other LGAs. Barile states that ‘in my ward 
we practice the zoning formula to avoid conflict…when there is this understanding in the 
members of a political party it makes things easier, and conflicts are avoided’ (Barile, April 
2014). This type of successful zoning formula, led to respondents like Barile to perceive 
political parties as monolithic, i.e. a one political party system of government.  Ikelegbe argues 
that ‘elections for political positions do not cause inter-community conflict, because most 
communities are monolithic in terms of political party affiliation, so what occurs in most LGAs 
is political conflict, and not community conflict’ (Ikelegbe, April 2014). Thus, the zoning 
system appears to have been effective in sharing political positions amongst NDCs. 
Whilst Barile and Ikelegbe claim that elections for political positions among NDCs is 
unproblematic and does not lead to inter-community conflict, others agree with this contention, 
but for different reasons. Igiran argues that elections for LGA positions have not been a cause 
for inter-community conflict because such affairs are determined by the parties. He maintains 
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that, ‘if you are in any party and your party wins, you have to accept it that way, communities 
do not interfere, if the community is with the majority party then they may reap one or two 
benefits, so election as an issue has not been a cause for conflict in our area…political 
appointments also come from the parties, and at times of election, whether people vote wrongly 
or rightly, it is the person that wins from a political party that gets there’ (Igiran, April 2014). 
So, for Igiran, NDCs are neutral when it comes to politics at the LGA level. Tamunor also 
claims that ‘we are not fighting because of politics, so anything political, we deal with it 
politically, and we are neutral in electing our local government chairman’ (Tamunor, April 
2014). This seems to suggest that traditional communities have not yet adapted to the modern 
LGA system of local administration. This is the position of Tombare’s, ‘issues of political 
positions happen to be a new thing in the community set up, because that is not the original 
structure of our communities, so most times, they conduct it with lack of zeal’ (Tombare, April 
2014). 
This also reflects Alagoa’s view, ‘you know the local government thing has not been married 
to the traditional system, it is still an alien thing, all the communities still have traditional 
offices like the Amenabo, compound chiefs, titled chiefs and so on, these institutions are still 
existing till date and still very effective’ (Alagoa, March 2014). Complementing this, Tombare 
talks about the lack of political and democratic awareness of NDCs’ members, ‘it is not like 
pride to them, it is just like part of the modern life coming from civilisation, so we just go and 
cast our vote, but if at the end of the day you are not able to mobilize your candidate to win, no 
problem, because they look at it as though the people emerging victorious are well educated 
and more exposed, hence they back out’ (Tombare, April 2014). Others have explained such 
attitudes of showing little concern over political matters on the basis that elections for LGA 




Some respondents who assert that politics are not a cause of inter-community conflict insist 
that a more important factor related to political acrimony is the issue of the paramount ruler. In 
Tombare’s words, ‘various communities under a clan normally have one clan head to govern 
them, and the issue of which community is going to produce that person, usually brings matters 
to a head, because that is where the natural pride of the Ogoni people comes in’ (Tombare, 
April 2014). This indicates that the appointment of a clan head (clan heads being the most 
important leadership role in most NDCs in the eastern ND) can be a matter of contention 
considering that the clan head is normally also the traditional head who in turn confirms the 
rulers of the constituent communities. Since a clan consists of various NDCs, it is not surprising 
that the coronation of its head can be a cause for inter-community conflict. Agreeing, 
Uzobarima maintains that the administration of each NDC is entirely the business of the 
paramount ruler of that community, who is installed by the clan head (Uzobarima, April 2014). 
Hence, this appointment is a major cause of rivalry between and among communities belonging 
to the same clan. Ibaba explains that ‘in the Eastern Niger Delta the compound chiefs are 
subordinate to the community chiefs, the community chiefs are subordinate to the paramount 
rulers, and the paramount rulers are subordinate to the clan head, that has always been the 
pattern and is still in existence’ (Ibaba, March 2014). NDCs contend to produce candidates for 
the traditional position of the clan head, since he wields influence in the appointment of 
paramount rulers, but remain indifferent to political positions at the LGA level. 
There are differing positions taken by respondents to this study regarding the influence of 
politics on inter-community conflcit. One position is that communities fight between 
themselves over the traditional role of clan head. Others argue that communites fight over local 
government psotions such as councilorships and chairmanships. Still others are that 
communities are frustrated by militants embedded in their communities who frequesntly not 
pursued or prosecuted by the local administration, leading to tension and conflcit between 
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communities. Other militants are detached from the local political system, providing security 
in areas where MNCs are operating liaising with local communities and creating inter-





















This chapter argues that political factors are major drivers that instigate inter-community 
conflict in the ND, and are largely based on the economic advantages that derives from political 
office. This triggers a political and economic imbalance that can contribute to the onset of inter-
community conflict. In other words, the idea that each NDC must protect its own economic 
interests by winning political power is a fundamental reason why communities in the ND enter 
into conflict. Thus, NDCs’ engagement in violent inter-community conflict emanating from 
political factors is traced to the notion that NDCs are inherently autonomous units and remain 
detached from the modern life of co-existence under the auspices of LGAs because their 
traditional values contrasts with modern ways of the ND government. 
Following the previous two chapters exploration of social and economic causal factors, this 
chapter investigates how the political underpinning of communities in the ND have led to the 
evolution of an ineffective and corrupt system of local governance that is not fit for purpose.  
Builds on these factors that portray the ND environment as corrupt, in other words lacking 
standard government capabilities, political authority thus means control over economic gains, 
which determines who has a better social status. This rests on the determination that NDCs’ 
traditional inherently autonomous nature contrasts with the modern LGAs, which subdue such 
autonomy and lack credibility for providing satisfactory administration for communities. 
Furthermore, the chapter analyses this porous environment as being favourable to powerful 
NDCs, as it appears that each sees itself as a completely different and distinct entity to the 
other, which presents the situation to be one of protecting one’s community interests in a place 
synonymous to an ungovernable international system. Thus, the underlying factors in each 
NDC protecting its own interests, striving for economic and political gains, are seen to reflect 
consolidated groups with a reckoned identity, protecting their own interests at the expense of 
the other. It is against this backdrop that the following concluding chapter seeks to describe 
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how tradition versus modernity stirs inherent autonomous communities to fight over social, 
economic and political factors, which is sequentially demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
The penultimate three analytical chapters evaluated the evidence and data gathered from a 
cross-section of respondents to this study based in the Niger Delta regarding the causes of 
conflict between their communities. The key finding is that the relationship, or often the 
absence of a relationship between LGAs and NDCs acts as a facilitating factor that drives the 
major factors of NDC’s inherent autonomous nature that manifests in the form of self-
determination to acquire or protect social, economic and political goods that ultimately fuels 
these conflicts. At the heart of this dysfunctional relationship is a dichotomy between the 
‘traditional’ represented by the pre-colonial practices employed by the NDCs in their internal 
administration and their relations with other NDCs and the ‘modern’ represented by the legal, 
constitutional and administrative practices employed by the LGAs. The quality of local 
administration is frequently poor, and corrupt procedures and partial decision-making often 
leave NDCs alienated and forced to resort to self-help, returning to pre-colonial means and 
methods of self-administration. At the same time, the inability of the LGAs to provide social, 
economic and political goods for their citizens brings communities into competition for the 
goods that are available which can lead to disputes. The resort by communities to inherent 
autonomy means that these disputes are often settled using traditional violent means.  
Disputes are settled using traditional violent means since NDCs trust in their inherent 
autonomous self-determination rather than the rule of law as exercised by the FGN. NDCs do 
not rely on the constitutional justice system for resolution of dispute. Though analysis in 
Chapter 7 indicates that the Okere-Urhobo NDC always respected the rule of law by suing the 
Okere-Itsekiri in court before the 2003 inter-community conflict between both NDCs, such 
practice is unpopular due to the alienation and distrust of governmental institutions as explored 
in Chapter 6. Government institutions and practices including the rule of law and LGAs are 
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perceived as not homegrown and detached from the real-life situation of NDCs, hence the 
strong reliance on a community’s inherent autonomy by violently resolving disputes in a form 
of self-determination to protect their social, economic and political ambitions.  
The overarching aim of the study is to determine the causality of inter-community conflict in 
the ND. To achieve this aim, three objectives were formulated: 1) To define and delineate Niger 
Delta Communities; 2) To determine the nature and scope of inter-community conflict; 3) To 
evaluate the social, economic, and political forces shaping inter-community conflict. 
A further three core research questions were devised to assist with testing the analytical 
framework. In a bid to determine causality of inter-community conflict in the ND, the research 
reviewed relevant literature and proposed three sub-questions: 1) what is the definition of 
NDCs? 2) what are the characteristics of inter-community conflict in the ND? 3) do 
communities fight over social, economic and political factors? 
There is agreement in the relevant literature that understanding the causality of inter-
community conflict is increasingly problematic. This thesis contributes to research in the area 
of the causes of conflict in the ND by exploring two under-examined dimensions. Firstly, the 
relevance of tradition versus modernity acts as a relative or facilitating factor regarding how it 
affects the social, economic and political that acts as the major factors that lead to inter-
community conflict. Secondly, the idea of NDCs’ being inherently autonomous in nature. More 
specifically, the thesis focuses on how the notion of NDCs’ traditional autonomy can come 
into tension with ‘modern’ administrative system exemplified by the LGA. A limitation of the 
study, is the researcher’s failure to collect primary data on LGA-NDC relationships from all 
nine ND states. This limits the study on the leadership role of LGAs with regard NDCs to the 
three core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. However, using secondary sources on LGA-
NDC relationship in the other six ND states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and 
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Ondo, comparative analysis of the relationship between LGAs and NDCs in the core ND states 
and those in the other six ND states determines that LGAs in the core ND states lack effective 
administrative capabilities that should ensure peaceful inter-community relations. Though the 
LGA’s weak and inefficient leadership is analysed as a relative or facilitating factor that 
influences the major causative factor i.e. inherent autonomous nature that drives NDCs’ self-
determination over social, economic and, political factors, study of its control over 
communities in the other six ND states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo 
needs further research. 
Chapter 1 presents the background, research problem, aim and objectives, justification, scope, 
and limitations of the study. It summarises the main and sub- research questions, which are 
outlined in Chapter 2 and developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 1 also outlines the plan of the thesis, 
the case study and methodological approaches.  
Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature on community conflict, and analyses existing 
scholarly thinking on the causes of inter-community conflict in the ND. The chapter provides 
a historical context to the current traditional and organisational structure of NDCs and violent 
forms of dispute resolution, showing how the political economy of oil and dissatisfaction with 
the role of the elders brought the youths into the structure of community governance that 
subsequently fuels violence between communities. It concludes that previous studies exploring 
inter-community conflict, whilst based on credible definitions of current and ancient 
communities, have not adequately defined and/or explored the NDCs’ innate nature and 
characteristics that is functional for this study. Furthermore, previous research has failed to 
access the leaders and residents of the communities in the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers that have resorted to violence to settle inter-community disputes. Chapter 3 explains 
how this study has gathered a corpus of evidence and data directly from those involved in the 
community decision-making processes that underpin the relations with the LGA and with other 
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communities that can lead to conflict, particularly in the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and, 
Rivers. It explains the collection of primary data in the core ND states as a limitation in 
methodology and suggests LGAs-NDCs’ relationship in the other six ND states of Abia, Akwa 
Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo as an area for further research. The chapter begins by 
presenting an analytical framework, or working hypothesis, demonstrating how the nature of 
NDCs is inherently autonomous, and how these inherently autonomous entities engage in 
conflict with one another due to the environment in which they find themselves. 
Geographically, politically and legally, this local administrative environment is governed by 
the mechanism constitutionally authorised to govern at a local level in Nigeria, the LGA. The 
study argues that traditional NDCs are inherently autonomous and their political practices stem 
from ancient practices developed before colonisation. It is argued that LGAs, on the other hand, 
are ‘modern’, that is colonial/post-colonial constructs that are alien to the residents of the 
NDCs, untrustworthy in that they are corrupt, partial and inefficient in distributing the few 
welfare goods available to the citizens of the ND. It is this dichotomy between the ‘traditional’ 
and the ‘modern’ that acts as a relative factor facilitating the major causal social, economic and 
political factors of the disputation between NDCs, that lies at the heart of this thesis’ argument.  
Chapter 3 also presents and defends the methodological approach used to achieve the aim and 
objectives of the thesis. A qualitative methodology is employed as the most appropriate 
methodology to achieve the goals of the study. Specifically, the core method used is the semi-
structured interview technique, buttressed by observation and the use of key primary sources. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted in the three ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers, as the most conflict prone states in the ND and, since he is a resident of Delta, the states 
most familiar to the researcher. The field activities in the core ND states, mean that the 
relationship between NDCs and LGAs in the other six sister ND states require further primary 
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research.  Fifty interviews were conducted in the three ND states. The interviews were 
transcribed and analysed by the researcher.  
Chapter 4 investigates the position of NDCs in the wider social, economic and political context 
of the ND, and how this context affects inter-community relations. It explores local government 
in the ND and the parallel traditional ‘system’ and modern constitutional system of LGAs and 
wards. It emphasises that the term ‘wards’ is unfamiliar to ND indigenes, whilst ‘communities’ 
is a more familiar term, albeit understood in diverse and divergent ways. The chapter further 
investigates the differences between the term ‘community’ and other entities such as clans, 
kingdoms, villages, towns, cities, and ethnic or tribal groups that are found in LGAs. It sets out 
the constitutional role of the LGAs, including the limitations of its jurisdiction over resolution 
of conflicts. It also outlines the duties of LGAs to their local indigenes in relation to how NDCs 
interact with one another over social, economic and political affairs in their respective LGAs. 
The chapter connects the response of communities to social, economic and political factors to 
the response of ‘groups’ to the same factors, arguing that communities are examples of groups. 
Furthermore, the chapter focusses on the specificities of the three core ND states – Bayelsa, 
Delta and Rivers - which form the geographical locus of the thesis, mapping a timeline of 
conflict. It sets out that conflict starts either by inter-personal dispute i.e. conflict between 
opposing community members, disagreement between NDCs’ ethnic groups, or a rational 
decision made by a community as an autonomous entity.     
Chapter 5 is the first chapter to explicitly analyse the empirical evidence and data collected 
from the respondents. It focusses on delineating a definition of the concept of the Niger Delta 
Community. It analyses the NDCs’ inherent autonomy arguing that NDCs sustain traditional 
political practices developed prior to colonisation. In this they more closely resemble 
independent sovereign states and/or autonomous groups than parts of a unitary state. Chapter 
6 builds on this by assessing the characteristics of inter-community conflict. It evaluates the 
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relationship between NDCs and LGAs underlining the dichotomy between the traditional and 
the modern. Again, reflecting the international system rather than domestic politics, the study 
finds that NDC leaders perceive themselves as interacting with other NDCs in an effective 
anarchic local government and administrative environment where the writ of the LGA does not 
effectively run. NDCs, alienated by these corrupt, partial and ineffective LGAs, effectively 
withdraw from their orbit, falling back on their own inherent autonomy evidenced by pre-
colonial administrative and government practices including relations with other NDCs.  
A key distinction between this study and previous research into the causality of inter-
community conflict in the ND is the mutability of previous understandings of the nature and 
character of the NDC, which the study explores in a way that addresses the research aim and 
objectives. To address this issue, the thesis focusses on two core elements of NDCs: the 
geographical and the political. The research finds that NDCs can be variously a kinship unit, 
village, town, clan, kingdom or sub-ethnic group, and that these entities represent the 
geographical and political parts of a LGA or clan/kingdom. The research assesses NDCs to be 
clans or kingdoms in cases where a clan or kingdom makes up a geographical and political part 
of an LGA, or geographical and traditional parts of clans/kingdoms in cases where the clan or 
kingdom straddles the boundary of two LGAs. For example, the Effurun-Otor kingdom is 
assessed as an NDC since it forms a geographical and political part of Ughelli South LGA, but 
the Itsekiri kingdom is found to have constituent communities that comprise its geographical 
and political parts, since these communities are in different LGAs. The study, therefore, argues 
that the characteristics of an NDC are conditional, though understood as geographical and 
political parts of LGAs, as well as clans/kingdoms. 
The thesis seeks to differentiate between ancient NDCs and contemporary NDCs. According 
to Alagoa, communities in the ND date back to the pre-colonial period and are described as 
clans and kingdoms with complete political autonomy, which deal with one another as 
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independent entities. Chapter 5 gives a variety of examples of clans and kingdoms from central 
and eastern ND, using testimony from the respondents to demonstrate that NDCs act as 
independent communities. The key distinction that follows from the evidence and data gathered 
from the respondents is that a contemporary NDC can be a kinship unit, village, town, clan, 
kingdom or sub-ethnic group if it represents the geographical and political part of an LGA, or 
a clan/kingdom and is not the same as the type of communities described by Alagoa. Rather, 
this research argues a contemporary NDC is assessed as having the same traditional 
autonomous nature as ancient clans and kingdoms, as described by Alagoa, because these 
communities were already in existence before the advent of modern LGAs. For example, an 
NDC such as the Effurun-Otor kingdom was autonomous prior to the advent of LGAs, and a 
community such as Okere-Urhobo created in 2003, is classified as inherently autonomous, 
since it was an organised group existing within the autonomous Okere community that predates 
the ND’s constitutional local government system and, therefore, would have retained its 
autonomy like other ancient kingdoms if not for the advent of the LGAs. On this basis, 
contemporary NDCs are deemed to be inherently autonomous considering their political and 
constitutional subjugation to the LGAs, therefore demonstrating how the ancient differs from 
the modern. 
This incompatibility between tradition and modernity is a factor that facilitates the social, 
economic and political factors that underpins inter-community conflict in the ND. There is a 
constitutional responsibility for a LGA to effectively administer and govern the people and 
communities that exist within its borders. However, as determined from primary data collected 
from the core ND states of Bayelsa, Delta and, Rivers, LGAs largely fail in this responsibility 
through corruption, partiality and inefficiency. However, evidence from the respondents 
equally indicates that the LGAs as administrative entities do not engender respect from the 
NDCs as they are considered an alien imposition stretching back to arrival of European 
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colonisers and are perceived as untrustworthy whereas the NDCs see themselves as home-
grown and inherently autonomous.  
The coexistence of disunited groups under the same government not only reflects the situation 
of NDCs under LGA governance, but also demonstrates how corruption creates a culture and 
environment where one community marginalises the other, thereby stimulating communities’ 
inherently autonomous nature leading to inter-community disputes that are potentially settled 
using violence. The final three chapters explore the social, economic and political dimensions 
to the conflict, investigating the major causal drivers of community contention in these areas. 
As inherently autonomous entities interacting within an LGA, NDCs seek to maximise their 
access to various resources and to win influence under these three categories. Social factors 
include prestige, social distinction and identity; economic factors include wealth, land and 
water resources; and political factors include political positions of authority and influence 
including LGA councillorships and chairmanships, as well as traditional positions with 
political influence. As a result of the failure of LGAs to efficiently govern their areas, including 
a failure to manage disputes, NDCs fall back on their autonomous nature settling disputes using 
pre-colonial practices as they violently contend over resources and influence. 
In terms of social drivers, the research finds that social inequity between inherently 
autonomous communities accounts for inter-community conflict, rather than ethnic rivalry as 
argued by Ukiwo. Analysis of the respondents’ evidence indicates that community leaders and 
residents are more loyal to the inherent autonomy of their NDC than to the ethnic group to 
which they belong. Communities of the same ethnic group will fight over access to their 
resources, especially mineral resources, reflecting the vestigial autonomy and identity politics 
surviving from pre-colonial times. This community collectiveness is key to instigating inter-
community conflict over social interests, rather than it being instigated by ethnic strife. The 
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evidence from the NDC respondents contradicts much of the existing scholarly thinking that 
argues that ethnicity is key to conflict in the ND.   
Likewise, from an economic perspective, existing literature prioritises the role of the individual 
seeking profits from oil (Ikelegbe, 2006). Whilst, politically, the literature emphasises the role 
of ambitious and unprincipled individuals seeking political authority and influence (Akpan, 
2010). However, analysis of the evidence indicates that, once more, it is the NDC exercising 
self-determination as a result of its inherent autonomous nature that is the fundamental driver 
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Akodi Amos, Chief (The Presiding Chief of Otumara-Jesse community, Ethiope West LGA, 
ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
Alagoa Ebi, Prof (Emeritus Professor of Niger Deltas’ History, University of Port Harcourt, 
ND-state of Rivers) March 2014  
Aghara, Pious Chief Dr. (The Chief Ruler of Kaani 1 Community, Khana LGA ND-state of 
Rivers) April 2014  
Aghe Richards (Youth President Effurun-Otor Community, Ughelli South LGA ND-state of 
Delta) March 2014   
Atutu Richard (Youth President Okunno Community, Ethiope West LGA, ND-state of Delta) 
March 2014  
Bekesu Stanley (Youth Secretary of Kilama community, Yenegoa LGA, Bayelsa) April 2014  
Biebalade Godwin (The Community Development Chairman of Kere-banga Community, 
Khana LGA, ND-state of Rivers) March 2014  
Duumaa Lucky, Chief (Head of Community Development, Academic Associate Peaceworks, 
ND-state of Bayelsa, Delta & Rivers) April 2014  
Eboh Ajaro, (Leader of Civil Defence, Okere-Urohbo Community) November 2016 
Eyakade Bernard, Chief (Vice President General of Effurun-Otor Community, Ughelli South 
LGA, ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
Eyitemi David, Hon. (Public Relations Secretary of Okere Community, Warri South LGA, 
ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
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Ebimo Zaccheus (Police Corporal serving at the Ughelli South LGA ND-state of Delta, Police 
District Station, deployed to quell the inter-community unrest between Uweru v Evwrheni in 
2006) March 2014  
Hope Henry (Community Development Officer, Academic Associates Peaceworks, ND-state 
of Bayelsa, Delta & Rivers) April 2014  
Ibaba Samuel, Dr. (Chief Editor of Niger Delta Research,Yenagoa LGA, ND-state of Bayelsa) 
March 2014  
Igiran Rankin, Chief (the Paramount Ruler of Kilama Community of Yenegoa LGA, NDstate 
of Bayelsa) March 2014  
Ighedu Samuel, Former Secretary of Ugbuagbue Community, Warri South LGA, ND-state of 
Delta) April 2014  
Jeremiah Tyger, Chief (Member Council of Chiefs Akumoni Community, Yenagoa NDstates 
of Bayelsa) April 2014  
Ighoriemuse Monday, Chief (Member of Council of Chiefs Effurun-otor kingdom, Ughelli 
South LGA, ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
Ikelegbe Augustine, Prof. (Principal Lecturer University of Benin, ND-state of Edo) April 2014  
Iniku Augustine, Chief (Compound Chief in Luusue-Sogho community, Khana LGA, NDState 
of Rivers) April 2014  
Laka Des (Youth President of Kaani 1 Community, Khana LGA, ND-state of Rivers) April 
2014  
Mahone Lucky (Youth President of Akumoni Community, Yenagoa LGA ND-state of 
Bayelsa) April 2014  
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Nalaguo Chris (Community Activists & Coordinator of the Niger Delta Peace Secretariat, 
Yenagoa LGA, ND-state of Bayelsa) April 2014  
Nengi Ilagha, Prince (A Journalist and a former Speech writer & Special adviser to the former 
President of Nigeria and Governor of the ND-state of Bayelsa, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan) April 
2014  
Odje Akpor, Dr. Barr (A Human’s Right Advocate Lawyer & Niger Delta Political Activist, 
Warri South LGA, ND-state of Delta) April 2014  
Ojudirere Prince (Secretary to the Okere-Urhobo Community) November 2016 
Ojuwu Okumagba, Prince (The Youth Leader of Okere-Urhobo Community, Warri South 
LGA, ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
Okpeya Jelicho, Elder (The Most Eldest Man and Ruler of Okunno-Jesse Community, Ethiope 
West LGA, ND-state of Delta) March 2014  
Okumagba Bright, Chief (The Secretary of Okere-Urhobo Community, Warri South LGA, ND-
state of Delta) March 2014  
Popo Amos (Former Executive Member of Ogunu Community, Warri South LGA, ND-state 
of Delta) April 2014  
Ofughara Silva Erumijiere, (Chairman, Ekpan Community Development Committee), 
November 2016 
Olu-fubara (News Reporter, Yenagoa Broagcasting Station, Yenagoa LGA, ND-state of 
Bayelsa) March 2014  
Omavonwan Frank, Elder (Uvwie Community) November 2016 
Omonoto Anthony, (Financial Secretary of Okere-Urhobo Community) November 2016 
241 
 
Omoseye Isaac, Elder (Jesse Community) November 2016 
Onobrakpeya Emmanuel, Chief JP (President General of Okere-Urhobo Kingdom, Warri South 
LGA, ND-state of Delta) April 2014   
Otavie Jeremiah (Community Development Officer of Academic Associates Peaceworks, ND-
state of Bayelsa, Delta & Rivers) April 2014  
Oyolo Peter (Deputy Leader of Okunno Community, Ethiope West LGA, ND state of Delta) 
March 2014 
Oyoroko Amos, Chief (President General of Owhor Community, Ughelli South LGA, NDstate 
of Delta) April 2014  
Tamunor Napoleon (Community Trust Chairman of Ayamabele, Yenagoa LGA ND-state of 
Bayelsa) March 2014  
Tombare Nzorka (Youth President of K-Dere Community, Gokana LGA, ND-state of Rivers) 
March 2014  
Uku Godwin (Secretary General, Okere Community, Warri South LGA, ND-state of Delta) 
April 2014  
Uzobarima Prince (Youth President of B-Dere Community, Gokana LGA, ND-state of Rivers) 
April 2014  
Variside Nenebare, Hon. Prince (Youth Secretary of the Luusue-Sogho Community Council 






Appendix II: Interview Questions  
(1) What is a community and what characteristics can you use to describe your community? 
Code: Autonomous Political Unit.  
(2) Tell me the difference between your community and neighbouring communities? Code: 
Different Autonomous Political Units.  
(3) How long has your community existed for and how can you describe its administrative 
structure overtime? Code: Autonomous Political Unit.  
(4) Explain the reasons for two communities going into violent conflict with each other? Code: 
Community protecting its own interests.  
(5) Describe the level of effectiveness of your local government council in overseeing or 
managing the relationship and violent conflict between communities in your local government 
area? Code: Area Ungovernable.  
(6) Describe the level of equality shown by the local government authority to communities in 
your local government area? Code: Ineffective/Area Ungovernable.  
(7) Explain why the people that engaged in the violent conflict between (specific communities 
and the period) did not wait for the state or local government authorities to settle the matter? 
Code: Anarchical Environment.  
(8) Does cooperation within (a) or your community such as unity within family units and 
kinship affects the way that community prosper or excel (as in protecting its own interests) in 
relation to neighbouring communities? Code: Effect of Mobilizing Internal Resources.  
(9)  Do election for (local or state) government’s positions forces communities to fight one 
another with the view that whichever community controls power and ascends sensitive 
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government positions, has the advantage of protecting its community interests over other 
communities? Code: Anarchical Niger Delta System constrains NDCs to react.  
(10) Explain, in terms of violent conflict between communities, why do some communities 
prevail over other communities and describe how communities perceive inter-community 
relations, in terms of one or the other being more powerful or influential in protecting its 






     
 
 
